LONG POST. I want to set the record straight about BRO, explain why I reacted so strongly, and help people understand the liquidity mechanics that can make or break their investments. Please take the time to read this, especially if you buy small ICP ecosystem tokens or are thinking about launching one. These lessons have cost me real money. At the end, I’ll explain the 100 ICP contribution I intend to make and exactly what it can—and cannot—do. I have lost more than half a million dollars over the past five years across investments in the ICP ecosystem. Failed projects, bad decisions, disappearing liquidity, exploits, misplaced trust. I have paid to learn. I’ve watched liquidity get pulled from a pool after my own purchases had helped put more ICP into it. I’ve also lost money in projects affected by token-code exploits. Those experiences are why this matters to me. I’ve fucked up plenty, and I own my investment decisions. Builders are responsible for their code, their conduct, and the commitments they make to the people supporting them. Disclosure up front: I hold BOB, OHSHII, and SNEED. I participated in Ohshii’s launch, have bought in the open market, added thousands of ICP in liquidity, and personally supported its founder. I know these builders personally and trust them. At the time of writing, I started buy BRO to help fix this. WHAT THE BRO FOUNDER ACTUALLY SAID @cryptalo_icp announced that BRO’s periodic ICP distributions, buy-and-burn activity, and the other activities he ran are stopping. The Inner Circle and Yield Circle channels are closing. Holding BRO will no longer provide those benefits, and no restart is planned. He also wrote: “I have withdrawn the liquidity I had provided.” That is the part I have a serious fucking problem with. A project can fail. A founder can run out of resources, discover the model doesn’t work, or decide they cannot continue. I can understand that. But withdrawing your liquidity while shutting down the project leaves holders facing the loss of the activities they bought into AND reduced liquidity through which to leave. He acknowledged that trading may become more difficult. In my eyes, that is a serious breach of trust, and it costs you credibility with me. Being upfront about it does not make the consequences disappear. To be precise, he said he withdrew the liquidity HE provided. Other liquidity remains. And I am criticizing the action he announced; I cannot tell you what was in his head. There are legitimate reasons to move or rebalance liquidity. Context and prior commitments matter. Here, the announcement is that the project’s activities are ending and the founder’s liquidity has been withdrawn. A responsible wind-down should explain what happens to the remaining assets, liquidity, and obligations to the community. Holders deserve a clear process, especially when the founder’s decisions directly affect their ability to exit. UNDERSTAND WHAT HAPPENS WHEN YOU SWAP When you swap ICP for a small token, your ICP goes into the available trading liquidity and tokens come out to you. You have bought tokens. You have not acquired ownership of the LP position or a guaranteed right to withdraw your original ICP later. That distinction is huge. When you sell back, you need available ICP liquidity or another buyer. The number displayed next to your balance is a valuation. It is not a promise that you can sell your entire position at that price. A token can show an impressive market cap while having very little actual ICP available for exits. Market cap is calculated from price and supply; it is not a bank account containing that amount of money. If your sell order is large relative to the liquidity available at those prices, your own trade moves the price against you. That is price impact. Slippage is a separate issue: the difference between the quote you expected and the execution you receive. Increasing your slippage tolerance does not create more liquidity. It can simply allow a worse execution. There are also different ways things go wrong: • An LP owner withdraws a position, reducing the liquidity available to trade against. • Holders sell heavily, exchanging the pool’s ICP for tokens and pushing the price down. • A token contract has an exploit or dangerous minting permissions, allowing extra tokens to be created and sold into the pool. All three can hurt holders. They require different protections. An LP lock addresses withdrawal control. By itself, it does not stop ordinary selling, fix a minting vulnerability, or make a project economically viable. This is why you need to understand the pool, the token contract, AND who can change the rules. YOUR REAL COST IS ALSO MEASURED IN ICP If you put 100 ICP into a token and eventually get 30 ICP back, you are down 70 ICP compared with simply holding the original 100, before considering fees. ICP’s dollar price could rise during that period and make your dollar result look less painful. You can still have substantially less ICP than you started with. That is the opportunity cost people overlook. You took an asset you believed in and exchanged it for an additional bet on a founder, a token model, liquidity, and future demand. The underlying network can keep improving while your particular investment fails. A useful blockchain does not make every token issued on it useful. I have made that mistake myself. Loving an ecosystem can make you too generous with your assumptions about everything launching inside it. I believe many builders mean well. Good intentions still need to be backed by competence: budgeting, communication, token design, security, liquidity management, and a realistic plan for generating value. Being an ICP maxi does not automatically teach you any of those things. THIS IS WHERE BOB’S LAUNCH STRUCTURE MATTERED Look at the screenshot attached to this post. The existing launchpad position shown there contains approximately 485 ICP on the ICP side and zero BRO. That is existing BOB launch liquidity, separate from the 100 ICP I intend to contribute. BOB’s launch system uses a bonding process that establishes market liquidity when the launch completes. In BRO’s case, the remaining positions are owned by the BOB launchpad account, separately from a personal position the token founder controlled. One of those positions provides ICP support within a narrow price band below the trading price. As selling moves the market into that band, the ICP in that position becomes available to buy BRO. That is what the support “floor” means here: actual ICP committed to trading within a defined range. The structure appears designed to provide support for the bonded allocation. The founder ending his project did not automatically give him control of that launchpad-owned liquidity. That is a meaningful safeguard, and BOB deserves credit for it. It also needs to be explained honestly. The pool does not know your purchase price. Someone who bought far above the support range can still lose a lot of money. And this is market liquidity, not a special refund account reserved for original bonding-curve wallets. BRO is transferable. A holder can trade against the available liquidity regardless of whether they bought during bonding or acquired the token later. The screenshot is a snapshot, too. Balances can change as people trade. For a complete assessment, you should also examine the launchpad’s and token ledger’s upgrade controls. “The founder cannot personally withdraw this position” is a specific, useful protection. It is not a claim that every part of the system is beyond all possible change. The lesson is that the liquidity structure established at launch can continue to matter after the person promoting the token walks away. BRO/ICP pool WHY I WANT PEOPLE TO UNDERSTAND OHSHII @ohshiilabs deserves much more attention for the mechanics it is building around this problem. I am speaking as someone who participated in the launch, bought OHSHII, added thousands of ICP in LP, and personally supported Ravenith. That financial and personal connection is relevant, and I have disclosed it. In my opinion, Ohshii is one of the more serious attempts in this ecosystem to make token launches fairer, more accountable, and less dependent on one founder’s promises. Here are the parts of its documented current launch model that people should understand: • Liquidity is part of the launch design. Approximately 90% of the ICP raised goes toward opening trading liquidity on ICPSwap. The rest covers the applicable launch costs, fees, and referral rewards. The allocation between contributors, pool tokens, and the project DAO’s treasury is defined. • Vesting applies to both creators and contributors. Tokens are released on a disclosed schedule, rather than every allocation becoming immediately sellable. That limits immediate selling from those allocations while also requiring buyers to accept a real restriction on their own access. Read the schedule and activation requirements. • The fundraising curve is buy-only while the launch runs. You cannot buy and immediately sell back into that launch curve. Trading begins after the move to the DEX. Combined with vesting, this constrains some of the behavior people complain about with launch flipping and snipers. • Purchase caps limit how much a wallet can receive. The tiers involve verification and governance participation. That is a concrete attempt to reduce concentration and discourage gaming the launch. It does not justify pretending bots or multiple-wallet behavior have become impossible. Check the current eligibility rules. • A completed campaign has its own DAO. The framework is designed to put project decisions under that community’s governance. Actions such as removing liquidity, withdrawing treasury assets, or changing code face stronger governance requirements than routine decisions. • Failed fundraising has a defined refund process. The current documentation describes approximately 95% back for contributors, subject to the applicable fees and a seven-day claim window. That is protection when the raise fails. It does not reimburse someone because a successfully launched token later falls in price. These mechanisms address specific risks. None of them creates customer demand or guarantees a return. Ohshii’s liquidity locks also have actual rules. Some releases or changes can be approved through governance. You still need to understand the position, the lock, the voting power, and the authority of the relevant canisters. That is exactly the kind of information a responsible launch should make inspectable. Yes, I find parts of the interface challenging. There is a lot of complex information to present: allocations, vesting, participation limits, voting, liquidity, and custody. I would like those things to become easier for newcomers to understand. The underlying choices still need to be made responsibly. From my own experience, Ravenith is present, committed, and willing to help. I can speak with him, ask questions, and discuss problems. I have supported him because I see someone continuing to build. That matters to me. I want more founders to learn how these tools work before asking a community to trust them with money. Ohshii · Launch documentation · Governance rules WHY SNEED’S GOVERNANCE MATTERS This is also why I keep bringing up @icsneed. Sneed is an SNS DAO on the Internet Computer. Its governance is accessible through the NNS app. The SNS is the framework for the project’s DAO; the NNS governs the network. That structure has value to me because it provides an established governance framework with public proposals and voting. It does not certify every investment decision or guarantee that the token price goes up. Sneed’s original liquidity arrangement allows LP positions to be placed under the Sneed DAO’s control. The DAO can manage those positions through its governance process. A founder who has handed over a position no longer gets to treat it as something they can simply remove from a personal wallet. But understand the arrangement: DAO-controlled liquidity can still be moved or managed if the applicable governance approves it. Sneed’s original design expressly allows that flexibility, including the ability to approve returning a position. A time lock is another type of commitment, with an expiry and whatever rules its implementation permits. An irreversible surrender of control is different again. When someone tells you “the LP is locked,” ask what those words mean in that specific case. Who owns the position? Who controls the relevant canisters? Who can approve its transfer or withdrawal? Can the code be upgraded? When does the lock expire? Who controls the votes? If you use Sneed’s governance, you are choosing to trust that governance and its rules. If you use an Ohshii campaign DAO, you need to understand that DAO’s rules. I trust both teams. I know the people behind the projects and how to reach them. I value the work they have put in over time. The point of these tools is to turn commitments into arrangements other people can examine, with limits on what one person can do. Sneed DAO FOUNDERS NEED A FUNDING PLAN Before launching, explain how the project will pay for development, operations, and maintenance. Will it use a treasury allocation? Revenue? Grants? Disclosed sales? Fees? What happens if trading volume falls and the token price drops? Buying a token on a DEX does not automatically put that money into the project’s operating treasury. Money reaching the pool and money funding development are different flows. If your plan is to sell treasury tokens for ICP to fund growth, disclose it. Explain the budget, the amount you expect to sell, the oversight, and what that spending is supposed to accomplish. Selling tokens to fund development can serve a legitimate purpose. It also creates selling pressure. The community needs enough information to judge whether the proposed use of capital makes sense. There is a limited comparison with an at-the-market stock offering: an issuer sells into an existing market to raise capital. But selling already-issued treasury tokens does not necessarily increase total token supply the way issuing new shares does. The analogy concerns funding and market pressure; it does not give token holders the same rights as shareholders. Also, throwing the entire supply into a pool is not a substitute for planning. There is no universal allocation that fits every project. Think through the opening price, the amount of actual ICP liquidity, the token distribution, vesting, future funding, and who controls each part. Adding more of your own token against the same amount of ICP does not magically create more ICP for people to exit into. Keeping a large allocation outside the pool is not automatically better, either. If it is unrestricted, it can become another source of selling pressure. The goal should be a transparent, workable allocation—not an illusion that a founder can control a token’s value forever. And holders should ask those questions before buying. Read the lock. Inspect the treasury. Look at concentration. Check minting and upgrade authority. Get a quote for selling a meaningful amount, not just a tiny amount that makes the price look good. Pay attention to how a team communicates when the market is quiet or things go wrong. That is part of earning trust. WHY I STILL BELIEVE IN ICP I have spent time in other ecosystems. ICP still offers the most compelling combination of real utility and on-chain accountability I have found in crypto. Applications, data, token ledgers, and governance can operate on-chain. There are tools to examine ownership and control and to move important decisions into public governance. That is a powerful foundation. Application bugs, dangerous permissions, poor business decisions, and dishonest conduct remain possible. Strong network technology does not remove the need to examine the applications built on it. ICP gives me more ways to inspect what I am trusting. My responsibility is to use them, understand the risks, and size my decisions accordingly. An issued token can also remain transferable after its original founder stops working on it, provided the relevant canisters remain functional. Other people may choose to provide liquidity or build around it. Cycles help pay for computation. They do not create customers, demand, or a business. A community still has to do that work, and the relevant control and permissions still matter. That is the opportunity I see: infrastructure that can outlast the enthusiasm of one promoter, with tools for people to organize and keep building. WHAT I AM GOING TO DO At the time of writing, I have bought BRO. I intend to buy some BRO in the open market. Separately, I intend to contribute 100 ICP of my own to an additional, tightly concentrated, single-sided liquidity position in the existing BRO/ICP pool. Using ICP per BRO as the price, I plan to place the position’s range above BOB’s existing support band, while keeping it below the trading price when I set it up so it can start entirely in ICP. As sellers trade into that range, my ICP will buy their BRO. That is how this contribution creates another opportunity to sell. I then intend to transfer the position to SneedLock. My personal commitment is to leave it there permanently and not seek its return. The actual custody and governance rules still apply. I will share the position and transfer details so people can verify what I have actually done. The 100 ICP is the initial contribution. As it buys BRO, the position changes from ICP toward BRO. Leaving an LP position in place forever does not mean 100 ICP remains sitting there unchanged forever. My aim is to help holders recover more of their money. Depending on what they paid and the eventual execution, some may be able to break even or make a profit. I cannot promise that outcome, and 100 ICP cannot repair everyone’s losses. This is an open market. Any holder can trade against the position, including the founder, new buyers, and arbitrage traders. It is not a refund restricted to particular victims. My contribution also does not restore BRO’s distributions, buy-and-burn activity, or other benefits. Read the founder’s announcement. I think the token will still fade away. I understand I will most likely lose what I put in. I am choosing to make this contribution to help where I can and demonstrate the mechanics with my own money. I regularly send personal money to people I know and have worked with to feed people in the Philippines and Ghana. In the feeding efforts I support, roughly $500 can help feed around 700 people. That is why I take the value of money seriously. Money used here could also help someone elsewhere. I also believe education can have lasting value. If understanding liquidity, custody, and token permissions helps people avoid repeating these losses, that lesson can keep helping long after this particular token is forgotten. I want to keep helping people directly and helping them understand how to protect themselves. That is the “teach a man to fish” part. We have builders creating useful tools. We have people willing to support them. We need more knowledge, better planning, honest communication, and commitments people can verify. I’ll soon add the 100 ICP position above BOB’s existing support and move it into SneedLock, with the intention of leaving it there permanently. That is me putting my money where my mouth is.