Looposhi retweeted
Massive retreat of the #Corvatsch Glacier over the past 57 years. Hard to imagine that summer skiing once took place here for around 30 years. Today, only a small remnant of ice remains.
Looposhi retweeted
$1,000 invested 15 years ago today would be worth:
• Bitcoin: $8,970,000
• Nvidia: $735,000
• Tesla: $231,000
• Apple: $29,000
• S&P: $8,400
• Gold: $2,150
Looposhi retweeted
Independent researchers have published a technical analysis of the USD1 smart contract.
#USD1 solana:USD1ttGY1N17NEEHLmELoaybftRBUSErhqYiQzvEmuB @worldlibertyfi #WLFI
Everyone holding or considering USD1 should read it carefully.
To put it in the bluntest terms, per their findings:
USD1's highest-level permissions allow the issuer to move USD1 out of YOUR account into its own wallet — or anyone else's — without your consent. Cold wallet? Multisig? Doesn't matter. The authority operates at the token contract level. Nothing you do can stop it.
Let that sink in:
this is a "stablecoin" whose issuer holds the technical power to reach into any holder's wallet and take the funds.
And there's a second finding that, frankly, is even more disturbing.
Per the researchers' analysis, the USD1 source code published on World Liberty's official GitHub does NOT match the code actually deployed on-chain.
The published version contains no "drain" or "reallocate" functions. The deployed version — after an April 2026 upgrade — contains both.
Anyone in crypto knows exactly what that pattern is. Showing auditors and users a clean codebase while running different code on-chain is the signature technique of rug pulls.
It sits at the top of every blockchain security firm's fraud-detection checklist — because there is no innocent reason to publish one contract and deploy another. Its only function is to defeat scrutiny.
A company that is currently seeking a U.S. national trust bank charter is using a playbook straight out of the exit-scam manual.
And as I allege in my Complaint, this is not the first time. The same pattern — backdoor functions added after the fact, contrary to public representations — is exactly what happened with the $WLFI token itself. First $WLFI. Now USD1. Once is a design choice. Twice is a pattern.
Don't take my word for it. Don't take theirs. The contracts are on-chain — verify every claim yourself. That's what blockchains are for.
USD1、USDT、USDC 三个稳定币的中心化程度对比 — USDC 能冻，USDT 能销毁，USD1 能将直接转走
今天早晨阅读了 Justin 的这篇推文，我对于他们的官司兴趣不大，但是 Justin 文章里有一句话确实引发了我的兴趣，说的是 solana:USD1ttGY1N17NEEHLmELoaybftRBUSErhqYiQzvEmuB 可能会有后门。
其实如果是指冻结资产的话，不仅仅是 USD1 有这个功能，其它 USDT 和 USDC 也都有，虽然不够去中心化，但这对黑森林频繁的币圈也算是好事。
所以我很有兴趣就做了一个对比，把 USD1、USDT 和 USDC 的智能合约放在一起比较了一下，三个稳定币发行方可以对用户资产做到的“风控”程度到底到什么地步。
1. USDC 的权限相对最克制。
Circle 可以把某个地址加入黑名单，一旦被加入黑名单，这个地址基本就不能再发送和接收 USDC，同时 Circle 还可以暂停整个 USDC 合约。
但目前的 USDC 合约没有提供一个管理员函数，可以直接把某个黑名单地址里的 USDC 转走，也没有 USDT 那种可以直接销毁黑名单地址全部余额的 destroyBlackFunds。
不过 USDC 本身是可升级合约，Circle 控制 Proxy Admin，可以更换新的合约实现，所以这里说的只是当前版本能够做什么，并不代表 Circle 永远没有增加这些权限的能力。
2. USDT 的权限更进一步。
Tether 除了可以通过 addBlackList 冻结任何 USDT 地址以外，还有一个非常直接的 destroyBlackFunds。
一个地址被加入黑名单以后，Tether 可以调用这个函数，直接把该地址的 USDT 余额归零，同时从 USDT 的总供应量中扣除。
所以即使 1,000 万 USDT 放在自己的冷钱包里，私钥也一直只有自己知道，只要 Tether 把这个地址拉进黑名单，链上的 USDT 仍然可以被冻结，随后甚至可以被销毁。
3. USD1 的权限又有一点不同。
USD1 同样拥有冻结、解冻、暂停、增发和销毁等管理员权限，但现在运行的 V2 合约里还有两个非常敏感的功能：drain ，reallocate 和 drain 可以在一个地址被冻结以后，把这个地址里的全部 USD1 转到管理员控制的地址。
reallocate 可以把被冻结地址里的 USD1 直接重新分配到另一个地址。
所以如果一个钱包有 1,000 万 USD1，管理员拥有的权限并没有停留在让这 1,000 万暂时不能动。而是在满足合约权限条件以后，还可以把这 1,000 万 USD1 直接从原来的钱包转走，或者重新分配给其他地址。
三个放在一起看，大概就是：
USDC：冻结
USDT：冻结 + 销毁
USD1：冻结 + 转走 + 重新分配
当然，这三个都是中心化稳定币，USDT 和 USDC 从来没有承诺过抗审查，所以 USD1 拥有管理员权限本身没有什么特殊。
USD1 比较特殊的地方在于它对已经冻结的用户余额提供了非常完整的后续处置功能。管理员不需要用户签名，也不需要获得用户私钥，就可以在智能合约层面改变这笔 USD1 最终归属。
说句最难听的，就是 USD1 的最高权限是可以在不经过用户许可的前提下，把账户中的 USD1 转移到自己或者其它人的钱包中，你是冷钱包还是多签钱包都没有办法阻止。
至于 Justin 说的“后门”，我觉得需要区分一下。
如果后门指的是开发者偷偷藏了一段没人知道的恶意代码，目前并没有证据证明 USD1 存在这种后门。freeze、drain 和 reallocate 都可以从公开合约里看到。
但如果大家说的后门是，钱明明放在自己的链上钱包里，私钥也只有自己掌握，发行方仍然保留一套特殊管理员权限，可以冻结甚至重新分配这些资产。那 USD1 确实存在这样的机制。
当然这么说不代表 USD1 就会无故的转移用户资产，也不代表 USD1 故意隐瞒，毕竟代码就是合约当中，算是一种虽然没有仔细说明，但确实存在的“调款”。
而且在我调差的时候发现了一个更加关键的问题，就是：
World Liberty 官方 GitHub 展示的 USD1 源码，并不是当前线上 USD1 实际执行的代码。
World Liberty 官方 GitHub 目前公开的 USD1 源码没有 drain 和 reallocate，但实际运行的 USD1 在 2026 年 4 月升级以后的 StablecoinV2 已经可以对冻结余额执行 drain 和 reallocate，已经拥有这两项权限。所以如果有小伙伴只看官方 GitHub，就会低估 USD1 当前的中心化控制权限。
@Gate Crypto、美股、港股、韩股、黄金、CFD、预测市场一站交易
Looposhi retweeted
Since no one was keen on answering this question, I've took it upon myself to build a PUBLIC Dune query which uses FOMO's fee router in order to calculate the total profitability of all active FOMO traders (SOL) in the past 90 days.
The numbers:
> Out of the 292,531 wallets traded through FOMO in the last 90 days, 18,033 of them are in profit.
> Only 6.16% of ALL traders in the last 3 months were profitable.
The median trader is down ~$120. As a group they are down $1.26 BILLION. Of the 6% who are green, 88% made under $100. Only 25 out of 292,531 wallets made more than $10K
Query is public and linked below:
dune.com/queries/8354772
For reference, a "wagering platform" such as Rainbet with a 1% house edge sits at ~37% user profitability over the same time span.
Looposhi retweeted
While markets have gone quiet, $BTC whales added roughly 190,000 coins, to 3.06M.
This has appeared near range bottoms before, though the strongest cases came at a realised-price test near $52,850, which price has stayed above.
Still watching the tape before calling a bottom.
Looposhi retweeted
Chainalysis casually dropping a geo-attribution heat map of drained Coldcard wallets is pure nightmare fuel.
You buy a Coldcard thinking you’re finally off the grid.
Meanwhile, surveillance firms are mapping your raw UTXOs straight to physical borders.
Pseudonymity on a transparent ledger doesn’t hide you -- it just doxxes your coordinates to analytics companies. Your entire financial history is geo-tagged by default. Public blockchains are global surveillance graphs waiting to be unzipped.
People keep asking “how the fuck do they know the country?” It’s not magic. It’s the nature of public chains + the infrastructure they deliberately built:
- Fiat on/off-ramp labeling (the main source)
KYC exchanges, local CEX deposit addresses, and fiat trading-pair linkages.
- Network-layer IP monitoring
Massive fleets of Sybil/direct-connection nodes on the Bitcoin P2P network → broadcast-origin capture + GeoIP mapping.
- UTXO clustering & historical contamination
Multi-input spends, change-address heuristics, and co-spending patterns that permanently taint addresses.
- Off-chain data collisions (OSINT)
Localized payments, merchant data, and public leaks that cross-match on-chain activity.
Stack these together with offline big-data matching and any Bitcoin address becomes a geo-tagged row in their database -- often with far more precision than most people realize.
The Coldcard hack is especially damaging to Canadian bitcoiners. Our analysis of attackers and victims finds that BTC holders in Canada are bearing 25% of attributable losses.
With estimates ranging as high as $110M, according to Galaxy Research’s dataset, we analyzed the geographic distribution of the ongoing hack.
Australia, the United States, and Thailand are also seeing major losses.
Looposhi retweeted
store 0.001 Bitcoin in 1000 hardware wallets of various brands, carried by 1000 mules in their ass in 1000 remote villages
Looposhi retweeted
If you defend yourself from an armed settler attack, you are not a terrorist. Actually, you are an honorable man who fulfilled your duty of defending your family.
No matter what the Israeli propagandists say, this is the cornerstone of civilization
