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How many were directly affected?
And how many indirectly?
Read the paper using this link:
ethicalapproach.co.uk/the_un…
#OperationTalla and #NG163
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ETHICAL APPROACH UK retweeted
NG163 - Evidence and Document Release - No. 6
This link provides access to documentation and reports which relate to deaths in care settings.
hidrive.ionos.com/share/grpg…
The short video link below provides an illustration of evidence given to the Scottish COVID Inquiry.
A lot of evidence has been obtained and carefully examined in great detail since March 2025.
It has spoken. Shouted, in fact.
The institutions identified through the Talla investigation know what we have. They know we have analysed in thoroughly and I believe they know we know what it points to.
That, in my view, is why we have reached a position where those same institutions are closing down correspondence.
It is what remains to be disclosed, as requested of them already, which they realise will cast the conclusive die.
The absence of an investigation can eventually produce an absence of evidence and that absence may then be offered as a reason why investigation would achieve little.
That is a very dangerous institutional circle.
Frameworks predating the pandemic recognised the importance of preserving evidence and coordinating police, healthcare and regulatory responses where suspected criminality arose.
By July 2020, an official cross-government paper was also examining whether disrupted care, premature discharge and reduced access to hospital treatment could contribute to deaths.
That analysis did not establish crimes. It did, however, establish that potentially fatal consequences beyond infection were recognised subjects of official concern.
So what safeguards ensured that national non-recording guidance could never displace the proper assessment of an identifiable death or serious injury?
• Who defined its scope?
• Who authorised it?
• What assessment preceded its application?
• Who checked for cases wrongly excluded?
Logging information as intelligence does not answer whether any alleged offence was adequately assessed.
The question is whether a national approach made serious allegations less visible before their merits had been properly examined.
Calling non-recording “a success” makes disclosure more necessary.
Show the guidance.
Show the safeguards.
Show the decisions.
Show how the claimed success was tested.
Fewer recorded allegations are no evidence of fewer victims.
SUSPICIOUS DEATHS IN HEALTHCARE: THE RESPONSE THE PUBLIC SHOULD EXPECT
A death in a hospital or care home does not become exempt from scrutiny because it occurred during treatment, followed an end-of-life decision or arose during a pandemic.
The documents I have examined in substantial detail describe a framework for establishing what happened: competent assessment, early cooperation, preservation of evidence and clear responsibility.
That framework has developed through the 2006 NHS–ACPO–HSE protocol, the 2018 Williams Review, the 2019 CQC–NPCC agreement and the December 2024 healthcare investigation framework.
Their provisions differ, but a consistent principle runs through them: where suspected criminality may have contributed to death, the relevant authorities must engage with the evidence and their respective responsibilities.
The distinction between police and CQC matters.
Police investigate suspected homicide, wilful neglect and ill-treatment.
CQC examines provider compliance within its regulatory remit and can take civil or criminal enforcement action.
Their responsibilities can require parallel investigations.
Referring a concern elsewhere should establish who will address it, rather than leave it between institutions.
Clinical records, medication charts, prescribing decisions, electronic audit histories and witness accounts can be crucial. Where appropriate, forensic examination and toxicology must be considered whilst evidential opportunities remain.
The police’s own 2025 practice advice warns that an erroneous initial decision that a death is non-suspicious can lead to a potential homicide being missed.
The first assessment can determine whether the evidence needed to discover the truth survives.
Bereaved families should therefore receive more than reassurance. Their specific concerns should be examined, relevant information considered and the resulting decisions explained.
To see the relevant documentation examined for yourself, visit:
hidrive.ionos.com/share/grpg…
For Covid-era concerns, a further question requires an answer:
Did national rejection or non-recording arrangements such as have been exposed in Operation Talla policing guidance, affect the assessment of any identifiable death which otherwise warranted scrutiny?
ETHICAL APPROACH UK retweeted
Have you noticed all the big accounts that ignored #Talla have ignored Bill Gates on trial in Holland!
ETHICAL APPROACH UK retweeted
IMPORTANT UPDATE FROM ETHICAL APPROACH
NG163 - Evidence and Document Release - No. 6
This link provides access to documentation and reports which relate to deaths in care settings.
hidrive.ionos.com/share/grpg…
The short video link below provides an illustration of evidence given to the Scottish COVID Inquiry.
NG163 - Evidence and Document Release - No. 6
This link provides access to documentation and reports which relate to deaths in care settings.
hidrive.ionos.com/share/grpg…
The short video link below provides an illustration of evidence given to the Scottish COVID Inquiry.
The Speirs Directive is an interesting document, as is the letter issued by Police Scotland, which accompanied the disclosure of the directive.
The disclosure letter indicated that the decision to issue the directive came from Gold Command.
Now, we must appreciate that Alan Speirs was a silver commander, not gold.
The gold commander at Police Scotland was, at the relevant time, Malcolm Graham. Malcolm retired from his police position and is now the Chief Executive of the Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service.
The self-proclaimed national UK-wide gold commander was at the relevant time, Martin Hewitt. Martin subsequently left policing and was appointed as the Border Force boss, but resigned from that position several months ago.
So, the Speirs Directive was signed by Alan, but on the evidence which accompanied it's disclosure, it was not his decision to issue it.
Was the issuing decision made by Malcolm, or was it down to Martin?
Such points as this require clarity.
ETHICAL APPROACH UK retweeted
Guidance is the wrecking ball of an out of control executive.
In my case IMAGINARY gov guidance trumped legislation.
There was no legal basis for my arrest in Jan ‘21.
👮♀️did it
~to punish me
~enter my name with code CVI on intel databases to justify
-breaching my human rights
-authorise criminal conduct against me
-frame me #OperationTalla
Policing in the dock...
In April 2014, Parliament published a report titled,
“Caught red-handed: Why we can’t count on Police Recorded Crime statistics”
Its findings were severe.
Under-recording undermined public confidence.
Institutional pressures distorted recording practices.
Attitudes leading to misrecording had become ingrained, including within senior leadership.
The Committee expressly called for officers to understand the distinction between recording standards and charging standards.
It demanded ethical leadership, rigorous scrutiny and consequences for deliberate non-compliance.
Almost eight years later, an internal email sent to Operation Talla Silver, ACC Owen Weatherill, on 14 February 2022 stated,
“it would appear that the guidance to not record has been a success as only one additional report has been created.”
The author’s identity is redacted - The words are not attributed to Weatherill and their significance requires no embellishment.
Parliament had warned against allowing institutional objectives to compromise the integrity of crime recording. Here however, in 2022, the small number of additional reports was being presented as evidence of success.
Success measured against what?
The public are entitled to ask how policing could assess the success of its approach without demonstrating what had been received and whether the resulting decisions were correct.
Oversight bodies should be pressing those questions and Parliament should want to know what became of its 2014 warning.
Did the standards Parliament demanded in 2014 governed policing’s decisions in 2022 and if so, how?
The evidence deserves an independent examination. The public deserve the result.
Read the 2014 Parliamentary report:
ethicalapproach.co.uk/caught…
See the 2022 internal police email:
ethicalapproach.co.uk/a4_FW_…
CAUGHT RED-HANDED - AND STILL LEARNING?
On 9 April 2014, the House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee published a report with an unusually unambiguous title:
“Caught red-handed: Why we can’t count on Police Recorded Crime statistics”
Its findings concerned under-recording, distorted incentives, failures of supervision and a culture in which the integrity of the record could become subordinate to the appearance of success.
The Committee found that attitudes leading to misrecording had become ingrained, including within senior leadership.
• It criticised the Home Office and the bodies responsible for statistical oversight.
• It called for rigorous independent audit, ethical leadership and consequences for deliberate non-compliance.
• It also expressly required officers to understand the distinction between the standards for recording a crime and those for charging a suspect.
That distinction matters because a person reporting suspected criminality should not have to arrive at the police station carrying a prosecution-ready case before the recording rules are properly applied.
More than twelve years later, police leaders, Police and Crime Commissioners and the Home Office should be able to answer some straightforward questions:
• Why are failures in crime recording still an issue the public must challenge, after Parliament identified their causes and prescribed remedies so plainly?
• Which recommendations were implemented?
• How was compliance tested?
• What consequences followed where established standards were deliberately disregarded?
“Lessons have been learned” is an agreeable expression. Twelve years should, however, permit some evidence of completed homework.
The consequences extend beyond an unreliable spreadsheet.
Under-recording can obscure victims, distort operational priorities and undermine confidence that reporting a crime serves any useful purpose.
A Parliamentary report should change institutional conduct. Its mere publication cannot reasonably be treated as the completion of that task.
The public are entitled to ask whether the lesson has been learned and if so, where the evidence of that learning is, or whether the report has just been filed, to gather dust.
Read and download the full Parliamentary report here:
ethicalapproach.co.uk/caught…
