Was Israel Justified in Bombing Hamas Combatants in Their Homes? Israel is accused of committing war crimes by killing Hamas & Palestinian Islamic Jihad commanders in their homes. With the release of NAZA, critics focus on the fact that Israel knowingly struck Hamas and PIJ combatant while civilians, including children, were present, perhaps even waiting until they returned home and calculated the expected collateral damage. They then pose their supposed decisive question: Would Israel consider it acceptable for its enemies to kill IDF soldiers in their homes? Once again, Hamas' entire battlefield strategy is erased from the discussion and the question has to be turned back around: Where exactly was/is the IDF supposed to attack Hamas for it to be considered acceptable? In its 400-mile tunnel network built beneath those same homes, hospitals and mosques? When Israel struck senior Hamas commander Ibrahim Biari in the tunnel network serving as the Jabalia Battalion HQ, it was condemned for causing excessive collateral damage when some buildings fell as a result. This is the prime example cited by NAZA director Yuval Abraham and that strike did not even target a home. Should Israel attack Hamas in hospitals it used as military bases? No serious analyst denies Hamas used hospitals for military purposes, above and below ground, or that numerous Hamas combatants were killed inside them, confirmed by their own martyr notices, so it’s not credibly disputable at this point. Then the IDF is accused of "targeting healthcare" even as over 100 “healthcare workers” are now confirmed to have been combatants, again, according to their own martyr notices. What about schools, where once again Hamas and PIJ's own martyr notices confirm dozens of their operatives were based? Israel is then accused of targeting education. I have challenged critics to name a single Hamas military base. Of course no one can do so. Now Google "List of Israel Defense Forces Bases." Everyone knows where they are, which is why Hezbollah was able to precisely strike the dining hall of the Golani training base in Oct 2024, killing four soldiers. Hamas has no conventional military bases, instead its military infrastructure is embedded in hospitals, schools, civilian homes, and mainly in massive tunnels with shafts opening into residential buildings. There is overwhelming documentation of this. At this point only the most committed Hamas apologists will deny it. Hamas combatants also fight in civilian clothes, deliberately erasing the distinction between military deployment and civilian life. They hide weapons under beds, a Hamas leader literally admitted this fact to a New York Times reporter (look it up). So where exactly can a Hamas combatant be killed? Only when he is standing in an open field holding an RPG? What Israel’s critics effectively demand is no attack. Hamas should enjoy permanent immunity. The human shield strategy must be rewarded. This is one of the main subtexts of NAZA and its promoters. And that is why NAZA actually demonstrates the opposite of what its promoters claim. The IDF's attempt to carefully calculate expected civilian casualties before striking Hamas commanders, even in their homes, is precisely a key element of the proportionality assessment required by the Laws of Armed Conflict. Perhaps striking a Hamas commander in his home, with known and assessed collateral damage, was preferable to striking him in a tunnel network and bringing down surrounding buildings. There is no doubt many civilians have been killed in Gaza, a tragic consequence of the war Hamas started and refused to end by surrendering and returning the hostages, and it is reasonable to assess and critique this. Yet nobody promoting NAZA as evidence of Israeli war crimes or genocide will ever seriously examine Hamas' battlefield strategy or the alternatives available to the IDF. They condemn strikes on homes, tunnels, hospitals, and schools without ever explaining where Hamas should have been attacked instead. They demand that Israel distinguish Hamas combatants from civilians while ignoring that Hamas deliberately organized its entire military strategy to make that distinction virtually impossible to make cleanly, because it viewed civilian deaths as a strategic benefit as its leaders openly and often admitted (again, only the most committed Hamas apologists will deny this). Now, back to the comparison with the IDF. Yes, it WOULD be acceptable for Israel's enemies to target IDF soldiers in their homes if the following were similarly true: (1) IDF soldiers did not officially transition from civilian life to military deployment as normal militaries do (2) IDF soldiers remained in civilian clothes and engaged in combat in civilian clothes (3) IDF soldiers never deployed to military bases (4) The IDF did not utilize clearly marked, sole-purpose military bases and buildings, but instead co-located them within or beneath civilian structures (5) The IDF stored military equipment in homes and rockets in schools instead of weapons depots at military bases (6) The IDF used hospitals and synagogues throughout Israel for direct military purposes. (Putting aside of course that Hamas would murder every Jew on earth if they had the ability, as if they wouldn't attack a home). Expect the same theme to continue: the complete erasure of Hamas from the battlefield analysis.