Supply-chain attacks against hardware wallets aren't going away. And that's something the entire crypto industry needs to take seriously. Following the recent Ledger Nano X hardware implant research brought to public attention by @MagicalTux, I decided to investigate the attack myself. Using an ESP32-S3, some basic electronics, and open-source tools, I was able to reproduce the display-bus interception concept and mirror my own Ledger Nano X screen onto another display. The video shows my experimental reproduction. What concerns me isn't just that information displayed by a hardware wallet can potentially be observed by an unauthorized hardware implant. It's how accessible the underlying techniques have become. And this raises an even more interesting research question: What if an implant didn't need to transmit stolen information at all? Could a more sophisticated implant interfere with physical button inputs, manipulate user interactions, or exploit weaknesses in seed-generation workflows? Could an attacker somehow cause a device to adopt a predictable recovery phrase without any external communication? These are research hypotheses, NOT demonstrated attacks. Importantly, controlling the display or buttons alone does not mean an attacker can override the Secure Element's cryptographic randomness. But they're questions worth investigating. The lesson isn't that hardware wallets are useless, or that their manufacturers are malicious. Quite the opposite: many people in this industry have dedicated years to protecting users. The problem is that security doesn't end at the Secure Element. Manufacturing, distribution, logistics, hardware interfaces, firmware, physical access, and user verification all matter. This is one of the reasons I'm building LeekWallet, an open-source, DIY hardware wallet designed around transparency, independent verification, accessible components, and user-controlled assembly. I encourage everyone to do their own research, learn how their devices work, experiment responsibly, and consider building their own hardware wallets. And please support open-source security projects. Independent research needs more than attention; it needs sustainable funding. Special thanks to @MagicalTux for bringing this attack into the spotlight, and to @ETHGlobal and @thedaofund Security Fund for contributing to an ecosystem where independent builders and security researchers can thrive. I'd also love to see more discussion around these issues from @ethereumfdn and @VitalikButerin. If you believe open-source hardware security research matters, consider supporting LeekWallet through TheDAO Security Fund: initiatives.thedao.fund/init… leekwallet.0xoucanproject.xy… github.com/0xOucan/LeekWalle… Don't trust. Verify. And whenever possible, build. #LeekWallet #OpenSource #HardwareWallet #Ethereum #SecurityResearch I'd also like to acknowledge @Ledger and @DonjonLedger. Protecting users against sophisticated hardware attacks is an incredibly difficult challenge, and the work security teams do deserves recognition. This research isn't about blaming manufacturers or undermining trust in hardware wallets. It's about understanding where trust boundaries can fail, encouraging independent verification, and strengthening the entire ecosystem. Security research should bring builders, manufacturers, and independent researchers together, not divide them. Responsible disclosure, open research, and collaboration make everyone safer.

The spy module reads the information from the OLED screen in the @ledger device. It still have the verification chip. So it passes software verification but hardware not. Spy SIM module is optional when building your own hardware wallet. Take a look into #leekwallet initiatives.thedao.fund/init…

Privacy for all. Integrate anon-rpc. ethereum.github.io/anon-rpc/