
Cyber | Digital Risk | Cyber Defense | Cyber | Ph.D., LL.M. | CISM CISSP | Fellow @cepa | Adj. Prof GWU | Fmr @ArmyCyberInst | Fmr Prof. @WestPoint_USMA |
New York, USA
Joined March 2013
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di.se/debatt/en-nordisk-fors… I don't write in Swedish often, but I did today. @cepa
"For us in Russia communism is a dead dog. For many people in the West it is still a living lion."
Alexander Solzjenitsyn
How a midterm sweep by Democrats could turn this tech selloff into a tech crash marketwatch.com/story/how-a-… via @MarketWatch
cepa.org/article/readying-th… A Nordic Defense Fund. "How might they further their integration? These are rich societies, but notably Finland lags the rest. The GDP of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark are respectively $730bn, $550bn, and $500bn. Finland’s is about $330bn.
Projected GDP growth for 2026 differs: Finland (1%) is half of Denmark and Sweden (2%) and less than Norway (1.5%). If we instead look at the tangible threat, it is reversed: Finland and Norway are more exposed to geopolitical friction and conflict risk than Denmark and Sweden.
So where does their money best serve regional security?
My proposal is for a Nordic Defense Fund, where Sweden, Denmark, and Norway pay €1bn ($1.1bn) annually for the next 10 years to support the modernization of the Finnish armed forces, enabling Finland to use these funds to buy military hardware, maintenance, R&D, and support from the EU and UK military-industrial complex, with half earmarked for Swedish, Danish, or Norwegian providers.
This could be broken down to €600m from Sweden because of its proximity to the eastern border and the likelihood it will benefit from sales; €300m from Denmark, and €100m from Norway, which has its own direct exposure but will also be a beneficiary of future sales.
Over 10 years, that is €10bn plus some adjustment for inflation, which would go directly to modernizing the Finnish Armed Forces, a significant sum for a country with a defense budget of less than €8bn. The compounded effect creates a long-term impact."
TALK OF A UN PEACEKEEPING ZONE IN UKRAINE
I don't see Western and Asian nations being interested in guarding a 1,200 km-long front, where you need at least 40 - 50 UN soldiers per km; in Lebanon, it is 63 per km along the border with Israel. That would need 72 000 UN Soldier, plus rotation. Plus if Russia attacks they have 72 000 minus casaulties POW to hard ball NATO with in negotiations as one large hostage. UN soldiers lightly equipped to monitor a peace deal can easily be overrun.
It is not feasible, and the risks are too high.
The Russian regime's murder plot against Kasparov
thenextmove.org/p/new-detail…
Who needs infinity anyway? Makes your head hurt. Haha. quantamagazine.org/what-can-…
The impact is yet to be seen. article.dowjones.com/preview…
I am less concerned with Kimi K3, the Chinese AI, and Russian AI, than maybe others. Why? I think in the long run there in an embedded conflict between AI, the concept, and a dictatorship/authoritian regime that need to uphold a fictious reality. There will be a point out there when these interest collide and the regime will tweak, strangle, suffocate the upside of AI. You need a free and open society to get the full leverage of AI. Lalala-land and AI doesn't mix well.
apnews.com/article/kimi-k3-c…
I am less concerned with Kimi K3, the Chinese AI, and Russian AI, than maybe others. Why? I think in the long run there in an embedded conflict between AI, the concept, and a dictatorship/authoritian regime that need to uphold a fictious reality. You need a free and open society to get the full leverage of AI. Lalala-land and AI doesn't mix well.
A LOT OF TALK ABOUT RUSSIA TESTING ART. 5
To truly test Article 5, you need 'boots on the ground,' so the Russians drive an armored infantry platoon (or company) into Lithuania for 15-20 minutes and exchange some fire with the Lithuanian border police—and then they withdraw, only to say afterwards that NATO exchanged fire with its unit on the wrong side of the border (or some other 'plausible' lie). Messing with the German federal computer servers or flying drones over Saaremaa (Ösel) doesn't count.


