8mint🌱

3/ Should the users use the private sector, or rely solely on the law enforcement? That raised the following thoughts among us: 1. We asked ourselves what actually happens after a regular user files a police report for a crypto scam. How many of these reports turn into a real investigation? 2. We questioned whether users would (and should) trust private recovery firms - or does the industry's "pay upfront, no guarantees" reputation keep people away from the entire sector? And should users judge the whole private sector based on their experience with just one company? 3. If law enforcement has limited crypto capacity, but private firms charge fees proportional to what's at risk - we wondered which failure users would prefer to live with. 4. We also discussed whether exchanges and stablecoin issuers freeze funds fast enough when victims report directly - or only when law enforcement formally asks them to. And should they consider private sector reports and temporarily freeze funds (for a couple of days) to give enough time to structure the legal aspects of a permanent freeze? 5. And for those who tried both paths - who actually moved the needle for them: the police report or the private effort? 6. Should CASPs/VASPs (CEXs, protocols, stablecoin issuers) have a light onboarding procedure for private sector investigators - one that at least allows them to report signals leading to a temporary asset freeze?

2/ What is needed to increase the success rate of asset recovery procedures? That raised the following thoughts among us: 1. We kept asking ourselves how many hours usually pass between the moment users realize they were scammed and the moment they actually report it. And whether acting faster would have changed the outcome at all. 2. We wondered how many users actually know where their funds went - if the funds moved to an exchange within minutes, do they even know which exchange, or how to reach its support team before the funds get withdrawn to fiat? 3. We were unsure whether regular users know which evidence matters for tracing (tx hashes, timestamps, chat logs, wallet addresses) - or do they learn it only after they've already been scammed? 4. We also discussed how much users end up paying in fees, "recovery agents" and services compared to what is actually recovered - and whether the recovery sometimes costs more than the loss itself. What is a reasonable price for this, and when should it be charged, considering both the victim's and the service provider's perspectives? 5. And whether the average user even knows what a realistic recovery scenario looks like - versus what the "we recover everything" ads promise.

1/ Today there was a very deep conversation within our team. The topic was "Asset recovery" for regular users, and especially the success rate. The conversation ran into two topics: 1. What is needed to increase the success rate of asset recovery procedures? 2. Should the users use the private sector, or rely solely on the law enforcement? The breakdown is below 👇

All Bitcoin addresses mentioned by the FBI were also publicly shared by Noxos Intelligence shortly after the Binance incident. We haven’t publicly launched yet, but having our findings align with those of one of the world’s leading investigative agencies is an important benchmark for us. teapawt.org/NoxosIntel/status/2115…

1/ Did we just crack Tornado Cash? Several weeks ago we shared that Noxos Intelligence started developing a new algorithm targeting funds routed through one of the most famous crypto mixers - Tornado Cash. The results so far? 👇

@binance was hacked, with losses estimated at ~$5.5B. The final figure is still being confirmed. Thanks to @tether and @circle, ~$2.2B in USDT and USDC has already been frozen. The rest of the stolen funds are on Bitcoin, Tron, and several EVM chains: Ethereum, Arbitrum, Base, and Optimism. The attacker is actively moving the funds and splitting them across multiple wallets. Noxos Intelligence is monitoring the flow. This is what the Bitcoin side looks like so far:

1/ CERBERUS, our monitoring engine, alerted us that the attacker behind the @x100global exploit has begun laundering funds through Tornado Cash. The following addresses made deposits: 0x8296721489d0a7e934edd66ea27159b1c88a42e5 ↳ 420.8 #ETH across multiple deposits of 0.1 and 10 ETH. 0xF637DCeE7Dd96E8FDaB926C5993D558B52D635ea ↳ 400.4 #ETH across multiple deposits of 0.1 and 100 ETH.

An hour ago, @x100global was exploited for ~$4.75M in #USDT on Ethereum. Our initial tracing shows the stolen funds were swapped to ~2,022 #ETH via Uniswap and are now split across 5 addresses: 0x8296721489d0a7e934edd66ea27159b1c88a42e5: 422 ETH 0xf637dcee7dd96e8fdab926c5993d558b52d635ea: 400 ETH 0x64b135af3d80733c9c290d58873e2cccb34a81ae: 400 ETH 0x4fdb9f9a44b356c8a9c2ea060a40fb7a9caabef3: 400 ETH 0x6790cf09ba33d05ada2c13cbb4104f5b8b666391: 400 ETH We’re monitoring these addresses and will post updates.

An attacker exploited the Newmont (NEM) token contract on BNB Smart Chain and drained ~$726K in #USDT. Attacker: 0xFd929B0F270DFeA6C4827262b4E2bF6Ea50FE9b6 Fund flow (traced by HYDRA): 1. Stolen USDT bridged from BNB Smart Chain to Ethereum via Relay. 2. USDT swapped for 296 #ETH on CoW Swap across 3 transactions. Current status: The funds are still held at the attacker’s address: etherscan.io/address/0xfd929… We’re monitoring the address and will post updates if the funds move.

1/ For the past 3 weeks we’ve been upgrading our systems based on what we learned in the last testing period. The latest changes to the HYDRA automated tracing engine are showing impressive results. Here’s a real-world test case 🧵

3/ From there, the funds split into two branches. Branch 1: $718.7K in #USDC went straight to HitBTC, through deposit address: BfP2dBiHbiqYvsmESsgHEL8wQtZt25sbDNKnwmNRB34G

1/ HYDRA, the tracing engine behind Noxos Intelligence, has finished its 2-month testing phase. Our in-house team and a group of volunteer private investigators ran 240+ multi-chain traces through it. Here's what comes next 👇

You're paying out selectively and still collecting deposits. From Aug 29 to Sep 8, all 148 stablecoin payouts from BitMart 16 were under $100. On Sep 18 it sent $106K to 17 addresses in under three minutes. Hours later you swept deposits sent after your July 26 suspension. On-chain, Aug 29 to Sep 28: - BitMart 16 made 169 stablecoin payouts (~$119K) and has sent nothing since Sep 18. It still holds ~277 ETH and ~$131K in stablecoins. - A BitMart-attributed Solana hot wallet paid 36,030 USDC to four Binance deposit addresses on Sep 23. It still holds 222K USDC and 2,894 SOL. - You suspended deposits on July 26: bitmart.com/en-US/support/ar… On Sep 18 you still swept at least $19K in deposits made between Aug 22 and Sep 15 into your hot wallets. Example, 4,000 USDT deposited Aug 29: etherscan.io/tx/0xd554dd7613… On May 23 you said you'd publish proof of reserves: bitmart.zendesk.com/hc/en-us… You still haven't. On Sep 9 you said you'd update users on the action plan within three weeks: bitmart.com/en-US/support/ar… That's Sep 30. The update needs to answer: 1. What qualified users for the Sep 18 and Sep 23 batches: amount, VIP status, request date? Why was every payout from Aug 29 to Sep 8 under $100? Where is everyone else in the queue? 2. Were the post-suspension deposits you swept credited to their senders? If not, when will they be returned? 3. Your User Agreement (§2.7.1) says assets in customers' wallets are not BitMart's property, cannot be lent out, and are not subject to creditors' claims: bitmart.com/en-US/support/ar… Are they all still there, 1:1? If yes, why does your Aug 21 update talk about distributions to creditors? bitmart.com/en-US/support/ar… 4. On what date will you publish assets and liabilities by asset, with a Merkle tree users can check their own balances against? 5. Since July 1, has any insider, affiliate, VIP account, market maker or listed project withdrawn while other users waited? Yes or no, and how much? 6. Who is the independent custody overseer, and on what date does it take control of keys and withdrawal approvals? 7. Will users face any haircut, forced conversion or lock-up? What is the date of the first distribution?

7/ We'd like to hear from law enforcement or anyone in a legal role who can check this case and act on it. This is not a one-off. A few weeks ago one of our own team got a call from "Binance Support." They said his funds were at risk because of new EU rules (MiCA) and he had to move them to a "safe wallet." The wallet was a Trust Wallet browser extension with a seed phrase the scammers had made themselves — and sent to him by email. These scammers are getting bolder. They belong in jail, but that takes government agencies around the world working together. If you're reading this, please share it. The more people who see it, the better the chance it reaches someone who can act.

1/ A user contacted us claiming his Ledger wallet had been hacked. A short conversation made it clear the hardware wallet was never compromised. He was social-engineered: a phishing message told him his funds were "at risk" and walked him into transferring them. The pattern points to an organized group. Law enforcement should look at this one. Details 👇

1/ Following up on our previous thread — here's the trace for the Aug 10 attack, ~$870K+ drained. Attacker address: 0x5172F58981ddD5230F4650e8809A83263A5F2c0e Ethereum again as the starting chain. The full investigation is ongoing; we'll publish the rest once it's finalized. This thread covers the #Ethereum branch only. Breakdown👇

1/ Two wallet-drain campaigns across multiple EVM chains were reported this month. Aug 25 — ~$500K+ drained Attacker address: 0x861EbCC056e0645cF7BA7F5BB528faE9fbA8BA55 Aug 10 — separate incident, ~$870K+ drained Attacker address: 0x5172F58981ddD5230F4650e8809A83263A5F2c0e Different addresses. Whether it's the same actor behind both is still open. Both drains span several EVM chains — we're starting the Aug 25 trace from Ethereum and following the funds out from there. Breakdown 👇

1/ On August 23, @term_labs (Term Finance) was exploited for ~$8.5M on Ethereum. We ran the incident through our HYDRA engine — and for the first time, we're publishing results from both tracing modes: Forward tracing — point at a source address, HYDRA follows the funds to their final destination. Backward tracing — select any address, HYDRA reconstructs the path funds took before arriving. Attacker wallet 1: 0xa908b3472d76e7744baB0A5911768a4a6300612B Sent the stolen 2800 #ETH to the consolidation address: 0xD5183d8BfC65a50863C62aF2538198A8288FFc13 Attacker wallet 2: 0x686457a7468B9B31c5dbA43b1b16077B48520691 Swapped the stolen ~1.7M #USDC to #DAI and moved it to the same consolidation address. From there, the attacker began depositing into Tornado Cash.

On August 19, @Allbridge_io was exploited for $189,751 The attacker (0x2419432344b0B892E592b2601B98eaE702Ba360e) swapped the stolen #USDC into #ETH — putting it out of reach of Circle's freeze function — then bridged from #Base to #Ethereum and forwarded the balance to 0x1fb4cf26ce82ad4dcd8f055a4092c625cebbdb85. The funds are still sitting there, untouched.