Bruce Klingner (@BruceKlingner) header
Bruce Klingner (@BruceKlingner) profile picture

Senior Fellow at the Mansfield Foundation. Formerly CIA, DIA, and Heritage Foundation. 30+ years on northeast Asia. [email protected]

Washington, DC
Joined April 2015
Photo by Bruce Klingner (@BruceKlingner)Photo by Bruce Klingner (@BruceKlingner)Photo by Bruce Klingner (@BruceKlingner)Photo by Bruce Klingner (@BruceKlingner)Photo by Bruce Klingner (@BruceKlingner)Photo by Bruce Klingner (@BruceKlingner)Photo by Bruce Klingner (@BruceKlingner)Photo by Bruce Klingner (@BruceKlingner)Photo by Bruce Klingner (@BruceKlingner)Photo by Bruce Klingner (@BruceKlingner)
I'm excited to announce that I have joined the Mansfield Foundation as a senior fellow (non-resident). As I have for 30+ years, I will remain dedicated to assessing North/South Korean and Japanese issues and providing U.S. policy recommendations. mansfieldfdn.org/about/mansf…
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That's a quote from the opening statement at the Nuremberg trials by US Supreme Court Associate Justice Robert H. Jackson, who served as the Chief Prosecutor during a leave of absence from the Court. November 1945. Here's the link: nationalww2museum.org/war/ar…
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That four great nations, flushed with victory & stung with injury, stay the hand of vengeance & voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the significant tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason. - Justice Jackson, Prosecutor at Nuremberg
Stop quoting laws to MEN WITH SWORDS.
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Bruce Klingner retweeted
The Scandal Is Bigger Than Jensen Huang I argue the most alarming revelation in this mess may not be that America’s most influential AI executive was involved with a suspected Chinese spy—but that senior administration officials were warned about the danger and nevertheless continued relying on him. American strategy has come to depend, to an extraordinary degree, on powerful private-sector actors whose incentives the government cannot simply assume will align with the national interest. The power of these individuals is fast escaping the reach of the institutions responsible for guarding against technological and geopolitical risks. The lesson of this scandal is not simply that these people are fallible. It is that we need institutions capable of checking their influence and managing the consequences of their mistakes before these individuals become too powerful to be held accountable. Read it in @TheAtlantic here: theatlantic.com/internationa…
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To all Marines on the 251st birthday of the Corps. Semper Fi, Devil Dogs!
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Drinking away my honorarium in NYC at a second speakeasy.
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In NYC for a meeting and what do you know? They have speakeasies here.
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Will Trump talk to NK about it as he said he would?
This quoted post is unavailable.
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Bruce Klingner retweeted
Final comments from both speakers: @VictorDCha: The natural, working-level reaction to North Korean activity will be increased patrolling activity from South Korea and the UN Command. What I worry about is the possibility of an escalatory spiral between the two sides. @BruceKlingner: US-South Korea relations are currently strained, North Korea is rejecting dialogue, and it is growing closer with Russia and China on top of these clashes at the DMZ. (joking) When you’re following North Korea, keep a pot of coffee and and a bottle of scotch close-by.
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Bruce Klingner retweeted
@VictorDCha takes a stab at why there is so much North Korean provocation at a time of strain in the US-ROK alliance. There could be North Korean logic that suggests if North Korea provokes South Korea as much as it wants, the US could try to hold back a South Korean response and thus make the US look like a bad partner. The last thing the US needs is a conflagration in Korea, but a provocation could benefit Pyongyang by causing more tension in the alliance.
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Bruce Klingner retweeted
@BruceKlingner notes that if there is a Trump-Kim summit pulled together at the last-minute, Trump runs the risk of making certain agreements with Kim to tout domestically as a foreign policy victory, not really understanding the implications that such an agreement could have on Northeast Asian security.
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Bruce Klingner retweeted
@VictorDCha expands on this point by noting that there is US-ROK asymmetry in responding to North Korean provocations plus already some dissonance, from investment disputes to OPCON transfer. The US and South Korea both want engagement with North Korea, but for very different reasons, which leaves this gulf of response level between them.
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Bruce Klingner retweeted
@BruceKlingner notes that the inter-Korean Comprehensive Military Agreement signed in 2018 was a good first step (removing some minefields and some guard posts) but that both sides oversold it. In the current space of tensions, especially since the agreement has collapsed, moving talks forward with North Korea will likely take a speech by a major US official, such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio.
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Bruce Klingner retweeted
@BruceKlingner picks up on @VictorDCha’s comments by noting that the US could try to set aside the nuclear issue to address some of these closer issues. The US could, in the future, offer to notify North Korea before military exercises begin or restrict their size and scope in order to de-escalate. A challenge, though, is that the US and South Korea need to be working together to do this; US-South Korean relations are currently heavily strained, and their domestic politics in both countries are polarized.
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Bruce Klingner retweeted
@VictorDCha notes that the landmine incident, the North Korean POWs from Ukraine and other issues start to create a basket that the US would want to talk with North Korea about if a summit does happen. It is too soon to tell whether or not a summit could happen, but @VictorDCha warns that a last-minute summit shouldn’t be discounted; the Panmunjom summit came together in 36 hours.
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Bruce Klingner retweeted
@VictorDCha notes that what needs to happen to move forward is that all three sides (the UNC, South Korea, North Korea) need to redraw the MDL together, removing vegetation and other issues that prevent a clear border. The issue is, however, that North Korea is not interested. Although it is too soon to tell, the latest news of a South Korean soldier being found dead overnight could put political pressure on the Lee administration to take on a stronger response.
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Bruce Klingner retweeted
@BruceKlingner interprets the current situation as a reiteration of North Korean signaling that it does not want to talk with the South; North Korea has abandoned reunification as it gets closer to Russia and China. It has not had any contact with the US since a diplomatic meeting in Sweden in October 2019.
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Bruce Klingner retweeted
@BruceKlingner suggests that while authorities are suggesting that North Korea deliberately placed the mines that exploded, they might be discounting other causes; rainstorms can cause mines to shift south with erosion. The danger is that either side could make a miscalculation out of an accident, which has historical precedent: in 2015, South Korea fired 39 artillery shells into North Korea after it reported the North had fired 13, but UN Command later concluded that South Korea had misinterpreted a lightning storm in the region as incoming artillery.
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Bruce Klingner retweeted
@BruceKlingner comments that North Korea has been improving and expanding its fortifications along the DMZ for about three years, unveiling self-propelled artillery near the DMZ and placing almost a million new landmines. The danger, though, isn’t an escalation into war, but an inadvertent clash between the two countries. “Anything at the tactical level at the DMZ (ex. a landmine explosion) can become strategic in the blink of an eye.”
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Bruce Klingner retweeted
@BruceKlingner unpacks what is happening in the DMZ; what has been unfolding? @BruceKlingner notes that three South Korean soldiers were injured by a landmine deliberately placed by North Korea south of the Military Demarcation Line in September, but it’s hard to say whether or not it was to intentionally cause harm to South Korean soldiers, or if Pyongyang was just following its own interpretation of the MDL. The precise division of where the Military Demarcation Line is along the DMZ are unclear, because many of the metal markers that were placed to delineate the boundary can no longer be used, meaning that both Koreas are using different ways to determine where their borders are.
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