The Carbon Markets Africa Summit in Kigali closed last week with a clear instruction: move from potential to delivery. For Guinea, that instruction arrives at a useful moment. The country is only weeks away from COP31 in Antalya and the Green Climate Fund Board meeting in Songdo. The practical question is no longer whether Africa will sell carbon credits. It is under what terms. The voluntary market remains thin. In 2024, declared transaction value fell to roughly 535 million dollars, down 29 percent in a year (Ecosystem Marketplace, 2025). African credits trade near 7.5 dollars per tonne, against a global average of about 6.3 dollars. European compliance allowances, by contrast, have traded between 60 and 90 euros. The Africa Carbon Markets Initiative’s target of 300 million credits a year by 2030 remains an ambition, not a market reality. Science imposes caution. A meta-analysis in Nature Communications finds that less than 16 percent of the credits examined, drawn from nearly 2,350 projects, correspond to real emission reductions (Probst et al., 2024). Quasi-experimental work on avoided deforestation reaches similar conclusions for most projects (West et al., 2023). Clean-cooking projects, among the most common in Africa, show particularly large gaps between claimed and measured outcomes (Gill-Wiehl et al., 2024). These are estimates, not final verdicts. They do, however, show that a poorly measured credit sells once and then discounts the entire market. Ghana and Senegal have already moved under Article 6. In July 2025 Ghana transferred nearly 11,700 ITMOs to the Swiss KliK Foundation for a clean-cooking activity, the first such African issuance for NDC use. In September 2026 Senegal and Switzerland authorised the first credits under a Dakar taxi electrification programme. Both cases rest on corresponding adjustments. Without them the same credit is counted twice. Guinea starts from a near-blank page. Its NDC 3.0, validated in Conakry in October 2025, estimates needs at 17.7 billion dollars for 2026-2035, of which 8.4 billion is for adaptation, and states an intention to use Articles 6.2 and 6.4. The country is also preparing a carbon price in the mining sector from 2027, which would make it the first in West Africa and the first in Africa to apply it by sector. A national carbon-markets cell is being formed, a registry is planned but not yet operational, and no bilateral agreement has been signed. That delay is useful. It leaves time to set conditions on quality, traceability, community rights and revenue sharing before the tap is opened. The risk is not selling too little. It is selling too fast and too low an asset the country cannot sell twice. #gt2050, #MEDD

The Carbon Markets Africa Summit in Kigali closed last week with a call to move from potential to delivery. For Guinea the timing matters: COP31 in Antalya and the Green Climate Fund Board meeting in Songdo are only weeks away. The practical question is now the terms on which Africa sells carbon credits. The voluntary market is still thin. Declared transaction value fell by 29 percent in 2024, to roughly 535 million dollars (Ecosystem Marketplace, 2025). African credits trade near 7.5 dollars per tonne, above a global average of about 6.3 dollars, while European compliance allowances have traded between 60 and 90 euros. The Africa Carbon Markets Initiative’s target of 300 million credits a year by 2030 is still only a target. The research gives reasons for caution. A meta-analysis in Nature Communications finds that less than 16 percent of the credits examined, drawn from nearly 2,350 projects, correspond to real emission reductions (Probst et al., 2024). Quasi-experimental studies of avoided deforestation reach similar conclusions for most projects (West et al., 2023), and clean-cooking projects, among the most common in Africa, show particularly large gaps between claimed and measured outcomes (Gill-Wiehl et al., 2024). These figures are estimates and may be revised. Even so, they show that a poorly measured credit can be sold once, after which buyers discount the whole market. Ghana and Senegal have already acted under Article 6. In July 2025 Ghana transferred nearly 11,700 ITMOs to the Swiss KliK Foundation for a clean-cooking activity, the first such African issuance for NDC use. In September 2026 Senegal and Switzerland authorised the first credits under a Dakar taxi electrification programme. Both transactions rest on corresponding adjustments, without which the same credit would be counted twice. Guinea is starting almost from scratch. Its NDC 3.0, validated in Conakry in October 2025, puts needs for 2026-2035 at 17.7 billion dollars, 8.4 billion of it for adaptation, and states the intention to use Articles 6.2 and 6.4. The country is also preparing a carbon price for the mining sector from 2027, which would make it the first in West Africa, and the first in Africa, to apply one by sector. A national carbon-markets cell is being set up and a registry is planned but not yet operational. No bilateral agreement has been signed. The delay works in Guinea’s favour, because it leaves time to set conditions on quality, traceability, community rights and revenue sharing before any credit is sold. The main risk is not that Guinea sells too little, but that it sells too fast and too cheaply an asset it can sell only once. #PresidenceGN #PrimatureGN #GouvGN #MEDDGN #EnsemblePourLaGuinee #MarchésCarbone #Article6 #FinanceClimatique #CDNGuinée #GT2050 #ClimatAfrique #SouverainetéCarbone