On the night of August 4 a group of teenagers lured a 37-year-old man to a public park in Plovdiv, Bulgaria's second-largest city, and beat him to death over the course of more than an hour. They filmed the entire attack and uploaded it to social media. The case has since exposed something more disturbing than a single act of teenage cruelty: a direct ideological lineage to a Russian neo-Nazi movement, playing out among ordinary, middle-class Bulgarian schoolchildren. The victim, Georgi Kuzev, was deliberately lured to Youth Hill (Mladezhki Hill) through a fake social media profile. A 17-year-old girl presented herself online as a 15-year-old and arranged to meet him there. When Kuzev arrived, a waiting group of teenagers ambushed him. Prosecutor Anelia Trifonova told reporters the attack was not only a beating but a deliberate act of humiliation: they shaved his eyebrows, burned him with cigarettes, and mocked him as the assault dragged on for over an hour. A district court judge, Petko Minev, later stated plainly that Kuzev had done nothing to provoke the group and that the teenagers "had intent to kill". Bulgarian police confirmed there is no evidence the victim had any predatory intent toward minors. Investigators are also examining whether the attack was motivated by homophobia, following reports that the meeting was arranged through a dating app for men, and that Kuzev's sexual orientation may have factored into why he was targeted. Ten minors between the ages of 14 and 17 were initially detained. Five of them — three boys and two girls — have been formally charged. According to Plovdiv police chief Vasil Kostadinov, the teenagers were consciously imitating so-called "pedophile hunter" groups that stage entrapments online, confront their targets, and administer vigilante punishment instead of contacting authorities. This is not a spontaneous invention. It is a well-documented format pioneered two decades ago in Russia by Maxim Marcinkevich, better known by his nom de guerre "Tesak" ("Hatchet") — one of the most notorious figures in the Russian neo-Nazi scene. Marcinkevich first built the neo-Nazi movement "Format18" (the numbers referencing Adolf Hitler's initials in alphabetical order), then created "Occupy Pedophilia" ("Occupy-Pedofilyay"), which combined vigilante entrapment of alleged predators with explicit neo-Nazi symbolism and propaganda filming. Police confirmed that at least some members of the group "profess a radical right-wing philosophy" and identify with skinhead subculture and neo-Nazism. Evidence exists that some participants hold such views, but that is not the same as proof of formal membership in, or coordination with, any organized group. No investigator has established a direct organizational link between the Plovdiv teenagers and Marcinkevich's network or any Russian entity. What connects them is ideological — a template absorbed through social media, not a chain of command. This all fits a broader, well-documented pattern. Researchers has found Bulgaria has one of the highest shares of youth expressing radical political sentiment — both left and right — anywhere in the EU, a vulnerability specialists link partly to sustained Russian disinformation and influence operations targeting Bulgarian society. What remains unresolved - legally and socially - is how much of this was genuine ideological conviction versus performative cruelty borrowed wholesale from the internet for validation and views. Bulgarian authorities have been explicit that they have not proven the group belongs to any organized neo-Nazi structure. But the fact that ordinary teenagers could absorb a two-decade-old Russian extremist "hunting" format so completely, down to the swastikas and the salutes, and use it to justify killing a man in a public park, is the part of this story Bulgaria is still struggling to explain.

For the first time in decades, Bulgaria will likely be led by a man who entered politics thanks to a campaign organized by Russian intelligence—a campaign that the Russian intelligence services themselves have publicly acknowledged.

Rumen Radev, whose party took the lead in Bulgaria’s elections tonight, has long been linked to the Kremlin in a “controversial manner”. Leonid Reshetnikov is a retired Lieutenant General of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) who headed the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISI) from 2009 to 2017. RISI, formally part of the SVR until 2009 and thereafter under the presidential administration, served as a key instrument of Russian soft power and influence operations across Eastern Europe. After leaving RISI in 2017, Reshetnikov became chairman of the supervisory board of Tsargrad TV, a neo-imperial Russian news channel financed by Kremlin-linked oligarch Konstantin Malofeev. The core of the Radev–Reshetnikov link traces to the 2016 Bulgarian presidential election. According to a U.S. State Department report on Russian disinformation, Reshetnikov directly interfered in that election. His institute commissioned a sociological study conducted between July 1–15, 2016, specifically designed to identify the profile of an ideal pro-Russian BSP presidential candidate - one who would increase support for Russia while eroding support for the US, EU, and NATO. The results of that survey, analysts noted, mapped almost precisely onto Rumen Radev's public profile. Crucially, just two weeks after the study concluded, General Radev resigned as Air Force commander on August 1, 2016 - and within days, BSP and ABV were already promoting him as their presidential candidate. After Radev won the 2016 presidential election, Reshetnikov himself publicly acknowledged that he had discussed Radev's candidacy with BSP leader Kornelia Ninova, effectively confirming Russian intelligence involvement in shaping the nomination. This admission was cited directly in Bulgarian and international media. The U.S. State Department subsequently included the 2016 Bulgarian presidential election in its broader report on the Kremlin's global propaganda and disinformation ecosystem. The Reshetnikov connection deepened in September 2019, when Bulgarian Prosecutor General Sotir Tsatsarov charged Nikolai Malinov - head of the pro-Russian Russophile National Movement - with espionage for Russia, and simultaneously announced that Reshetnikov was banned from entering Bulgaria for 10 years on national security grounds. Investigations revealed that Malinov had controlled accounts receiving funds from RISI and the Double-Headed Eagle Society - organizations linked directly to Reshetnikov and Malofeev. At the time, President Radev responded cautiously, demanding "incontrovertible evidence" and suggesting the prosecution might be a politically motivated domestic maneuver — a reaction that critics interpreted as shielding the network. On the eve of today's election, the Washington Post published an analysis describing Bulgaria as the "Kremlin's next best bet" following Viktor Orbán's defeat in Hungary - framing a potential Radev government as Moscow's most significant remaining lever of influence inside the EU and NATO. Analysts and former diplomats interviewed expressed concern that Russian influence operations, with Reshetnikov's 2016 template as the blueprint, had now produced a political vehicle - Progressive Bulgaria - capable of reaching government.

Update from Sofia: Pro-Russian populist president of Bulgaria, Rumen Radev, has just resigned during an address to the nation. This is an important development not only for Bulgaria and a context is much needed for better understanding why. A story about Russian influence, degraded political system, and a populist who can affect one of the Black Sea EU member-states. 🔽 The resignation is significant because he is stepping down mid-term to run in Bulgaria's upcoming snap parliamentary elections, marking a rare move from ceremonial presidency to active electoral politics during a severe constitutional crisis. Vice President Yotova will serve as president and will be Bulgaria's first female president. Radev's decision to resign and enter politics directly breaks the traditional ceremonial role of Bulgaria's presidency. By stepping down, he can actively campaign and potentially lead his own political project, with expectations that he will announce his formal entry into politics on January 21. This transition allows him to move from symbolic influence to direct political power at a critical moment when Bulgaria requires stable governance. ℹ️ Bulgaria has been without a stable government since December 11, 2025, when Prime Minister Rosen Zhelyazkov's administration resigned under pressure from massive protests against the 2026 budget and endemic corruption. All three major political parties subsequently refused Radev's constitutional mandate to form a new government, triggering snap elections. This represents yet another cycle of political instability in a country that has experienced multiple failed governments in recent years. Radev's pro-Russian populism is a critical dimension of his resignation's significance. He has consistently opposed military aid to Ukraine and Western sanctions against Russia following the 2022 invasion. He boycotted the July 2024 NATO summit, refusing to support Bulgaria's commitments regarding Ukraine, which critics called "confirmation that Radev's positions serve foreign, not national interests" and reflect "dependencies and ties in the East". He has attacked pro-Ukraine governments as "parties of war" and accused them of wanting to "burn Bulgaria in the fires of war," leading coalition partners to call for his impeachment. Radev originally won the presidency in 2016 on a pro-Russian platform backed by the Bulgarian Socialist Party, explicitly supporting relaxation of sanctions after Russia's Crimea annexation. His resignation to enter active politics now means he could lead or influence a populist, Russia-aligned electoral bloc at a moment when Bulgaria faces snap elections and needs stable governance to meet EU commitments. This raises concerns about Bulgaria's continued alignment with NATO and EU security policy toward Russia's war in Ukraine. ℹ️🇷🇺 Leonid Reshetnikov, a retired Lieutenant General from Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), played a direct role in orchestrating Radev's 2016 presidential victory as part of a broader Kremlin strategy to reorient Bulgaria away from NATO and the EU. ​ Reshetnikov headed the Analysis & Information department of the SVR before retiring in 2009, then directed the influential Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISS) from 2009 to 2017. RISS, which was part of Russia's foreign intelligence service until 2009 and later attached to the presidential administration, conducted a survey identifying the ideal Bulgarian presidential candidate profile that precisely matched Radev: a man under 60, successful, uncorrupted, non-intellectual, advocating for greater sovereignty within the EU and NATO. Reshetnikov met with Bulgarian Socialist Party leader Korneliya Ninova to discuss backing Radev's candidacy weeks before he was officially nominated. A U.S. State Department report on Russian disinformation explicitly documented that Reshetnikov "interfered in Bulgaria's 2016 presidential elections". RISS funded strategic political reports in 2016 that allegedly contributed to Radev's election, with Bulgarian sociologists questioned by authorities about these Reshetnikov-financed analyses. In 2019, Bulgarian prosecutors banned Reshetnikov from entering the country for 10 years after establishing that he coordinated Russian espionage operations aimed at reorienting Bulgaria toward the Kremlin's orbit. Evidence showed he funded the Russophile National Movement through organizations including RISS and the Double-Headed Eagle, transferring money for activities directly affecting Bulgaria's national security and foreign policy. During a 2025 trial at London's Central Criminal Court, prosecutors revealed that spy ring members Biser Dzhambazov, Katrin Ivanova, and Vanya Gaberova "helped in the 2021 elections when President Rumen Radev was elected". In text messages presented as evidence, Dzhambazov told his handler Orlin Roussev that he had a "very strong relationship" with Radev. The Bulgarian group operated from 2020 to 2023, conducting surveillance on Russian dissidents and critics across Europe for Russian intelligence services, coordinated through fugitive Jan Marsalek, the former Wirecard executive. Their operations included using IMSI catchers to intercept communications at Ukrainian military training sites in Germany, surveillance of investigative journalists like Christo Grozev and Roman Dobrokhotov, and discussing kidnapping or killing targets for fees up to £700,000. 🤔 Meanwhile, political scientists and commentators associated with Radev claim that if Radev becomes party leader, he will be pro-European. Interesting times are coming for the political life in Sofia.