Alex (@AlexanderKim120) header
Alex (@AlexanderKim120) profile picture

South Korea FICC manager with structured products(IR, Credit, FX, and Commodities) & Prop trading(cross-asset view)

대한민국 영등포구
Joined February 2023
<Notice> 제 글은 모두 개인적인 겸험, 생각 및 논리에 입각하여 작성되었음을 밝힙니다. 저는 이러한 글을 통해 그 어떠한 영리적 목적도 취하지 않으며 이는 순수하게 투자권유 행위와는 무관함을 다시 한 번 밝힙니다. 저의 글은 일반 개인투자자에게는 매우 부적합하며, 거래하는 모든 종류의 기초자산과 상품속성 또한 개인에게 부적합합니다.
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Of all the reports I've read recently, this piece from UBS is by far the most thought-provoking.
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18,070
GS Bond CTA
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3,323
I think I need to monitor the situation a bit longer. I still need to see how broadly Congress intends to incorporate semiconductor controls into the NDAA during this or the next legislative session following the scandal involving Jensen Huang and Megaspeed. From a macroeconomic perspective, I believe this carries implications not only for P, but for Q as well. The underlying context so far is that due to Q's ecosystem experiencing expansive yet restricted growth, P has shown a trend of partially moving in tandem and partially leading the way. My primary focus is on the sensitivity to Q. For now, it seems I inevitably have no choice but to wait and watch how this unfolds.
So let’s do calculation
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We need to keep a close eye on whether USDJPY rises to the 162-163 level. In December, the BOJ might attempt to slightly push back against the current rate hike pricing. Additionally, a grocery tax cut bill must be passed by December 12th, the BOJ is holding a meeting with PDs on November 26th, and the FY27 issuance plan is expected to be released around the upcoming BOJ meeting. This appears to be a truly critical moment.
We must be careful within 1-2 months..
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We must be careful within 1-2 months..
Takaichi: Japan's Economic And Fiscal Policy Decisions Are Unrelated To Attempts To Manipulate Forex
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SK rates trader will feel urgency. I dare say that they gonna be in huge trouble..
Replying to @VKMacro
I believe it needs to rise by at least 20 basis points from current levels. I think the ideal 3-year level is 3.80-3.85, and the 10-year should be around 4.20-4.25. While I am keeping my duration exposure open, looking at the recent UBS CTA, I noticed a fairly thick accumulation of long positions in KR10y. If some of those normalize, I think those levels could be easily achieved. As for the downside, if we push it a bit, I'd say a drop of up to 15 basis points from the current level is possible. There are many rate traders here at SK who failed to build up duration at the last rate peak.
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Oct is not decision meeting and Dec meeting is deleted
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So let’s do calculation
At this moment, the most plausible level I see is an increase in yields of about 10 basis points across all tenors. That is the most ideal scenario, and it certainly does not mean we should completely abandon my duration strategies. Only by approaching that level can we resume our strategic calculations regarding the complex path ahead. Objectively speaking, so many factors have been discounted too heavily up until recently that we haven't even had the chance to properly assess the appropriateness of that 'discount rate.'
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I'm researching JP FY27 Fiscal projection. I dare say that the various noises surrounding public finances in 2026 are highly likely to be amplified to their peak in 2027. Furthermore, I believe the very first step should be analyzing JP's fiscal projections and net issuance, which elevated this year's global fiscal issues to the next level through the concept of 'fiscal dominance.'
Japan PM Takaichi: No intention to adopt fiscal measures that could cause high inflation
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At this moment, the most plausible level I see is an increase in yields of about 10 basis points across all tenors. That is the most ideal scenario, and it certainly does not mean we should completely abandon my duration strategies. Only by approaching that level can we resume our strategic calculations regarding the complex path ahead. Objectively speaking, so many factors have been discounted too heavily up until recently that we haven't even had the chance to properly assess the appropriateness of that 'discount rate.'
Wow hawkish CPI Prints.. But I will not add duration in this level..
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Wow hawkish CPI Prints.. But I will not add duration in this level..
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GS Bonds CTA
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This is just my opinion. Regardless of the current positioning and future revenue structures, it's just a pure thought. Everyone knows that Saudi Arabia needs peace. It would be difficult for them to simply give the Houthis the money they are demanding, and everyone would agree that regional tensions must be resolved in one way or another. The question is, can Saudi Arabia truly and fully accept the PGSA? In a situation where they are pressured by the Houthis in the Red Sea and by Iran in the Strait of Hormuz, the most viable solution would be a grand bargain between the US and Iran, and they would likely hope this expands to the currently disputed Houthi territories for a package settlement. Let's assume the various headlines stating that an agreement on 3.67% uranium enrichment can be reached are true. In that case, could they agree to cap enrichment at 3.67% indefinitely? If during this process frozen assets are released (there is no way the US will pay war reparations, and if every country agrees to collect them globally through the PGSA framework, that might roughly cover it), various economic sanctions on Iran are "gradually" lifted, the current HEU stockpile can be sent to a third country, and IAEA inspectors can enter Iran at any time to monitor all underground facilities, then it wouldn't be an exaggeration to call it JCPOA 2.0. Among the seven conditions put forward by Iran, two are listed as separate items: "a cessation of all military hostilities in the region including Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and the Gaza Strip" and "the withdrawal of US forces from the Middle East." But are they really entirely separate clauses in practice? To my eyes, they don't seem that way at all. Could there perhaps come a time when everything flares up in a brilliant instant, and everyone lays down their desires to cry out for "peace" all at once? I think that possibility might exist. However, I am quite skeptical that this moment is right in front of us. Everyone is currently engaged in a tense tug-of-war, each holding onto their own fatal weaknesses. They are grinding their teeth and holding out to the very end, trying to gain even the slightest edge. Because the stamina on both sides is different, one of them will eventually face a depletion of strength. To hastily guess when that time will be is difficult, as what is happening right now has actually unfolded far too unrealistically. They might somehow pull themselves together, readjust their grip on the rope, and pace their strength until someone slacks off, but even so, no one has let go of this rope yet.
Trump told Reuters that Qatar and Saudi Arabia would prefer a peaceful resolution to the conflict with Iran, but said the United States remains prepared to carry out strikes if necessary, following talks with Qatar's leader.
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3.67%.. back to JOCPA..?
Al Arabiya sources say a Qatari-Pakistani proposal has revived serious US-Iran negotiations. Washington has reportedly agreed to allow uranium enrichment in Iran up to 3.67%, with Tehran accepting. Discussions are also being arranged for the return of IAEA inspectors, while a preliminary agreement to reduce Iranian uranium enrichment is considered likely.
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teapawt.org/AlexanderKim120/status… The midterm elections ended in a blue sweep, and Vance has openly targeted DJT. According to subsequent reports, Vance could hold the most powerful negotiating leverage at this juncture. Bessent is also continuously adding to the OFAC sanctions list, pressuring Iran into a voluntary withdrawal. The critical point here, as highlighted by a series of recent reports, is likely the issue of "disposing of Iran's HEU stockpile." I believe trading this for the seven clauses proposed by Iran is the most urgent topic of negotiation right now. Conversely, this situation is compounded by various strikes, CENTCOM's attempts to conceal them, and frequent rumors of renewed strikes in the Middle East. My perspective was very simple, consisting of two main points: (1) given the economic asymmetry, any negotiation that takes place must significantly favor the U.S., and (2) a comprehensive nuclear agreement will be difficult to achieve in the short term. I don't actually think that fundamental dynamic has changed much. What makes it complex, however, is the question of "how will this ultimately conclude?" assuming Vance manages to bring Iran to the table in some capacity and a trade-off occurs between the HEU inventory disposal and the seven clauses. If Vance fails to get a perfect answer on that front, I believe even he (despite insisting that negotiations must happen right now) might inevitably be forced to accept military strikes. This is because if Iran begins to regain some financial leeway (though the U.S. will naturally try to steer this toward a phased relief), the blueprint for the ultimate "nuclear agreement" at the very end could become tangled once again, potentially leading to mutual distrust. The extent to which Iran is willing to concede right now seems to me to be the most important factor.
Behind the scenes: Vance has been speaking almost daily to Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani, Pakistani Chief of Army Staff Field Marshal Asim Munir and other mediators about the negotiations with Iran, sources with direct knowledge said
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I am reviewing this cycle because I believe it will be an important moment going forward. First, I continuously lengthened my duration from early September to early October. As I increased it, the expected margin gradually expanded from 15-20 bps to 30-50 bps. As time passed, I felt that the expected margin of those positions was gradually growing, even if the absolute level remained similar. Many market participants discounted the number of rate hikes and inflation too heavily over too short a period. Because I thought this was a positioning issue disconnected from actual economic fundamentals, I became confident that the margin relative to the actual level was larger. If rates had spiked further at that moment, I probably would have made the decision to cut my losses. The worst-case level I envisioned was the 2Y reaching 5% and the 10Y hitting 6%. However, if the pace of approaching those levels had been very gradual, I would have continued to add to my position. Some might say, "You should buy at those levels," but the recording of numbers that the system cannot handle suggests that the impact won't stop at first-order effects; much stronger second-order effects could emerge. This is highly dangerous. It is on a completely different level than when entities systemically mandated to hold bonds temporarily suspend judgment on deploying funds for additional purchases due to short-term rate spikes. Once a certain threshold is crossed, they are forced to go against a normally functioning system and actually reduce their bond positions. That point is always a highly perilous zone. A similar incident occurred recently in France. Since the U.S. is a place where much broader liquidity is concentrated, it is structurally difficult for rate spikes to occur with the same sensitivity as in France. The reason I remained confident in buying was heavily driven by these systemic factors. Let’s shift the perspective a bit. I’ve been semi-forcibly exposed to all sorts of noise coming from the stock market over the past month. We sometimes see cross-asset factors resetting at very rapid cycles. In this September-October cycle, the correlation between AI tech stocks and interest rates was, quite simply, very strong. I don't know much about individual stocks, but I do understand the strategies the industry executes. Many people mention hedge fund liquidations, and I strongly agree. However, I am somewhat cautious about that interpretation because, even if they distort the index using massive leverage, it hasn't yet been confirmed whether there has been a broad shift in the positions of unleveraged investors—what I often call the "big hands" (large institutional money). In this regard, what I am paying attention to is the "room for policy changes." Truly big players rarely move technically like momentum players or long-short funds. Their positions tend to shift over horizons ranging from a minimum of six months to several years. While we simply look at the "stock index," a significant portion of their actual investments goes directly into the AI ecosystem. This encompasses the sheer scale of the OTC market, ranging from over-the-counter products like ABS/ABL to direct loans or purchasing the bonds of hyperscalers. Therefore, as I watch the market debating where the bottom of the index is or at what level it will rebound, I have one main question: "Will these large institutions reduce the funds they've injected into the AI ecosystem? If they maintain it, will they reduce the increment (delta) of their capital injections? Will they just maintain it? Or will they invest even more aggressively?" This will be triggered by the midterm elections that ended with a Blue Wave this week, but we need to monitor it with a longer time horizon. If I were the CIO of one of those large institutions, I would give this order: "Hey, recheck all the risks of our current investments. Run a more sensitive scenario analysis on our IRR assumptions. If necessary, casually ask the brokers who intermediated our funds about the movements of other players." It's not about a day or two of crashes and rebounds. I am not confident that we will have all the information regarding the decision-making of the people actually holding these funds until at least right before the new Congress is formed on January 3rd next year. That is why I, too, will not fix the expected value of my current position just yet. From now on, however, I think it is rational to focus much more sensitively on the delta of AI investments, which is the core factor of global growth.
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