Alex Mezza

Dear Ricardo, with all due respect: I understand the constitutional, contractual and political objections. But there is a fundamental economic point that cannot be ignored: Venezuela cannot wait for the perfect political transition before beginning the reconstruction of its productive capacity. The Venezuelan economy has been devastated not simply by a political regime, but by the destruction of its capital stock, infrastructure, institutions, human capital and productive networks. Oil production is only one part of the problem: Electricity, refineries, pipelines, ports, roads, machinery, finance, industrial suppliers and thousands of private companies must be rebuilt. That requires something Venezuela does not currently possess in sufficient quantity: massive long-term capital, technology, managerial capacity and credible external guarantees. And here lies the strategic importance of the United States. Transparency is a means to an end: improving the lives of the Venezuelan people. The fundamental question is not whether an agreement looks perfect on paper. The fundamental question is whether it helps Venezuela produce again, creates jobs, restores infrastructure, attracts investment, rebuilds industry and gives Venezuelans a future in their own country. America is not simply another foreign investor. It is the hemisphere’s largest economy, the world’s deepest capital market, a technological superpower and a country with a long republican tradition of property rights, corporate governance, independent courts and contractual enforcement. That institutional ecosystem can substantially reduce Venezuela’s country risk and crowd in capital from Europe, Canada, Latin America and Asia. The alternative is not some abstract model of Venezuelan sovereignty. The real alternative is leaving Venezuela with depleted infrastructure, declining production, unemployment, migration and an economy incapable of generating the tax base required to finance a democratic state. There is also an important historical lesson. Venezuela did not become a major oil producer by isolating itself from international capital. Foreign technology, capital and expertise helped transform Venezuelan oil into an industrial sector. Before Chávez, Venezuela reached approximately 3.4 million barrels per day. So the objective today should therefore not be “America versus Venezuela.” It should be America investing in Venezuela so that Venezuela can produce again. That requires safeguards: transparent contracts, competitive processes, independent audits, environmental standards, anti-corruption controls, congressional oversight where appropriate, and a clear mechanism ensuring that oil revenues finance Venezuelan reconstruction rather than another political kleptocracy. But rejecting foreign capital because the political transition is incomplete reverses the sequence of economic reconstruction. Democracy needs an economy capable of sustaining it. The sequence is by oposite: The Venezuelan people need an urgent economic recovery is first. A productive Venezuela will have stronger institutions, a broader middle class, more employment, greater fiscal capacity and considerably more political autonomy than a Venezuela dependent indefinitely on humanitarian transfers. The United States should therefore not be viewed merely as a buyer of Venezuelan oil. It should be viewed as a potential anchor investor and institutional partner in the reconstruction of Venezuela. The question is not whether Venezuela should surrender its resources. It should not. The question is whether Venezuelans can use their resources, together with American capital, technology and institutional guarantees, to rebuild a modern productive economy. That is not surrender. If properly structured, it is reconstruction.