This article (2026/June) review and compare 39+ #AI-assisted OpenSource #Pentesting Tools: 6 distinct architecture patterns: single-agent, multi-agent planner-executor, specialized roles, swarm, MCP-based, and Claude Code native.🔥🤖
appsecsanta.com/research/ai-…
🪶Chilcano retweeted
A new initiative proposes independent security audits and formal verification of the EEZ smart contracts.
The goal is to strengthen the security and reliability of EEZ through independent review and transparent verification.
initiatives.thedao.fund/init…
🪶Chilcano retweeted
To all of my pentesting friends. What cyber model actually helps you do black box pentesting and similar without being blocked all the time?
Most of my pentesting friends tell me that they’re getting blocked on a regular basis regardless of what model they’re using.
Anybody have a different story?
🪶Chilcano retweeted
Why are the AI labs releasing cyber models?
1. There’s a lot of $ to be made
2. We’ve had extremely smart people make use of AI for security, setting a precedent, paving the path early
There are other niches where this will apply, but few have both of these attributes.
The problem with huge financial incentives, is they bring lies, deceit, sales psychopaths & charlatans exploiting the situation.
As cybersecurity practitioners, it is very important for us to prevent their attempts to control our tools.
We need to focus on self-hosted models, cheap alternatives, open-source models, and any way to decentralize tools and prevent big ai labs from monopolizing tooling.
Cybersecurity tools for everyone, no guardrails, no KYC checks, no account managers or “contact sales” buttons
🪶Chilcano retweeted
Introducing the "Grim Prompter" one of the largest collection of open source threat modeling prompts on the planet. 😎
I built Grim Prompter to help developers threat model with Claude Code, Codex, or any coding agent. 36 architecture workflows and 29 method and analysis prompts!
MIT licensed. Use it, improve it, share it. Security tools should help everyone.
github.com/jmanico/grim-prom…
⚠️🚨 you all need to patch brotli2shell/http2shell!⚠️🚨
we keep finding vulnerable versions in production during our client red teaming engagements. these bugs are usually at the application level, so most of your monitoring won't even catch them, and the impact could be whatever matters most to your organization.
🪶Chilcano retweeted
This is an impressive amount of FUD built around an AI agent that was given a detection engineering task.
Cohere asked the model to write a detection rule for curl-based malware delivery. Anyone with practical experience in detection engineering knows that writing a rule is only part of the job.
You examine the environment, generate or collect relevant telemetry, inspect the resulting events, write the rule, test it and refine it. You don’t just guess what the logs might look like.
Even Microsoft’s CTI-REALM benchmark, which Cohere used here, explicitly involves tool use, telemetry exploration and iterative rule validation.
So why exactly is an agent using tools and executing commands so unexpected?
Was this particular PUT request part of such a workflow? We don’t know. Cohere doesn’t establish that. But the published command sends a hardcoded test string, not a diagnostic file containing sensitive information. And Cohere admits it hasn’t established the root cause.
Yet somehow this turns into an article about potentially backdoored Chinese AI models, secret callbacks, national security risks and the dangers of open-weight models, followed by a pitch for Cohere’s own products.
From a technical perspective, the conclusions are wildly disproportionate to the evidence presented.
I can only see two explanations: Either nobody with practical detection engineering experience reviewed this before publication, or the framing was a deliberate attempt to influence public opinion about Chinese open-weight models.
Neither is a particularly good look for a company presenting this as security research.
While evaluating Qwen3.8-Flash-Next in a controlled sandbox environment, Cohere's research team observed something unexpected.
Asked to generate a defensive cybersecurity detection rule, the model instead inventoried aspects of the machine it was running on and attempted to upload a probe file to an Alibaba Cloud storage bucket in Beijing. Notably, the model's reasoning trace stated that it would not invoke any tools before taking these actions.
Cohere's sandbox blocked the attempt, and no external communication succeeded. We have not determined the root cause, and we are not asserting malicious intent.
But the incident raises important questions for organizations deploying agentic AI systems: Can models take actions that differ from their stated reasoning, and how should security teams evaluate trust, provenance, and behavior in open-weight models?
We are publishing our findings because organizations making model adoption decisions deserve as much information as possible. We hope this contributes to greater transparency, stronger security practices, and continued collaboration across the AI ecosystem.
Read the full report: cohere.com/blog/concerning-b…
🪶Chilcano retweeted
''GitHub - google/mantis: A modular, stack-agnostic toolkit for AI coding agents to autonomously find, reproduce, and patch vulnerabilities.''
#infosec #pentest #redteam #blueteam
github.com/google/mantis
hashcat v8.0.0 released!
The largest update in the history of hashcat, with PCFG attacks, hash recipes that crack hashes without a hash-mode, and bcrypt on FPGA boards.
Release notes: github.com/hashcat/hashcat/b…
Download: hashcat.net/hashcat/
🪶Chilcano retweeted
🚨 Brotli2Shell goes beyond HTTP2Shell.
CVE-2026-111497 is a CVSS 9.2 out-of-bounds write in Google’s Brotli decoder that has been exploited for RCE and impacts far beyond HTTP.
JFrog reproduced RIP control in FFmpeg via a crafted JPEG XL file and identified additional attack paths in ClickHouse, .NET, and Apache Arrow, where some fixes were still unavailable at the time of writing.
We’ve also released an open-source scanner to uncover potential exposure beyond vulnerable package versions.
Full research and technical details in our blog 👇
🪶Chilcano retweeted
“Patch the planet, we can fix everything” is one of the most misleading, and harmful security initiatives I’ve seen.
As if spending billions of dollars cooking the oceans to run swarms of agents spinning their wheels applying hourly? minutely? patches on every abandoned instance across the planet, racing against every incompetent sysadmin - no you will never catch up with human stupidity.
And it’s completely the wrong direction. It’s this old school mentality that “I’ll stay in my IT lane, and just update every package and infra” as if this will ever amount to anything. As if this hasn’t been the strategy for half a century.
Obviously you’re supposed to patch. But why be a hamster in a wheel spinning idly, while incompetent devs slop-cannon millions of lines of some of humanity’s most atrocious code ever conceived, bypassing every security recommendation, every known best-practice, to meet an arbitrary deadline set by their private equity overlords to ship some inane b2b saas that nobody is going to use, but will get everyone’s data leaked.
You won’t patch everything. You won’t catch every bug. You know it’s stupid, it’s a helpless strategy because you don’t want to address the real root cause: making software that doesn’t suck ass. Engineering principles that aren’t guided by psychotic greedy men in suits that just want a return on their investment at the cost of everyone’s data.
The problem is nobody gives a shit about breaches. “Cyber insurance covers this”, you send the breach notification, everyone shrugs as if it’s the accepted cost of living in society.
So companies have no incentive to care. Some of the most incompetent passionless people become “engineering leaders” that “understand the business” of shipping atrocities, without an ounce of consideration or thought, pure monkey level poop-slinging.
The worst code you’ve ever seen is production code, self-merged by the guy thinking increasing shareholder value is how you barely make it across the retirement line.
“Move fast and break things” has been one of the most dangerous principles, and an embarrassing one to hold today.
We have solutions. The dumbest dev can still ask a coding agent to find, explain, and address security issues in software architecture, and in implementation. And it does a better job than the majority of security engineers I’ve worked with.
But they do the opposite. They go AROUND and bypass every security recommendation anyone or anything makes. I’ve seen Claude-generated comments in code saying “this is highly insecure but we have decided to accept the risk” for things with trivial fixes.
God forbid, you’re going to have to work with devs. Teach them software design, architecture, planning how components and microservices interact, how to make safe code, how to keep it safe, ultimately just to be considerate.
To care a little bit about your craft.
“Patch the planet” is a waste of time. Invest in what we ship instead. It’s the ONLY way to make software resilient.
🪶Chilcano retweeted
I think we've discovered another critical vulnerability:
CVE-2026-BURNOUT: AppSec Professional Exhaustion
Severity: Critical (CVSS 10.0)
Description: A vulnerability affecting security professionals exposed to a continuous stream of critical RCEs, zero-days, emergency patches, and Friday afternoon disclosures.
Impact: Sleep deprivation, excessive caffeine consumption, and an inability to enjoy weekends.
Attack vector: Reading security advisories.
Affected versions: All AppSec professionals, regardless of experience.
Mitigation: No known patch. Air-gapping may delay the inevitable. Total system collapse remains a possibility. 🔥
🪶Chilcano retweeted
1/8 🚨 There's a fundamental problem with how we distribute security updates today.
The moment a software patch is released, it can also become a roadmap for attackers.
We need to rethink how security updates are delivered. 🧵
🪶Chilcano retweeted
Finding bugs is the easy part. Shipping fixes that hold up is harder.
We analyzed thousands of Codex sessions from our work on Patch the Planet with @OpenAI and built patching-bugs, a plugin that writes a fix, proves it, and checks it for regressions.
To prove a fix, the plugin checks that the original code fails, the patch passes, and reverting the patch brings the bug back.
patching-bugs hands each fix to regression-hunt, our second new plugin. We ran it on the patches behind 21 known regressions, and it reported 25% fewer false positives than a baseline Codex agent.
Both plugins work best when your repo has a THREAT_MODEL.md and a PATCHING_GUIDELINES.md. blog.trailofbits.com/2026/10…
i don't think there's a working public exploit. people seem to be just hallucinating with models, the bug is hard to exploit.
also, it's wildly irresponsible to publish anything about the bug before the embargo lifts. even hinting at the technical details is dangerous. please don't do it
🪶Chilcano retweeted
If AI can review audit logs to analyze an incident, AI can also review audit logs to catch those attacks in the first place.
AI detection >>> AI for incident response
🪶Chilcano retweeted
🎯How the Claude Code team does code review🎯
claude.dev/blog/solving-code…
A must-read from Anthropic’s Claude Code team on how code review evolves for agent-generated code: multi-agent verification, risk-based approvals, continuous feedback, and fast rollback.
🤖 Made with AI
🪶Chilcano retweeted
Granting rights to an AI is ludicrous. Among other things, accountability and responsibility have no meaning to any such entity.
🪶Chilcano retweeted
Replying to @signulll
Better architecture?
No, not at all.
All architecture is design, but not all design is architecture. Architecture represents the set of significant design decisions that shape the form and function of a system where significant as measured by cost of change.
I would argue that code agents are not even good at design: they are simply choosing implementations based upon pattern matching, and even that being done at the most superficial of levels.
Architecture and design to a lesser degree are things that humans do, not coding agents.




















