Al Mussell retweeted
Great article: "Understanding soil microbial activity" farmtario.com/crops/understa…
Al Mussell retweeted
Interesting.
Somebody bought ~800 near-the-money 585 #wheat calls yesterday for around $300K.
The purchase looked a bit strange ahead of this week’s expiry.
After today’s spike in wheat on the Kerch Bridge arch collapse, the value of the position roughly doubled.
Nice timing.
Obviously, it could also be a hedge against a short futures position, or something else entirely. But odds are it was just a short-term spec trade.
A very lucky one.
#oatt #sizovreport
Al Mussell retweeted
World class equine event centre breaking ground near Milverton ctvnews.ca/london/article/wo…
Al Mussell retweeted
Brilliant message from Anne
The 2026 midterm elections didn't just determine who controls Congress for the next two years—they also determine whether the United States, 250 years after its founding, remains a democracy, @anneapplebaum says. She explores what citizens and lawmakers can do next to strengthen the institutions and values that have been threatened in the Trump era.
Al Mussell retweeted
🏆
Michael Steele, of the University of Guelph, wins a Synergy Award for Innovation in recognition of their outstanding partnership with the Saskatoon Colostrum Company.
▶️ tinyurl.com/4mwttsjk
Al Mussell retweeted
2026 was not a good year for agriculture in France.
🔴 Agriculture française 2026 : les rendements s’effondrent, notre souveraineté alimentaire est menacée !
Les derniers chiffres officiels d’Agreste, publiés le 13 octobre 2026, sont particulièrement préoccupants.
🌽 Maïs grain : –27 % de rendement, avec seulement 63 q/ha, le plus bas niveau depuis plus de 30 ans. Production : 7,3 millions de tonnes.
🌾 Orges : –11 % de production par rapport à 2025.
🌻 Tournesol : –23,7 % de rendement, avec seulement 15,8 q/ha. Production : 1,21 million de tonnes.
🫘 Soja : –32,1 % de rendement, avec seulement 18 q/ha. Production : 281 000 tonnes.
🥔 Pommes de terre : –22 % de production par rapport à 2025.
🍠 Betteraves sucrières : 25,3 millions de tonnes, le plus bas niveau depuis au moins 1980.
Canicules, sécheresse, stress hydrique : les conséquences sur notre agriculture sont considérables !
Et pendant ce temps, certains continuent de considérer l’irrigation agricole comme un problème plutôt que comme une solution d’adaptation !
👉 Sans eau au moment où les cultures en ont besoin, il n’y a pas de miracle agronomique.
Il devient urgent de développer une véritable politique de gestion de l’eau : stockage des excédents hivernaux lorsque c’est possible, irrigation raisonnée et amélioration de la capacité des sols à retenir l’eau.
Produire moins en France, c’est prendre le risque d’importer davantage demain.
La souveraineté alimentaire ne se décrète pas. Elle se cultive, et elle a aussi besoin d’eau !
📚 Source : Agreste — Ministère de l’Agriculture, 13 octobre 2026. Estimations provisoires.
agreste.agriculture.gouv.fr/…
#Agriculture #Irrigation #SouverainetéAlimentaire #Agronomie #GestionDeLeau
Al Mussell retweeted
Incredible video shows a Russian drone attempting to destroy a Ukrainian ground robot but being disabled when the robot deploys an anti drone net and catches it.
We literally have robots fighting each other on Ukraine’s frontline.
Al Mussell retweeted
Canadian actor, Michael J. Fox was invested as a companion of the Order of Canada by Governor General Louise Arbour during a ceremony at Rideau Hall in Ottawa today. 🇨🇦
Al Mussell retweeted
Saudi Arabia will supply no oil to Europe next month due to strikes on its east and west pipeline-Bloomberg
Al Mussell retweeted
Both Canadian and U.S. efforts to stockpile critical minerals need “to go much further and be more North American in scope to contribute to the fight against Chinese market dominance,” writes @ChadBown.
foreignaffairs.com/united-st…
Al Mussell retweeted
Trump can’t both kill off Canadian manufacturing and hope to retain access to the Canadian consumer.
My Latest, late yesterday in the New York Times 👇
Yes, there is one really big winner from Trump's new trade war with Canada. But only one.
Thanks to the @nytimes for publishing my new essay.
Gift Link: nytimes.com/2026/08/26/opini…
Al Mussell retweeted
We're ready to re-engage at any moment, by the way. But we also want to be treated fairly, equitably, and with respect.
Al Mussell retweeted
Donald Trump may lose his trade war with Canada for the same reason he lost the Iran war, @davidfrum argues. theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/0…
Al Mussell retweeted
What are the risks to Canada's dairy sector if Canada concedes to US demands on cheese imports under the threat of tariffs? cdhowe.org/publication/a-sli…
Al Mussell retweeted
This cattle feeding area looses half its cattle packing capacity
Two red dots plant closures and the green ones remaining harvesting
Al Mussell retweeted
There is growing talk of a potential food crisis. Let’s take a look at this situation.
Global grain stocks remain quite high, and the harvest is currently in full swing. However, several factors are already shaping a future crisis in which, unfortunately, the most vulnerable countries will once again suffer the most: Sudan, South Sudan, Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan, Syria, Haiti, Gaza, and parts of the Sahel. In these countries, the food situation is already unstable, and a significant share of the population depends on humanitarian aid.
A second group at risk consists of major importers: Egypt, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Nigeria. Here, the main risk is not that grain will disappear entirely, but that imports will become sharply more expensive, forcing governments to increase subsidies.
Let’s look at where things stand today. Global grain production in the 2026/27 season could decline by around 2%, to 2.98 billion tonnes. Stocks remain at around 949 million tonnes, with a stocks-to-use ratio of roughly 32%. On the surface, there appears to be a safety margin.
But that figure is misleading. A significant share of global stocks is concentrated in China and India, which hold grain to ensure domestic stability and are unlikely to release it onto the global market. So the right question is not how much grain exists in the world, but how much is actually available for international trade. That amount is much smaller.
Take wheat, for example. Global wheat production could fall by around 4%. Drought has hit parts of the EU, Australia, and the United States, and combined production among the seven largest exporters is expected to be 11% lower than last year. Another roughly 30% of the wheat harvest may either fail to reach the market or reach it only with great difficulty and at a significant premium because of Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Almost all Russian and Ukrainian grain exports move through the Black Sea, which has now effectively become blocked. In 2022, Russia was the only one playing this game, striking Ukrainian ports. This year, Ukraine has closed the Sea of Azov to Russia and extended its reach to Novorossiysk and Taman. The Kremlin and the criminal war it is waging against Ukraine are the cause of this situation.
Russia is facing problems similar to Ukraine’s this year. The harvest is large - 135-139 million tonnes of grain, including 86-90 million tonnes of wheat. Before the escalation, Russia was on track to maintain its status as the world’s largest wheat exporter, with a forecast of 45-47 million metric tons.
But the Sea of Azov has effectively been closed since mid-July, and the Kerch Strait has stopped accepting requests for passage - a route that accounts for a quarter of Russia’s grain exports. A major terminal in Taman is idle, taking around 6 million tonnes of annual handling capacity out of operation, while a nighttime navigation ban is in effect in Novorossiysk.
July wheat exports fell by about 30% year-over-year, to levels not seen in nearly a decade. Seasonal export forecasts have already fallen below 45 million tonnes.
Attempts to reroute these flows look desperate: a 90% subsidy on rail tariffs for transporting grain from Russia's Rostov region to Black Sea and Baltic ports, while road transport to Novorossiysk has nearly doubled in price, and the railway system, which is simultaneously carrying military cargo, oil, and coal, simply cannot absorb the additional volumes.
Wheat in the Baltic port of Klaipėda now costs more than in Novorossiysk - the opposite of what used to be the case. The Baltic route exists, but it is longer, more expensive, and too small for the volumes required.
For Russia, as for Ukraine, the risk is not hunger but grain piling up with nowhere to go. For the global market, the conclusion is simple: some of this season’s grain will physically fail to reach buyers - not because it does not exist, but because there is no way to transport it.
So what is happening on the global market? Wheat prices have already risen by around a quarter from January levels, while the FAO Food Price Index reached its highest level in more than three years in July. What happens next will depend on reduction in exports.
A rough scale of the crisis could look like this (this is a personal point of view but it is based on market structure).
The loss of around 5 million tonnes of Black Sea exports would be an unpleasant but manageable shock: other exporters and existing stocks could compensate, prices would rise, there would be no shortage.
A loss of 10-15 million tonnes would be a completely different situation: price increases of tens of percent, serious pressure on the Middle East, North Africa, and parts of Asia, and the first discussions of export restrictions.
A loss of 30 million tonnes or more would be a systemic shock that could not be quickly offset: panic stockpiling, a cascade of export bans, and the poorest buyers losing out to wealthier countries in the competition for grain.
For Russia alone, market estimates suggest up to 6.5 million tonnes of lost wheat export potential in the second half of the year. For Ukraine, the figure is 2-2.5 million tonnes per month. If the current intensity of attacks continues through the end of the year, the combined shortfall will exceed 10 million tonnes - meaning the world is moving not toward the first threshold, but toward the second.
It is also important to understand that Russia views a food crisis as a weapon. We have seen these Russian "hunger games" before: withdrawal from the grain deal in 2023, playing on the fears of the Global South, and offering "free grain" to the poorest African countries as a substitute for Ukrainian trade.
The logic is the same as with gas in 2021-2022: create a shortage, then sell the solution as a concession to be paid for through sanctions relief or political concessions. Destroying Ukraine’s port capacity simultaneously removes a competitor and creates leverage for future bargaining.
But this time, the calculation has become more complicated. Ukraine’s campaign against the Sea of Azov and Black Sea terminals has, for the first time, made the food lever two-sided: every month of the blockade now costs the Kremlin as well - in lost foreign-currency revenue, overstocked warehouses, and anger in the agricultural regions of southern Russia, which have traditionally been the regime’s stronghold.
Food has shifted from being a Russian instrument of pressure to a field of mutual attrition. This changes the negotiating framework: any future "grain deal 2.0" would no longer be an "act of goodwill" by Moscow, but a trade-off in which both sides have something to lose.
For Europe, and indeed for the world as a whole, this leads to an uncomfortable conclusion: Black Sea food security is not a humanitarian issue somewhere on the periphery of the war, but a direct component of the strategic balance that will shape both the structure of future negotiations and the Global South’s position on the war itself.
But some have prepared. China stands out most for its geopolitical foresight. Even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, China sharply increased imports in 2020-2021 and built up additional reserves of wheat, corn, and soybeans. Today, China holds the world’s largest stocks.
India also has large state reserves of wheat and rice and will protect its domestic market, but will restrict exports in the event of problems with its own harvest.
The Gulf states depend on imports, but they have money, strategic reserves, and long-term contracts: they will simply pay more. Egypt, the world’s largest wheat importer, acted prudently this year: record purchases from its domestic harvest, combined with increased imports, have bought it time. But it has already suspended its August purchasing program: freight and insurance costs have pushed replacement prices so high that, for now, waiting is cheaper.
What's next? Three factors could push the crisis from the second threshold of rising prices into a full-scale third-threshold crisis.
Energy: more expensive oil means higher costs for fuel, grain drying, fertilizer, and freight, which will be passed on to retail prices in a few months.
Fertilizer: if high prices force farmers to cut back on nitrogen and potash, the impact will be felt in the 2027 harvest.
Weather: a strong El Niño combined with a Black Sea blockade would turn the crisis into a global one.
And separately - export restrictions: governments impose them not when there is a grain shortage, but when they fear rising domestic prices; if several major exporters do this simultaneously, they will create a shortage faster than any missiles could.
But the other side has tools as well. The experience of 2023 showed that even a partial insurance mechanism backed by international guarantees can bring shipowners back into high-risk waters - it becomes a question of the price of the premium, not of principle.
The EU can do what it already knows how to do: strengthen the Solidarity Lanes, open up Romanian and Polish routes further for Ukrainian grain, increase transshipment capacity through Constanța, and subsidize war-risk insurance for vessels serving Ukrainian ports.
These risks have different causes, but one of them can be eliminated through political decisions: Russia’s war against Ukraine.
It is this war that disrupts Black Sea ports, drives up insurance and transport costs, destroys export infrastructure, creates uncertainty for global markets, and forces countries to build reserves rather than rely on international trade.
That is why the most effective way to reduce the risk of another global food crisis is not only to find alternative routes or increase reserves, but also to increase pressure on the Kremlin and deprive Russia of the ability to continue the war.
As long as the war continues, the world will be forced to keep responding to its consequences. The sooner Russia loses the capacity to sustain this aggression and ends it, the sooner markets and global food security will begin to recover.

























