Jeet retweeted
Thanks @jacqmelinek !
The part that stayed with me is his proposal for near real-time, cross-platform freezing between venues. As an engineering goal it is clear, but on Oct 29 the money wasnt saved by venues and not by network speed, it was saved by issuers and law enforcement, and it took hours, yup? The bottleneck was authority, not latency: who decides, on whose request, what happens on a false positive, and where the victim goes when his token was frozen because of somebody else's incident. If the alliance targets speed, it produces a list of on-call numbers. If it targets rules and liability, it produces the institution crypto still does not have
And the quieter point. @cz_binance himself says people lose money in self-custody not to hacks but to their own operational errors. That is the same failure class as the DevOps laptop and the service container. So the lesson of the largest hack isnt about cryptography, its about operations, and it holds equally for a user with a seed phrase, for an exchange with a pipeline and for a fund with a register
🚨 LIVE @CZ_Binance's First Interview on @_TalkingTokens After The $6.3B @Binance Hack teapawt.org/i/broadcasts/2peANvaaX…
Jeet retweeted
October in RWA, or what actually changed this month
Month-end, so I want to lay RWA out as one chain instead of a news list, because in October every decision dragged the next one behind it, and taken separately none of these stories make sense
Let me start with the permission, since that is what turned tokenization from an experiment into a commitment. On Sept 17 the @SECGov issued its five-year Innovation Exemption (teapawt.org/SECGov/status/21005713…), with Chairman @SECPaulSAtkins framing it the same hour as bringing American capital markets into the digital age (teapawt.org/SECPaulSAtkins/status/…), and the order itself running to sixty pages of conditions: permissioned access only, real ownership only, no synthetics, no leverage or hypothecation, 75 securities per venue and no more than 0.25% of average daily volume per name (sec.gov/files/rules/exorders…)
Three weeks later, on Oct 8, @Securitize launched Securitize Stocks with twelve US names from Apple and Microsoft to Nvidia, Tesla and Palantir, settled in USDC on Solana, trading in extended hours first (reuters.com/technology/secur…), and the disclosure is blunt about what a holder actually owns: a security entitlement backed one to one by a share, not a place on the shareholder register unless they convert (crypto.news/apple-shares-arr…). That is the difference from a pilot. A pilot can be closed with one line in a press release, while a product with a ticker and dividend rights has to be serviced for the people who bought it
Then it gets more interesting, because a product needs yield, and gold quietly climbed out of the vault
On Sept 26 @paxoslabs shipped PAXGy, where the return accrues from institutional gold lending rather than from printing new tokens, and on Oct 7 @GSR_io launched Hare with a hundred million of its own capital, first product Hare Gold Earn built with Paxos Labs on PAXG and PAXGy through @aave , which you can read about here (coindesk.com/business/2026/1…). Gold in token form stopped being a bar in a safe and became collateral that works, and the category quickly became visible: five point three to five point five billion dollars, XAUt around three, PAXG around one point eight, ninety percent of the market between the two of them, and ninety point seven billion in spot volume in Q1 alone (aerapass.io/blog/the-rise-of…). It is the only RWA with a real secondary market, and I will ask you to remember that, because it pays off at the end
Equities and gold need settlement if they move, and that is where @The_DTCC walks in
On Oct 28, one day before the Binance incident, DTC launched the Tokenization Service commercially, and their own announcement is a single line saying it is live and this is only the beginning (teapawt.org/The_DTCC/status/211542…), against twenty signed participants from @jpmorgan and Bank of America to Citadel Securities and DriveWealth, a hundred and fifty firms in the working group, and a hundred and fourteen trillion in custody behind it (dtcc.com/press-releases/2026…), running on @CantonNetwork and a private Besu
The fine print matters more than the announcement, and here is why. Those tokens carry no settlement value and no collateral value inside DTC's own risk management, so meeting margin or an end-of-day obligation still means converting back to ordinary book-entry form. Wallets have to be DTC-registered, dividends, votes and tenders stay off-chain, and the contracts ship with mint, burn, pause, clawback and transfer limits (techtimes.com/articles/32965… and coingabbar.com/en/dtcc-token…). The infrastructure did not arrive to remove the intermediary. It arrived so the intermediary can keep working around the clock and never leave
Then comes the boring part, which is exactly why it matters. Settlement needs reserves, and on Oct 22 @JPMorganAM put MONY and JLTXX on @solana (am.jpmorgan.com/us/en/asset-…), where JLTXX is not simply a money market fund but a registered government money market fund designed specifically as a GENIUS reserve asset for stablecoin issuers, with a one million minimum and 0.16% in expenses (phemex.com/blogs/jpmorgan-so…). Worth saying plainly: they announced this in a press release and did not bother posting it on X, which tells you exactly who the audience was. GENIUS reserve compliance lands by January 2027, and the whole migration is happening without a single headline: the reserve base of the crypto dollar is moving out of an issuer's own portfolio into a 2a-7 fund with audits and reporting. Three hundred billion in stablecoins is changing its backing and almost nobody writes about it, because it is dull
Money, meanwhile, is contracting
Stablecoins peaked at 322.4 billion on May 17 and slid to 300.4 by Oct 25, with USDC alone down 4.69 billion in thirty days (stablecoinbeat.com/charts/ma…), while RWA grew from 21.5 billion at the start of the year to 39 per @RWA_xyz , and 46.3 per @tokenterminal , because the two count different things. Add it up and no new money entered crypto this month, it just changed form: part of those stables moved into tokenized Treasuries, since 3.6% on BUIDL beats zero on USDC, and landed inside the same compliance perimeter. Same dollar, different wrapper, different issuer, different regulatory regime. And there is a signal almost nobody flagged: Token Terminal puts only 13.3 billion of T-bills inside a 46.3 billion market, under a third, while yield strategies and credit funds grow faster, which means the market started hunting yield instead of just parking cash
And now Oct 29, where the number that matters is not how much left but what got stopped. @blockaid_ walked through the mechanics first, fifty EIP-7702 authorizations sprayed into one transaction because the attacker did not know the live nonce, one of fifty landing (teapawt.org/blockaid_/status/21159…), and Binance's own update the next day reads far less exotic than the thread did: hot wallets compromised around 20:05 UTC, about 6.3 billion dollars impacted, roughly 3 billion frozen with partners, no evidence of a private key leak, and an initial finding pointing at a compromised DevOps engineer's laptop that gave access to a service container and from there to unauthorized withdrawal transactions (teapawt.org/binance/status/2116258… and teapawt.org/_RichardTeng/status/21…). Sit with that for a second: the largest crypto heist in history may have started with one laptop and a service container, with no private key involved at all
Look at the RWA bucket (thx @HarryTran_RWA teapawt.org/HarryTran_RWA/status/2… ) inside that incident and the picture becomes painfully clear: XAUt with 50.5 million frozen, @Ondo with 8.7 million sold, PAXG with 7.7 million, which @Paxos froze themselves at 1,906.67 PAXG in a named wallet and confirmed their reserves never moved (teapawt.org/Paxos/status/211594074…), while CFG at 1.3 million, RE at 1.3, PLUME at a million and SYRUP at 0.9 cannot be frozen at all. What survived had an issuer with a blacklist function and a compliance desk able to press a button at two in the morning, and ONDO was sold not because the project is worse but because it is a governance token with no issuer able to freeze somebody else's coins. The response itself is the argument: @tether froze over 1.567 billion USDT, in Ardoino's @paoloardoino own words about protecting the industry and their partners (teapawt.org/paoloardoino/status/21…), @circle over 800 million USDC in coordination with law enforcement, Ripple around 200 million, World Liberty 27 million USD1 (techflowpost.com/en-US/artic…), and Binance's verified tally climbed to roughly 3 billion (teapawt.org/binance/status/2116258…). Two private companies and a few issuers stopped billions overnight, without a courtroom, without a regulator, and without asking anyone in this thread
Put all of it together and the real story of the month is a shift from issuance to recovery. September asked whether a share can be tokenized at all. October asked something else entirely, namely how you claw the money back when something breaks, and only the permissioned perimeter has an answer, because the permissionless one has none by design. At the same time competition moved from technology to jurisdiction: @Nasdaq got approval in March, the SEC wrote the exemption in September, DTC went live in October, J.P. Morgan built a GENIUS-ready fund in May and shipped it to a second chain in October, and the winner here is not the fastest chain but the one holding a license, an audit and a way to freeze
There is one more thing to keep in mind the next time somebody shows you a beautiful growth chart. Watch holders, not AUM, because BUIDL is 2.25 billion across 106 holders at a 21 million average (rwa.xyz data, eco.com/support/en/articles/…), tokenized Treasuries sit at 15.4 billion with almost no secondary trading, BUIDL lost 600 million in a month, DEX volume in tokenized assets halved according to trackers, and Figure's 24 billion never leaves its own platform so it does not even count as distributed (greenwichsoundcapital.com/ar…). The IMF (@IMFNews) put it plainly on Oct 13: the market is small, fragmented, relatively illiquid and around 1.5 times more volatile than its traditional counterpart, with nearly all activity in repo at 300 to 350 billion a day (financemagnates.com/cryptocu…). Taken as a whole, RWA in October 2026 is a registry rather than a market: enormous, legal, impeccably reported and almost motionless, which is fine at this stage as long as nobody calls it a market
Four things I will be watching in November. First, January 2027 and the GENIUS reserve deadline, with November and December as the quiet run-up to it. Second, whether DTC tokens start counting as collateral, because the entire boundary rests on that today, and when they do, repo moves on-chain and that gets measured in trillions. Third, whether secondary liquidity shows up anywhere outside gold. And fourth, what Binance's post-mortem actually says about that laptop, because if the answer is a DevOps machine and a container rather than a broken key, then the whole security conversation in this industry has been pointed at the wrong target for years, and that is a much bigger story than 6.3 billion
Jeet retweeted
getting ready for bed and all, but ok
UPDATE, hours later - and let me correct myself first
I wrote that the Binance thing was unconfirmed. Now it's worse than I said: CZ himself posted "it does look like a hack on Binance." Outflows $5.5–5.8B across ETH, BTC and Tron. Withdrawals paused. Tether froze over $1.56B in USDT, Circle ~$823M in USDC, Ripple another ~$200M - so roughly $2.4B of stables frozen within about an hour
Three corrections to my own post: it's not unconfirmed anymore; it's not $2.8B but $5.5–5.8B; and Bybit at $1.5B is no longer the biggest heist in crypto history yup
But let me be precise so nobody catches me on the numbers:
— the part actually tied to the attacker is the Ethereum side, $3.3B (167,464 ETH + $1.6B USDT + 62 tokens, then another 28,006 ETH and $780M USDC);
— the $5.5–5.8B is gross outflow across chains, including BTC and Tron, which nobody has tied to the attacker yet. That's an on-chain estimate, not a confirmed loss;
— and when CZ was asked about a "$1B loss after the freezes" estimate, he replied: "Loss might be a bit higher than that, but will cover."
Now look at what actually just happened, because this is the point I was making, only better
Two private companies froze ~$2.4B in the middle of the night. Not a regulator. Not a court. Tether and Circle. That's the whole new financial architecture in one screenshot: money that moves in seconds and stops in seconds, by two issuers nobody in this thread voted for. This is what "money has moved into digital" looks like in practice - and it comes with an off switch.
And notice who pays. $2.4B frozen is a win. The rest isn't: about $700M in USDT left the receiving address before the blacklist and was already swapped to ETH, and native assets like ETH and BTC can't be frozen at all. And here's the part nobody's writing: SAFU is 15,000 BTC, roughly $1.2B - basically the size of the realized loss. The reserve sits in a volatile asset while the liability is denominated in dollars. That's the cash gap in one sentence: BTC drops 20% and the cushion stops being a cushion
One more detail. Binance edited its own statement twice in 13 minutes, from "we have not confirmed any impact to user funds" to "user funds are completely safe." It never once used the word hack. Withdrawals are halted until the environment is confirmed safe, per co-CEO Yi He
And the cherry. The gas for the attacker's address came through Tornado Cash, and the same steps were run on three small wallets earlier - looks like a rehearsal. One reported vector is EIP-7702, where a wallet gets pointed at a contract. Binance will have to explain it, but "internal wallet reshuffle" is already off the table
Nothing in my original post changes in substance. It just got upgraded from theory to this morning's news. Cash gaps surface as "we got hacked," the loss gets moved onto specific people, and trust moves from the small to the licensed. Only the size of the receipt changed
And yes, I'd rather correct myself in public than be right in silence
latenight schizo posting from Yurich, continued
blah-blah-blah we got hacked, ffs
I dunno, I've been saying this for ages, but today is just a perfect illustration day, so let me put it all in one text, alright
First, the facts for today
@Polymarket - hacked: 995 wallets, two million six hundred fifty-four thousand dollars, and literally within an hour. And they didn't hack the exchange itself, they hacked the supply chain: there was a third-party web-analytics script running on the site, and someone stuffed malicious code into it. That code read your trading session straight out of the browser, dumped your positions into the market in a cascade - c'mon) - first 3% under market, then at half price, then at the floor, - and swapped the balance into POL and sent it to the attacker's address. The malicious script vanished from production at 17:59, and the build even kept the commit message where they removed it. So you don't have to crack the safe - you just swap out the camera that shows what's inside the safe. And that's their second case this year: June was about three million, anyone who remembers that one is as much of a schizo as I am, HEH
Next - "they hacked Banana for like ±5 bil" ?
On-chain you can see movement - about 167k ETH and 780 million USDC from @binance wallets to a new address, - but movement doesn't equal theft, it could easily be an internal wallet reshuffle. And a comment from Banana might come out while I'm writing this, or might not come at all, or honestly who gives a damn about their comment)). The funniest part is the market paid anyway. BNB down nearly a tenner percent, BTC down five or so, etc., in one hour they force-closed over 600 million in positions, and 97% of it was longs. So a rumor about a hack cost more than the actual hack. Silence in a system like this is also an action - just one aimed at your own people)
@Bybit_Official glitched too or whatever, but that was Feb '25, and it's still the biggest heist in crypto history at one and a half bil) But more to come) They didn't even steal keys there - they swapped the interface where the transaction gets signed: the signers saw the correct address, but the transaction did something else. This year the main hit was Bitget - 387.5 million in September, through a hole in a third-party security product, which gave them internal access and let them forge withdrawal commands
Now, the reason I'm writing this.
Any hack, crack, break or whatever other junk on an exchange - is a cash gap first, and an external attack second. An exchange is not a safe where your coins sit. It's just a balance sheet: on one side, what you see in the app; on the other, what's actually in the wallets and how much of it is already lent out, pledged or working. While the market's going up, nobody cares about that difference. But when liquidity contracts, the difference crawls out. And it doesn't crawl out in the form of "uh, we're short on money and here's us being honest about it," because that's bankruptcy and criminal charges - it crawls out in the simple form of "Uhh, we got hacked" - and that's just force majeure, like at Wildberries (who know) and so on, and then come the sympathy, the insurance, the deferral and the chance to scrape the money back together. And a hack just stops being a crime and becomes an accounting category too. I'm not saying every hack is staged (although…), there are more than enough holes in the supply chain. I'm saying a hack is the only legal form in which a hole can come out into the open without killing the company. That's why, in moments of stress, institutions suddenly remember hacks
And immediately the question - who's actually paying, huh?)) Always someone specific. Bybit closed its one and a half bil in 72 hours - but not out of thin air: loans from Galaxy Digital, @FalconXGlobal and @wintermute_t plus support from other exchanges. Customers didn't lose anything, only now those creditors have leverage over the exchange. @bitget covered 387 million out of its protection fund - and that fund was topped up with the same users' fees. Polymarket says it'll make everyone whole - okaaaay, except for whose money and when, they're not saying)) The loss doesn't disappear, it just moves. And to whom?))
Now on liquidity redistribution, and here I want you to get the mechanics, not the mysticism. In today's hour, 620 million in liquidations, almost all longs. That means: people were sitting on leverage betting up, price went down, collateral ran out, exchanges closed their positions at market. Who got that money? The ones on the other side who weren't leveraged - right? right) Market makers, funds, whoever was holding cash. Then the forced selling pushes price even lower and knocks out the next layer of leverage. That pump doesn't need a bad actor, it just needs a match. And a rumor can be the match. Thaaaat's why the real leverage in this market isn't theft - it's plain animal fear. Whoever can sell fear earns more than whoever can steal, that's a fact)
On October 27, two days before today's hacks, the US Treasury Secretary spoke and said it straight: digital assets are a strategic technology, "we will win in the digital asset stack, and it's going to continue to fortify the US dollar," and stables are "an important source of funding for the Treasury" pfft haha. That's not some influencer saying it - that's the actual Treasury Secretary) Look at the numbers: 300 billion in stablecoins worldwide, 99%+ of them in dollarydoos. Tether holds about 141 billion in short-term US paper in reserves - meaning the biggest holder of short-term US government debt isn't a bank or a fund, it's a crypto-dollar issuer. Tokenized Treasuries already past 14 billion, @BlackRock and @jpmorgan are launching their own funds, @NYSE through its parent put six hundred million into Polymarket. That's what moving finance into digital actually looks like - but notice who wins in it, that's all)
Because my conclusion differs from what people usually say. It's just the dollar that moved into a new shell. And the infrastructure of the new shell went to whoever has a license and capital: BlackRock, JPMorgan, Circle, ICE, Kalshi. And here's the picture from a single day: while they were draining wallets at Polymarket, Kalshi announced a billion-dollar round at a 40-billion valuation the same day - a year ago it was worth five. Loss at the bottom, capital at the top. That's redistribution, literally, no conspiracy theory required)
And why do hacks move the architecture of the world at all, even though they're small individually - think about that too. They redistribute not money but trust. After every story like this - and there've been three in a row now, through Safe, through a security vendor, through an analytics script - smart people draw the conclusion like "don't keep it on the exchange!!" and move into self-custody. And the regulator gets a mandate: GENIUS Act, MiCA, oversight. And rules are always written for whoever can comply. The small ones close, the big ones get a license and an inflow of clients. It's the same cycle every time: 1907 - the Fed was created, 2008 - too big to fail, 2023 - the stablecoin law. Crisis is a tool of centralization, that's not my invention, it's a pattern going back a hundred-plus fuckin' years
That's why I'm saying: what's happening is not a string of random hacks, and stop believing that already) It's just liquidity contracting, the holes surfacing, trust flowing from small to big, and money physically relocating into the digital dollar. The shift in the financial operating system is already underway, and it's not following the crypto-anarchists' script - it's following the US Treasury's script (let's officially call it that)
What to do? Eh, do whatever you feel like)
And on the whole "is this a conspiracy theory" thing) I always offer a simple test: separate three things. What happened, who benefits, and who organized it. Whoever mixes those three together is the one they call a conspiracy theorist. I don't mix them. I look at the mechanics: the holes, the creditors, the valuations, the laws, and where the money actually ended up. And so far the mechanics check out every single time
Late-night schizo posting from Yurich
But honestly - which "schizo take" lately hasn't turned out to be true?
Mwah!
he knows
blah-blah-blah we got hacked, ffs
I dunno, I've been saying this for ages, but today is just a perfect illustration day, so let me put it all in one text, alright
First, the facts for today
@Polymarket - hacked: 995 wallets, two million six hundred fifty-four thousand dollars, and literally within an hour. And they didn't hack the exchange itself, they hacked the supply chain: there was a third-party web-analytics script running on the site, and someone stuffed malicious code into it. That code read your trading session straight out of the browser, dumped your positions into the market in a cascade - c'mon) - first 3% under market, then at half price, then at the floor, - and swapped the balance into POL and sent it to the attacker's address. The malicious script vanished from production at 17:59, and the build even kept the commit message where they removed it. So you don't have to crack the safe - you just swap out the camera that shows what's inside the safe. And that's their second case this year: June was about three million, anyone who remembers that one is as much of a schizo as I am, HEH
Next - "they hacked Banana for like ±5 bil" ?
On-chain you can see movement - about 167k ETH and 780 million USDC from @binance wallets to a new address, - but movement doesn't equal theft, it could easily be an internal wallet reshuffle. And a comment from Banana might come out while I'm writing this, or might not come at all, or honestly who gives a damn about their comment)). The funniest part is the market paid anyway. BNB down nearly a tenner percent, BTC down five or so, etc., in one hour they force-closed over 600 million in positions, and 97% of it was longs. So a rumor about a hack cost more than the actual hack. Silence in a system like this is also an action - just one aimed at your own people)
@Bybit_Official glitched too or whatever, but that was Feb '25, and it's still the biggest heist in crypto history at one and a half bil) But more to come) They didn't even steal keys there - they swapped the interface where the transaction gets signed: the signers saw the correct address, but the transaction did something else. This year the main hit was Bitget - 387.5 million in September, through a hole in a third-party security product, which gave them internal access and let them forge withdrawal commands
Now, the reason I'm writing this.
Any hack, crack, break or whatever other junk on an exchange - is a cash gap first, and an external attack second. An exchange is not a safe where your coins sit. It's just a balance sheet: on one side, what you see in the app; on the other, what's actually in the wallets and how much of it is already lent out, pledged or working. While the market's going up, nobody cares about that difference. But when liquidity contracts, the difference crawls out. And it doesn't crawl out in the form of "uh, we're short on money and here's us being honest about it," because that's bankruptcy and criminal charges - it crawls out in the simple form of "Uhh, we got hacked" - and that's just force majeure, like at Wildberries (who know) and so on, and then come the sympathy, the insurance, the deferral and the chance to scrape the money back together. And a hack just stops being a crime and becomes an accounting category too. I'm not saying every hack is staged (although…), there are more than enough holes in the supply chain. I'm saying a hack is the only legal form in which a hole can come out into the open without killing the company. That's why, in moments of stress, institutions suddenly remember hacks
And immediately the question - who's actually paying, huh?)) Always someone specific. Bybit closed its one and a half bil in 72 hours - but not out of thin air: loans from Galaxy Digital, @FalconXGlobal and @wintermute_t plus support from other exchanges. Customers didn't lose anything, only now those creditors have leverage over the exchange. @bitget covered 387 million out of its protection fund - and that fund was topped up with the same users' fees. Polymarket says it'll make everyone whole - okaaaay, except for whose money and when, they're not saying)) The loss doesn't disappear, it just moves. And to whom?))
Now on liquidity redistribution, and here I want you to get the mechanics, not the mysticism. In today's hour, 620 million in liquidations, almost all longs. That means: people were sitting on leverage betting up, price went down, collateral ran out, exchanges closed their positions at market. Who got that money? The ones on the other side who weren't leveraged - right? right) Market makers, funds, whoever was holding cash. Then the forced selling pushes price even lower and knocks out the next layer of leverage. That pump doesn't need a bad actor, it just needs a match. And a rumor can be the match. Thaaaat's why the real leverage in this market isn't theft - it's plain animal fear. Whoever can sell fear earns more than whoever can steal, that's a fact)
On October 27, two days before today's hacks, the US Treasury Secretary spoke and said it straight: digital assets are a strategic technology, "we will win in the digital asset stack, and it's going to continue to fortify the US dollar," and stables are "an important source of funding for the Treasury" pfft haha. That's not some influencer saying it - that's the actual Treasury Secretary) Look at the numbers: 300 billion in stablecoins worldwide, 99%+ of them in dollarydoos. Tether holds about 141 billion in short-term US paper in reserves - meaning the biggest holder of short-term US government debt isn't a bank or a fund, it's a crypto-dollar issuer. Tokenized Treasuries already past 14 billion, @BlackRock and @jpmorgan are launching their own funds, @NYSE through its parent put six hundred million into Polymarket. That's what moving finance into digital actually looks like - but notice who wins in it, that's all)
Because my conclusion differs from what people usually say. It's just the dollar that moved into a new shell. And the infrastructure of the new shell went to whoever has a license and capital: BlackRock, JPMorgan, Circle, ICE, Kalshi. And here's the picture from a single day: while they were draining wallets at Polymarket, Kalshi announced a billion-dollar round at a 40-billion valuation the same day - a year ago it was worth five. Loss at the bottom, capital at the top. That's redistribution, literally, no conspiracy theory required)
And why do hacks move the architecture of the world at all, even though they're small individually - think about that too. They redistribute not money but trust. After every story like this - and there've been three in a row now, through Safe, through a security vendor, through an analytics script - smart people draw the conclusion like "don't keep it on the exchange!!" and move into self-custody. And the regulator gets a mandate: GENIUS Act, MiCA, oversight. And rules are always written for whoever can comply. The small ones close, the big ones get a license and an inflow of clients. It's the same cycle every time: 1907 - the Fed was created, 2008 - too big to fail, 2023 - the stablecoin law. Crisis is a tool of centralization, that's not my invention, it's a pattern going back a hundred-plus fuckin' years
That's why I'm saying: what's happening is not a string of random hacks, and stop believing that already) It's just liquidity contracting, the holes surfacing, trust flowing from small to big, and money physically relocating into the digital dollar. The shift in the financial operating system is already underway, and it's not following the crypto-anarchists' script - it's following the US Treasury's script (let's officially call it that)
What to do? Eh, do whatever you feel like)
And on the whole "is this a conspiracy theory" thing) I always offer a simple test: separate three things. What happened, who benefits, and who organized it. Whoever mixes those three together is the one they call a conspiracy theorist. I don't mix them. I look at the mechanics: the holes, the creditors, the valuations, the laws, and where the money actually ended up. And so far the mechanics check out every single time
Late-night schizo posting from Yurich
But honestly - which "schizo take" lately hasn't turned out to be true?
Mwah!
Jeet retweeted
Time travel challenge: it’s 5 years ago. You already know that the quiet, tangible stuff is about to get a lot more attention than most people think. What’s your play?
Jeet retweeted
BlackRock didn’t invent RWA.
The idea of putting real-world assets on a blockchain is older than Ethereum - and its roots reach back centuries.
The idea of putting real-world assets on a blockchain is older than Ethereum and its roots reach back centuries.
Fck u @pointfarmcap
This idiot @pointfarmcap deployed solana:BpLjp3ydXEPmnEp7RL3gEZigS91qnuvuA6MwA8aUR3ph and sold. I love these types of idiots
Gm btw












