Ingrid Burke Friedman

Below is a brief description of Prigozhin's mutiny and the factors that contributed to its outcome. We, as observers, initially missed important details due to the scarcity of information and lack of time for in-depth analysis. Here's the perspective that currently seems most plausible: 1️⃣ Prigozhin's rebellion wasn't a bid for power or an attempt to overtake the Kremlin. It arose from a sense of desperation; Prigozhin was forced out of Ukraine and found himself unable to sustain Wagner the way he did before, while the state machinery was turning against him. To top it off, Putin was ignoring him and publicly supporting his most dangerous adversaries. 2️⃣ Prigozhin's objective was to draw Putin's attention and to impose a discussion about conditions to preserve his activities - a defined role, security, and funding. These weren't demands for a governmental overthrow; they were a desperate bid to save the enterprise, hoping that Prigozhin's merits in taking Bakhmut (that's why he needed it!) would be taken into account and the concerns would catch Putin's serious attention. Now it appears that these merits helped Prigozhin to get out of this crisis alive, but without a political future in Russia (at least while Putin is in power). 3️⃣ Prigozhin was caught off-guard by Putin's reaction and found himself unprepared to assume the role of a revolutionary. He also wasn't prepared for the fact that Wagner was about to reach Moscow where his only option remained - to "take the Kremlin" - an action that would inevitably result in him and his fighters being eradicated. 4️⃣ Those in the elites who were able reached out to Prigozhin with offers to surrender. This likely added to his sense of impending doom. However, I don't believe any high-level negotiations took place. Lukashenko presented Prigozhin with a Putin-endorsed offer to retreat on the condition that Prigozhin would leave Russia and Wagner would be dissolved. 5️⃣ I don't think Prigozhin was in a position to make demands (such as the resignation of Shoigu or Gerasimov - something many observers expect today. If that happens, it will be due to another reason.) After Putin's address in the morning of June 24th, Prigozhin's primary concern was to find an off-ramp. The situation would have led to inevitable death in merely a few hours. It is possible that Putin has promised him safety on the condition that Prigozhin remains quietly in Belarus. I stand by my previous assertion that Putin and the state have been dealt a severe blow (which will have significant repercussions for the regime). However, I want to emphasize that image has always been a secondary concern for Putin. Setting optics aside, Putin objectively resolved the Wagner and Prigozhin problem by dissolving the former and expelling the latter. The situation would have been far worse if it had culminated in a bloody mess in the outskirts of Moscow. And no, Putin doesn't need Wagner or Prigozhin. He can manage with his own forces. He's now certainly convinced of that. I will disclose many more details in my bulletin to be issued tomorrow evening.

The current situation is as follows: Putin has taken a clear stance to quash the rebellion. However, there are at least two major issues with this. The first one is the civilian population. Would they dare to attack civilian facilities in Rostov? The second issue pertains to controlling the army. It is tough to gauge current loyalties at the moment. I am confident that the military hierarchy stands with the government, and there won't be any switching of allegiances. Yet, lower in the ranks, it's a different story. If orders to open fire are issued, how will individual soldiers react? For now, it appears that Prigozhin and his associates will be coaxed into surrendering. I'm sceptical about the success of this strategy. This could potentially result in a protracted stand-off. The Kremlin will likely aim to physically isolate Prigozhin, cut off his resources, and bide its time. However, Prigozhin's downfall seems inevitable.