حسن غالب

Houthis in #Iraq | Iraqi journalist @ali_alifadhil raises serious allegations about the Houthis’ expanding political, financial, and commercial networks in Iraq, including the alleged diversion of Iraqi public funds, cooperation with influential political figures and militias, and the use of Iraqi businesses and currency exchange offices to facilitate financial transfers. One of his most significant allegations concerns Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Al-Fadhil claims that the PMF pays 4 million Iraqi dinars [$2,647.25] to each qualifying Houthi family residing in Iraq, using financial allocations designated for the families of PMF personnel killed or wounded in combat. If substantiated, this would raise serious questions about the diversion of Iraqi state resources to support a foreign armed movement. He also names Laith al-Khazali, the Iraqi deputy prime minister, suggesting that his political influence could facilitate increased financial allocations to the PMF. Al-Fadhil discusses Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Zaidi, whom he describes as attempting to keep Iraq out of the wider regional conflict involving Iran. However, he argues that the prime minister must also confront the activities of foreign armed groups, particularly Houthi operatives, inside Iraq. He alleges that certain officials within the Iraqi government are undermining these efforts through their relationships with Houthi representatives and militia-linked organizations. Among those named is Mustafa Sanad, Iraqi minister of communications, whom Al-Fadhil accuses of maintaining regular meetings with Houthi figure Abu Taha al-Washli. He also criticize Sanad over statements concerning cooperation between Iraq’s Ministry of Communications and Al-Muhandis Company, which he describes as sanctioned. Al-Fadhil refers to an August interview discussing this cooperation and questions whether government institutions are being used to advance the interests of politically connected armed groups. He also references a controversial statement attributed to Sanad about reducing government employees’ salaries to secure electricity supplies from Iran. Al-Fadhil further alleges that Abu Taha al-Washli, a Houthi figure operating in Iraq, disappeared from public view following earlier allegations concerning his personal conduct. He separately discusses Abu Idris al-Sharafi, identified as a Houthi representative in Iraq, claiming that his recent absence may be connected to suspected espionage on behalf of an unidentified party. According to Al-Fadhil, al-Sharafi reportedly told Houthi associates that he had traveled to Iran for medical treatment. Al-Fadhil acknowledges uncertainty surrounding these claims and calls for an official explanation. On the commercial side, Al-Fadhil identifies Al-Yaqout Trading Company in Baghdad and Al-Baqir Transport Company in Basra as businesses allegedly involved in Houthi-linked commercial activities. He suggests that these businesses form part of a wider commercial network through which the Houthis may generate revenue and maintain access to Iraqi markets. He also names two currency exchange businesses, Ayoun Al-Mustaqbal exchange office in Babil Governorate and Al-Amir exchange office in Samawah, Muthanna Governorate. Al-Fadhil alleges that these offices facilitate suspicious financial transfers benefiting the Houthis.