(((Michael Jacobs)))

Last real update before double-envelopes: with 88.6% (5.05 million votes) counted, there are only about 65 polling stations not reporting vote counts yet. The bloc map is very stable at this point -- double envelopes are likely to move around one seat away from the Arab parties, and Reservists-Economy are highly unlikely to cross the threshold. The exact vote totals will determine allocation of the last 4-5 seats under the Bader-Ofer method. Counting should be done within the next 24 hours, and then the CEC will need to certify the results and publish the final mandate allocation.

A lot of the initial conversations about a unity government in Israel seem to start from the premise that the Haredi parties, the Arab parties, and Ben Gvir need to be excluded. Depending on political leanings, some add in Smotrich and the Democrats to the no-go list. That leaves Together, Yashar, Yisrael Beitenu, and Likud alone. It's worth thinking through what one is leaving on the table with this sort of thinking. None of the following is advocacy for one direction or another. • Including Smotrich but not Ben Gvir may have a certain domestic logic -- there are not the same accusations of rank incompetence and Smotrich has often shown more responsibility than Ben Gvir, such as on key cabinet votes over the hostage deal. Yet abroad, Smotrich is generally viewed by the less informed as interchangeable with Ben Gvir and by the more informed as more dangerous, given his capabilities. A government with Smotrich that continues his policies in the West Bank will face all the same problems and friction as one that includes Ben Gvir as well, eroding the benefit of a unity government. If Smotrich's votes are not needed for a majority unity government, other parties would need to weigh the costs and benefits of adding him. • Ruling out The Democrats for membership in a Zionist mainstream coalition does not make much sense outside of partisan politics: they would not be in charge of security policy under such a government, and are aligned broadly on most key issues. They also would not bring any baggage (and possibly some benefit) internationally. • Ruling out Ra'am is a very different thing from ruling out the Joint List. Ra'am has a significant integrationist approach (at least with respect to politics) and is the best available vector to address the legitimate and pressing concerns of Arab Israelis. From a simple good governance perspective, the organized crime and homicide wave must be tackled and Arab communities must be invested in. It also has internal and external political benefits for the state's legitimacy. Some of this is a matter of priorities: what are the respective parties willing to sacrifice for the sake of progress elsewhere? For the opposition, signing up for unity with Netanyahu could mean a tough compromise on judicial overhaul, inability to alter some laws passed under the current government, and very possibly giving up on the sort of October 7 state commission of inquiry most Israelis demand (since the sharpest opposition to this is due to Netanyahu, not the Haredim or far right). Those are bitter pills to swallow, perhaps unbearably so. For Likud, it means giving up on the longstanding right-religious alliance and accepting genuine policy shifts to the center that might hurt its support. From a systems perspective, though, Likud would be getting the better deal here: breaking the Zionist opposition's moratorium on sitting with Likud would give it much more maneuverability in future elections. But it would almost certainly mean that Netanyahu is no longer on top, which is in large part what has prevented similar efforts from succeeding in the past. It is an open question if it is possible to have a successful unity government without Netanyahu as prime minister. Keeping Netanyahu in the government would also largely sacrifice the chance to repair Israel's reputation abroad and ties with key players, especially the U.S. This may not be a focal point for Israeli voters, but it has real implications for future security, economic, and political trends. There are ways to mitigate this through real (and in many cases simply necessary) shifts in policy, but Netanyahu's brand is uniquely toxic abroad and is at a point that I do not believe can be mitigated. Those are the negatives: they are serious. But a unity government does allow for decisive and consensus-based action that has a better chance of being durable, since it will have been taken by a Zionist majority. If there is better policy made as a result, Israel would find itself on stronger footing. Whether a unity government or a minority opposition+Ra'am government is formed, the next Israeli government will have no time or space to delay, both from internal and external demands and pressures. The most important thing will be the actual policies they enact and progress they make. From a personal perspective (separate from the analysis above), the most successful kind of unity government would draw in Ra'am and the Democrats as well as Likud -- thereby supporting integrationist trends among Israeli Arabs, giving itself as much international legitimacy as possible, and freeing it up to tackle key domestic issues and make consensus decisions on regional ones. Whether that is better or worse than a minority opposition+Ra'am government that makes bold and effective policy choices is a different question. From a U.S. perspective (both in the Trump admin and more broadly), the current top priorities are progress in Gaza, managing the Iran crisis, and stopping the decline into chaos in the West Bank. It seems to me that both types of government would be capable of delivering or failing to deliver on those priorities -- it all comes down to their willingness to act professionally and responsibly. Past 2028, the picture is much more complicated whether a Democrat or Republican replaces President Trump.

With 50.1% of the vote counted (still a non-representative sample, so things will shift further), I think it's okay to begin drawing some interim conclusions: • Amcha Israel is almost certainly out of the running. Reservists-Economy would need to see significantly better results from the remaining ballots to cross, but remains within about half a point of the threshold. Double envelopes may be consequential here. • The bloc balance is likely to shift a bit further back towards the opposition and Arab parties as some big cities and Arab localities publish more results. Ra'am in particular should rise as votes from the Negev Bedouin are added in. • The argument that Channel 14 and i24 were right in their pre-election polling is not yet convincing to me. The bloc totals are likely to look much more like what the main pollsters had predicted, and Likud's strengthening mostly came at the expense of other parties in the Netanyahu bloc. It's not tenable (in my view) to say that a pollster was "right" about one part of a polling picture if it created disalignment elsewhere (like overestimating other parties in the bloc). We need to see more of the actual results to do a fair comparison, of course -- and the argument could still validate itself. • The early predictions about Yisrael Beitenu falling below the threshold look to have been pretty far off -- it is sitting comfortably right now and is likely to win 7-8 seats. There'll be much more to say by tomorrow afternoon (morning for us here in the U.S.).