
Asst Prof of Comparative Politics @GUQatar • Economic shocks, authoritarianism, class, populism, health • #FirstGen • Formerly @EuropeAtHarvard & @Cambridge_Uni
Joined August 2014
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I have a new paper out in the European Journal of Sociology! Commodification and Social Reproduction: Theory and Mixed-Method Evidence on the Effect of Privatization on Childbearing.
I have friends who do brilliant work on #social #reproduction, take #Marx seriously, but don’t find #demography inspiring. I also have demographer friends who do brilliant work on #fertility but don’t know social reproduction theory and don’t take Marx seriously. Putting these two worlds in dialogue was always going to be a tall order. That’s also what motivated this study.
Economic production and social reproduction are two sides of the same coin. Social reproduction theory asks a deceptively simple question: if workers produce value, who produces workers? And how are the costs of producing and sustaining life #distributed across genders, households, markets, and the state? We argue that these are not side questions but core to understanding the #postsocialist #fertility #decline. This is not a minor story. Around 15 of the world’s 20 fastest #shrinking populations are located in Eastern Europe, with low fertility as a major driver.
Empirically, we combine cross-national panel models with subnational and qualitative evidence to trace the mechanism. #Privatization and commodification shift risk downward, reorganize household budgets and time, and make #childbearing a far more uncertain project. Marketization does not just reshape jobs and incomes. It reaches into intimate life decisions by transforming the conditions of social reproduction.
I’m grateful to all my co-authors Lawrence King, @EvaFodor_CEU, Raymond Caraher, and Gosta Esping-Andersen. Co-authoring with Gosta, a doyen of welfare state theory and social demography, was quite an experience. As the acknowledgements section demonstrates, many contributed to this study. I’d like to flag the help from @azarrova, Darja Irdam, @gigoca, @EszterKovats, @LMurinko, @i_reprosoc, and @DorottyaSzikra.
A peek behind the scenes, because behind every success in academia there are dozens of invisible setbacks. This paper took around eight years from first idea to publication. It went through multiple submissions, a second-round rejection at a top journal (American Journal of Sociology), and several R&Rs that would have required reshaping the argument in ways that would have hollowed out what the paper is trying to say. Part of this reflects how broken the academic publication game is. Part of it reflects the paper’s unusual niche. It relies on advanced quantitative tools, but it is not a clean causal inference design. It is also theoretically hybrid, and the tensions between social reproduction scholarship and mainstream demography made some pushback almost inevitable.
A lot changed in my life over these eight years. I lived in six cities, in five countries, across three continents. I held multiple precarious contracts and lived through major political upheavals. There was one “comforting” constant, though: this paper was almost always under review somewhere. Not anymore.
As they say: Each article is its own Vietnam — easy to get into, hard to get out of. In the end, it found a very good permanent home at EJS. In the end, it found a very good permanent home at EJS. Comments welcome!
#politicalconomy #sociology @GUQatar @QNLib
Gabor Scheiring retweeted
For Zeteo, I debunked the whole 'moderates overperformed/progressives underperformed' midterms BS schtick from centrist pundits like Yglesias, Chait, Tanden, et al. With receipts.
8 things they don't tell you about the races and the results:
Gabor Scheiring retweeted
Of the 11 victorious Democratic Senate challengers in 2026, *all* had websites attacking billionaires
The 3 Dems who avoided this economic populist stance all lost their races
Gabor Scheiring retweeted
I've been in politics for a quarter century. It's hard to express how staggering it is to see a conversation like this on corporate US media. The Morning Joe panel gobsmacked by the directness of @AbdulElSayed's points.
(clip via @DropSiteNews)
Gabor Scheiring retweeted
DSA candidates and Blue Dogs both beat the Democratic Party average last night. Edge is small esp. once you add controls for demographics and other candidate characteristics (e.g., anybody would have crushed Paxton; Collins would have done well against any Maine Dem).
Gabor Scheiring retweeted
Leftist Senate candidates faced off against the strongest GOP candidates this cycle according to NYT/Sienna favorability.
- Susan Collins (+82% Rep Fav/-2% Ind Fav) and Michele Tafoya (+81% Rep Fav/+2% Ind Fav) had clearly the highest favorability among both Independents and Republicans.
- Ashley Moody had the highest favorability among Independents (+15% Ind Fav).
- Mike Rogers was the most liked among Republicans (+83% Rep Fav).
If you're post election analysis doesn't take candidate quality into consideration, it should not be trusted.
Which voters did the Democrats lose in 2024, and which did they regain in 2026? I charted the change in the Democratic margin by income, education, age, and race and gender: first from 2020 to 2024, then from 2024 to 2026.
The headline: Democrats campaigned on economic populism in 2026, and regained the low-income, non-white, and young voters they lost to Trump in 2024.
The 2026 midterm results are strong correlational evidence that an economic populist campaign can regain voters from illiberal populists. They are also inconsistent with much of the cultural backlash thesis of Inglehart and Norris. Trump’s 2024 gains were among young, lower-income, and Latino and Black voters, and those same groups voted Democratic again two years later, once the party campaigned on the cost of living and corporate power. When identifiable social groups change their vote twice within six years, in a pattern that follows income and age, they are responding to their material conditions and lived experience. Cultural values simply do not change that fast.
Income: in 2024 the Democrats lost 10 points among households under $50k and 6 points in the $50–100k bracket, while gaining 3 above $100k. Trump was the first Republican presidential candidate since Reagan in 1984 to receive more votes than the Democrat among working-class voters (households under $50k). This is what led many to say, somewhat prematurely but not without reason, that Trump had built a multiracial working-class coalition. That coalition has now fallen apart.
In 2026 the Democrats gained 18 and 17 points in the two lower brackets. The 2026 gain was larger than the 2024 loss, and it occurred in the same brackets. The party gained a further 5 points above $100k, so economic populism did not reduce its support among affluent voters; i.e., no need to fear that economic populism would scare away Chuck Schumer’s mythical affluent suburban centrist voter. That fear is a myth. Chuck, you can be bold.
Age: the Democratic margin among voters aged 18–24 fell by 20 points in 2024, the largest decline of any age group, and rose by 42 points in 2026. The 2026 gains are smaller in each older age group, with 5 points among those over 65.
Race and gender: the margin among white men and white women was almost unchanged in 2024, and by some measures Trump even lost white voters that year. Trump’s gains were concentrated among Latino men (−34) and Black men (−6), and these two groups recorded the largest Democratic gains in the race and gender panel in 2026 (+27 and +23).
According to cultural backlash theory, the far right increasingly attracts older, white, less educated voters who reject the progressive values of younger generations. Only the 2024 education data are consistent with that expectation: the Democrats lost 20 points among voters who never attended college. In 2026, however, the Democrats’ gains were nearly uniform across education levels (+16 to +19 in four of the five groups).
In sum: the 2026 result was the work of the working class (low income), the young, and Latino and Black men, the voters Trump had won in large numbers in 2024, who voted Democratic again. The professional class contributed least to the 2026 landslide: the Democrats gained 5 points among households above $100k against 17–18 points below that line, and college graduates moved about as much as voters without a degree.
Two footnotes. First, the data in the chart are changes in margins; the level of support in each group is not included. In cross-section, large differences by education, race and age remain: even in 2026, Republicans led among white voters without a college degree by 21 points, and the Democratic margin was far larger among the young than among the old. Elections, however, are won and lost through changes. Second, exit-poll data are correlational, and this time Trump was the incumbent responsible for inflation, so a significant part of the change is a vote against the party in power. At the same time, the realignment shows clear patterns, so it is not a mere midterm correction.
Sources and method are in the figure note.
Gabor Scheiring retweeted
When you listen to James Talarico, you realize that last night's results were not just a rejection of Trump and Israel's Iran war, but also a rejection of a Democratic Party led by people like Biden, Blinken, and Sullivan:
"I've never taken money from AIPAC, and I'm not taking money from AIPAC in this campaign. Seeing what's happening in Gaza makes me sick to my stomach as a teacher, as a Christian, as a human being"
This is his message, and he won in Texas!
Gabor Scheiring retweeted
"The worst possible scenario for the Republican Party."
Hasan Piker reacts to Democratic wins across the United States, including by many on the populist left.
Brazil, Serbia, and now America in a single week: three defeats for the global far right, and the American one is the biggest. Democrats have retaken the Senate, flipping six or seven Republican seats when they needed four, among them Texas, where no Democrat had won a statewide race in thirty-two years. El-Sayed in Michigan, Jackson in Maine (both by every indication), Talarico in Texas. The House is not yet called, but in all likelihood it flips too.
This is not the end of the war against the far right. 2028 will be different: Republicans will have two years to shift to more popular policies, build a base, and campaign better; Trump will veto; and even the scenario of refusing to accept an election result is not off the table, however conciliatory they sound today.
Why this may be more than the usual swing of the political pendulum: a number of key races were won by candidates the Democratic establishment did not want. El-Sayed is, by every indication, winning despite AIPAC spending 30 million against him and despite his centrist primary opponent crossing over to the Republican candidate in the final days. In Maine, Jackson is a logger and union man through and through, Sanders' former Maine campaign chair, whom his own centrist-establishment Democratic governor refuses to endorse to this day. Talarico beat a candidate stuffed with 158 million of Musk's money by twenty-one points, on the message that the affordability crisis is a corruption crisis. From January, six or seven democratic socialists will sit in the House, and around them a wider circle: the House Progressive Caucus already has a hundred members, four sitting Democratic representatives were ousted in primaries by left challengers, in Minnesota Flanagan beat the Schumer-backed Craig for the Senate nomination, in Georgia Ossoff won re-election on Sanders' anti-oligarchy message. DSA has 120,000 members, union approval stands at 71 percent, and according to the AP survey half of voters called the cost of living decisive, not immigration.
This is not only the Democrats' victory but that of the millions who have been organizing and mobilizing for two years. The pendulum did not merely swing back; a movement decades in the making gave proof of its vitality. That could be decisive for the renewal of American democracy in 2028.
Why we shouldn't be surprised that young people are increasingly disillusioned with the status quo even in established democracies - episode 67. I already talked about the structural crisis of the German political-economic model; here is another crucial component: a significant decline in intergenerational mobility from Gen X onward.
A paper by Julia Baarck, Moritz Bode, and Andreas Peichl, “Rising Inequality, Declining Mobility: The Evolution of Intergenerational Mobility in Germany”, is now out in the Journal of Public Economics. Using SOEP data on children born between 1968 and 1987, they systematically show that intergenerational income mobility in Germany decreased over the observed period:
📉 Intergenerational income mobility declined sharply: persistence roughly doubled. For children born in the 1980s, a 10-percentile higher parental income rank translates into a 3.4-percentile higher income rank as an adult, about the same as in the US.
🎓 As a potential mechanism, parental income became more important for education. Germany expanded access to higher education in this period, but children from low-income families benefited much less. Cuts to student aid (BAföG) in the 1990s may have played a role.
🪜 The decline coincided with rising income inequality, an “intertemporal Great Gatsby Curve”: the rungs of the income ladder moved farther apart while climbing it became harder.
Free to download here: sciencedirect.com/science/ar…
Before you give in to the temptation to read Hungary as the "blueprint" for fighting against the far right: here is the country's new foreign minister cozying up to "Little Marco," pledging "joint efforts to combat far-left terrorism," I bet, in the hope of getting a few cents of investment.
Thank you, @SecRubio, for today’s substantive talks.
Two concrete agreements and a shared commitment to deepen U.S.–Hungarian cooperation on energy security, law enforcement and the challenges we face together. 🇭🇺🤝🇺🇸
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Gabor Scheiring retweeted
In case you missed it in person, the recording of our event with @gscheiring is now live on our YouTube channel. Give it a watch! youtube.com/watch?v=RjRC0uMo…
One of the several reasons I like working with social anthropologists is that they understand culture through lived experience, and many of them refuse to conceputalize the economy and culture as separate realities. This is the case with many of the articles forthcoming in this special issue in Comparative European Politics we've been working on under the guidance of @i_kalmar. In this introductory article, Ivan provides a new framework for understanding illiberalism bridging political strategy, culture, and economy through the notion of the internal subaltern: the subordinated member of a privileged formation situated within a privileged group but close to its lower edge.
Class formation describes how wage laborers are stripped of productive assets and rendered dependent economically, legally, and symbolically, producing both material exploitation and cultural subordination. The attribution of inherent cultural deficiency to peripheral populations justifies their economic disciplining. Illiberalism today emerges as the politics of internal subalterns defending their precarious position against those ranked below, in alliance with fractions of capital requiring state protection under conditions of intensifying inter-imperial competition. This analysis suggests that illiberalism is not merely a cultural or political phenomenon, but a structural response to the conditions of internal subalternization produced by capitalism.
The rest of the articles will come out in the next few days/weeks, including mine with Ayet Bouhajeb comparing the failure of dependent democratization across Europe's southern and eastern peripheries, ie., in Tunisia and Hungary.
link.springer.com/article/10…
#democracy #socialclass #FarRight #populism
Gabor Scheiring retweeted
Serbian 🇷🇸student/civic two year democratic movement incarnated politically today as the "Student List - Students Win" - makes historic electoral victory, and gains a full majority in Parliament, defeating the 14 year elective authoritarian regime of Alexander Vučić.
Gabor Scheiring retweeted
A young blonde woman with an American accent in Israel says that all the Arabs must be kicked out of Gaza because it is "our land" since "God commanded us to take it."
The Palestinians should be kicked out to any other Arab state, she continues, except Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, "because they are ours."
"Or we will kill them," she adds
Can we stop pretending that this is a marginal view in Israel? That these are the comments of a fringe minority?
They are not. Israel has been on this path for quite some time.
Western governments know it fully - yet they continue to fund and enable Israel's genocidal policies.
I started my book talks at @Georgetown, @GWtweets, and @KetteringFdn with a personal anecdote. A trip down memory lane, to a small room in the 2000s packed with activists and big hopes, to an era when the future unquestionably belonged to democracy, and many believed another world is possible. How did we get from there to where we are now? What is the triple devaluation? And how will democracies revive? Book forhtcoming next year with Stanford University Press.Snapshots from sunny October DC.
#democracy #FarRight #illiberalism #globaljustice @GUQatar
Gabor Scheiring retweeted
Just a reminder! Join us on Oct. 21 for How Democracies Revive with
@gscheiring and @MSnegovaya
You won't want to miss it! Register here: tinyurl.com/2v5wzhce
Join us on Oct. 21 for How Democracies Revive with @gscheiring and @MSnegovaya. You won't want to miss it! Register here: tinyurl.com/2v5wzhce
























