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Never give up 😎✊

Україна
Joined June 2022
Photo by Bright Man (@BeyondBox_Go)Photo by Bright Man (@BeyondBox_Go)Photo by Bright Man (@BeyondBox_Go)Photo by Bright Man (@BeyondBox_Go)Photo by Bright Man (@BeyondBox_Go)Photo by Bright Man (@BeyondBox_Go)Photo by Bright Man (@BeyondBox_Go)Photo by Bright Man (@BeyondBox_Go)Photo by Bright Man (@BeyondBox_Go)Photo by Bright Man (@BeyondBox_Go)
Replying to @SpoxCHN_MaoNing
China says the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries must be respected. Yet one of Xi's guests invaded Ukraine and claims its territory. Will Beijing apply that principle to Russia as well? Or does respect for sovereignty stop at the banquet door?
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Replying to @Krot233 @business
Your timeline is backwards. Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The so-called referendums took place seven months later, under Russian occupation. You cannot invade another country, stage a vote under military occupation, and then call it self-defense. How exactly was Russia "defending its territory" seven months before it even claimed to annex it?
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Bright Man retweeted
⚡️ Putin took his “nuclear briefcase” with him to China As if anyone still doesn’t know what it’s actually for 💩 Looks like Russian propagandists have completely run out of cards if they’ve started talking about this too...
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Replying to @Krot233 @business
Political rehabilitation by Trump. That's what I meant. Shaking hands with world leaders doesn't lift sanctions, cancel an ICC arrest warrant, or end Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
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Replying to @business
Putin made it back into the family photo. That's a diplomatic opening. But which sanctions were lifted? Which ICC warrant was withdrawn? Has Russia ended its invasion of Ukraine? A place in the photograph is not the same as rehabilitation. The cameras changed. The facts didn't.
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Як воно було
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Replying to @clashreport
Diplomatic protocol speaks volumes. Xi Jinping personally welcomed Trump, China's main geopolitical rival. Putin, supposedly Beijing's closest ally, was received by Cai Qi instead. For a Kremlin obsessed with projecting superpower status, that's quite a public embarrassment.
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Replying to @MarioNawfal
Diplomatic protocol speaks volumes. Xi Jinping personally welcomed Trump, China's main geopolitical rival. Putin, supposedly Beijing's closest ally, was received by Cai Qi instead. For a Kremlin obsessed with projecting superpower status, that's quite a public embarrassment.
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Replying to @clashreport
Putin admits Russia didn't abandon the dollar and euro voluntarily. It was pushed out. Now he presents the collapse in their use as a financial victory. Being forced to rebuild your payment system isn't proof that sanctions failed. It's proof they changed your options.
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Replying to @Telegraph
Russia invades Ukraine, then demands Britain weaken its nuclear protection of European allies as the price for peace. Notice the pattern?
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Атакован Ильский НПЗ
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Replying to @China_Fact
Putin arrived in China expecting a starring role in a new geopolitical order. Instead, he's just an extra in Xi and Trump's diplomatic show. Russia is nothing more than stage scenery.
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Replying to @MarioNawfal
He's citing APEC's 60% share of global GDP. Apparently forgetting that APEC also includes the United States, Japan, Canada and Australia. The world's economic center of gravity may be shifting. That doesn't mean Moscow is anywhere near its center.
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Replying to @nexta_tv
Putin arrived in China expecting a starring role in a new geopolitical order. Instead, he's just an extra in Xi and Trump's diplomatic show. Moscow dreams of shaping the world order. But in Beijing's geopolitical theater, Russia is nothing more than stage scenery.
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Bright Man retweeted
Krasnodar Krai under attack the whole night.
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Replying to @ABC
But history won't judge this meeting by the red carpets or handshakes. It will judge whether anything actually changes. And if Ukraine's future is on the table, Ukraine must have a seat at it. Otherwise, this isn't a new world order. It's an old one dressed up for the cameras.
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Replying to @Gerashchenko_en
Ukraine made sure Putin arrived at the negotiating table empty-handed.
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Putin has arrived in China for the APEC summit, where he is also expected to hold a meeting with Trump and Xi Jinping.
On November 19, on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Shenzhen, Donald Trump, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin may meet together for the first time. For Moscow, the very possibility of such a meeting is already a political achievement. Russia, which has been waging a full-scale war against Ukraine for almost five years, is once again seeking a seat at the table where global security issues are discussed. For the Kremlin, it is important to be treated as an equal participant in negotiations over the future international order. As of today, the parties have yet to agree on either the final format of the meeting or its agenda. Washington wants to discuss nuclear weapons and Iran. Putin wants Ukraine included in the talks. Beijing is not interested in having the Ukraine issue decided in this format. These differences show how difficult it will be for the three powers to agree even on the scope of their discussions. The United States wants to reduce the number of simultaneous conflicts it faces and concentrate its resources on competition with China. Washington maintains a military presence in Europe, provides security guarantees to allies in Asia, protects maritime routes, and confronts Iran. Trump is looking for ways to reduce these costs through agreements with Moscow and Beijing while shifting greater responsibility for security onto US allies. There is a logic to this approach, but the pursuit of quick results could lead to concessions that weaken America's position and undermine its allies' trust. Russia wants to exploit Washington's desire to reduce its commitments in Europe to reshape the European security order. Moscow demands recognition of the Ukrainian territories it has seized, restrictions on Ukrainian sovereignty, an end to further NATO enlargement, and NATO's withdrawal from the territories of former Warsaw Pact countries. Putin hopes to achieve through diplomacy what Russia has failed to accomplish by military force. China seeks to strengthen its position in Asia and increase its influence over international rules. Beijing wants to establish military superiority near its shores and secure broader access to strategic technologies, resources, and transport infrastructure. Taiwan remains the central issue. At the same time, China's economy depends on international trade and access to global markets. Xi wants to ease US technology restrictions and military pressure in the Pacific, but he does not want to assume responsibility for Russia's war or allow Moscow to set the agenda for trilateral negotiations. The deepest contradictions between Washington and Beijing are concentrated in the western Pacific. The Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and the security of Japan and the Philippines are of critical importance to both powers. China seeks regional dominance and wants to limit the American military presence. The United States aims to preserve its access to the region and the alliance system underpinning its influence in Asia. The scope for compromise is narrow. Any US retreat would undermine the confidence of its Asian allies, while Beijing is unlikely to abandon its ambition to establish its own security rules near the Chinese coast. The Russia–China partnership benefits both countries but makes Russia increasingly dependent on China. Moscow gains export markets, manufactured goods, technological components, and diplomatic support. Beijing secures energy supplies and a partner that maintains constant military pressure on the West. At the same time, China is expanding its economic and political presence in Central Asia, a region Russia has traditionally regarded as its sphere of special influence. In the Arctic, their interests overlap around transport routes, resources, and infrastructure. Growing economic dependence is gradually restricting the Kremlin's freedom of action. Trump's calculation that the United States can pull Russia away from China by offering concessions to Moscow appears unrealistic. This idea overlooks the depth of the economic and technological ties between the two countries. Agreements with Trump may give Putin additional room for manoeuvre, but they are unlikely to change the foundations of Russia's partnership with Beijing. Moscow will seek to benefit from both relationships. Competition over strategic routes, resources, and infrastructure will increasingly shape relations among the three powers. For Russia, the Kola Peninsula and the northern seas are critical to protecting its nuclear capabilities. China is interested in Arctic shipping routes, resources, and transport infrastructure. The United States is concerned with the security of the North Atlantic, Greenland, and the lines of communication between America and Europe. Growing military and economic activity in the region will intensify competition and increase the risk of local crises. The crisis surrounding Iran demonstrates how different Russian and Chinese interests can be, even when they share a common adversary. For Moscow, a US war with Iran offers advantages: it diverts American military resources, drives up global oil prices, and thereby increases Russian revenues. China, by contrast, depends on stable energy supplies from the Middle East and safe passage through maritime chokepoints. Washington seeks to contain Iran while protecting its allies and maritime routes. Nuclear arms control will be one of the most difficult issues in trilateral negotiations. The United States wants China included in future strategic arms limitation agreements because its nuclear arsenal is growing. Russia wants to preserve its status as an equal nuclear superpower and link arms control to broader demands concerning US military policy. China has little interest in restrictions that could lock in its current disadvantage for decades. The most dangerous outcome of a meeting in Shenzhen could be partial agreements that give Russia new advantages without any meaningful reduction in the threat it poses. Washington may agree to concessions to Moscow in the hope of reducing America's security burden in Europe. The Kremlin would use these opportunities to consolidate the gains of its aggression, rebuild its military capabilities, and advance new demands. Beijing will closely assess Washington's willingness to honour its security commitments. If the use of military force enables Russia to secure political concessions, this will influence China's calculations regarding Taiwan. At the same time, Beijing will take into account the military costs of aggression, the response of US allies, and the economic consequences of war. Why There Will Be No New Yalta Trilateral negotiations are unlikely to produce a stable division of the world into spheres of influence because the strategic interests of the United States, China, and Russia overlap too extensively. The United States will compete for military superiority, access to key regions, and technological leadership. China will pursue dominance in Asia, control over Taiwan, access to resources, and greater economic influence. Russia will seek recognition of its sphere of influence in Europe, a weaker NATO, and the ability to determine its neighbours' security decisions. The comparison with Yalta in 1945 has significant limitations. The agreements reached then were based on the military realities at the end of the Second World War and the victors' effective control over territories. Today, there is no shared military victory that could provide the foundation for a new order. None of the three powers is prepared to accept definitive limits on its own ambitions. The Most Likely Outcome: Prolonged Negotiations and Persistent Competition The most realistic prospect is a series of temporary agreements through which the parties will attempt to manage conflicts while strengthening their own positions. These could include specific nuclear security measures, trade rules, or mechanisms for managing regional crises. Such arrangements may reduce particular risks, but they will not eliminate the underlying causes of strategic competition. The greatest danger will arise wherever one of the powers concludes that its rivals are unwilling to defend their interests. For Russia, this primarily concerns Ukraine and NATO's eastern flank. For China, it is Taiwan and the western Pacific. For the United States, it is the ability to deter both competitors simultaneously while maintaining the confidence of its allies. Ultimately, the United States, China, and Russia are competing for the power to define the rules of the international order and the limits of other states' freedom of action. They will reach agreements where their interests align and continue competing for strategic advantages elsewhere. Real stability will depend on the balance of power, states' ability to resist coercion, and allies' willingness to honour their commitments. Agreements among great powers alone are not enough to guarantee peace.
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Replying to @clashreport
Putin arrives in China. The cameras will capture the handshakes. But the real question isn't how he's welcomed. It's what Moscow is actually prepared to change. Will the Kremlin offer verifiable steps toward ending its invasion – or just another round of demands? A seat at the negotiating table is not proof of military superiority.
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Replying to @nexta_tv
The Kremlin wants to negotiate Europe's security architecture from a position of strength. Meanwhile, a section of the Kerch Bridge collapses following a Ukrainian strike. A seat at the negotiating table is not proof of military superiority.
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