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Muslim Kurds, fake Ezidi shia dogs, ashuri gawads, Armenian sellouts all attack me.
Life is good 😎
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Şêrê Mirîd retweeted
Koma Wetan was the first ever Kurdish rock band, founded in 1973 in Soviet Georgia, Tbilisi.
Three Yazidi Kurds and one Armenian singing in Kurdish. Frontman Kerem Gerdenzeri was born and raised in Tbilisi however his family roots originate from Kars and Van.
Koma Wetan - Sînê
Şêrê Mirîd retweeted
ساڵیادی بنیاتنانی شاری سلێمانی، شاری هەڵمەت و قوربانی لە هەموو کوردستانییەکی دڵسۆز و نیشتیمانپەروەر پیرۆز بێت.
هاووڵاتییانی خۆشەویستی سلێمانی، شایستەی خزمەتی زیاتر و ئازادی و پێشکەوتن و سەقامگیریی و ئارامین.
Şêrê Mirîd retweeted
An important 2025 publication investigating how Öcalan’s democratic confederalism opposes only one state, the Kurdish one, by socially engineering and removing Kurdish social and political structures that act against assimilation. This is proven using his own writings and notes. In his original Turkish he calls Turkey’s borders legitimate and says the Turkish flag can fly over his grave. He told Kurdish MPs that asking the state for Kurdish education “is a mistake”. He promised that his model removes the “danger” of Kurdish becoming an official language, and eases the assimilation process of Kurds in the countries they live in. He said he built the KCK during talks with Turkish intelligence chief Emre Taner. He also called the Kurdish National Congress the body that would “determine the Misak-ı Milli”, the 1920 pact that claimed Mosul, Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah for Turkey.
It draws on Öcalan’s post-2000 Turkish texts, including the KCK Social Pact, Democratic Confederalism, Problems of Democratization in Turkey, Defending a People and his İmralı notes from 2013 and 2014, and prints the originals in the footnotes. Democratic confederalism is presented as an alternative to the nation-state, yet it leaves all occupying forces that rule Kurdistan untouched and treats them as legitimate.
The translation problem is specific. Democratic Confederalism is under 50 pages, yet its flag statements, “I respect the Turkish flag” and “your flag is mine”, appear only in the Turkish edition. The English version uses the word “assimilation” five times, always critically. The Turkish original uses it once, and there Öcalan accepts the “natural assimilation” of Kurds, describing them as a “sociological phenomenon” and a “richness” for the Turkish nation. Most Western scholarship on Öcalan, including Jongerden, Akkaya, Gunes, Dirik and Graeber, rests on these selective translations. Kamran Matin and Michiel Leezenberg are among the few critical exceptions.
The story that Öcalan converted from Kurdish statehood to post-nationalism under Murray Bookchin’s influence does not hold, because there was no statehood project to give up. In 1977 he said the PKK “did not emerge exclusively for only one nationality”. In 2004 he admitted that “Independent Kurdistan” was a slogan and that the PKK never thought the question of a state through. In a 1988 interview with Mehmet Ali Birand he spoke of coexistence and “internal independence”. At a 1993 press conference in Lebanon with Jalal Talabani he said Kurds and Turks could not separate, comparing them to “a fingernail and the surrounding flesh”, and offered to disarm in return for legal guarantees. In 1996 interviews with Nabil al-Mulham he denied that Western Kurdistan exists, saying “it is correct to say Syrian Kurds”, and proposed federalism inside Turkey, Iran and Iraq on the German, Spanish and Swiss models. The real shift after his capture was from supporting Kurdish federalism to opposing it. He also claims that without his “insight” in prison he “would have been a primitive nationalist aspiring for the nation-state”, which contradicts his own account.
Behind this sits a Kemalist view of Kurds that runs through his writing. In 2004 he wrote that Kurds “were not even aware of the extent of their betrayal” and that “neither human nor animal laws applied to them. They almost played the role of a third kind of being.” He spoke of the “old Kurdish trouble”. He told cadres that Kurds who believe they are free “must first be enslaved, and then these slaves must be freed”. He said his personality and principles “are more like those of a prophet”. In 1992 he told Birand that Kurdish power must stay under a single leadership: “I hold all these strings in my hand.” The PKK’s working language remained Turkish, and in 47 years it has produced no serious plan to revive Kurdish. Meanwhile the war emptied 2,685 Kurdish villages and hamlets by 1996, according to Human Rights Watch. A Van teachers’ union estimate puts the share of Kurds speaking Kurdish at 90% in the 1920s and around 7 to 8% today, with voluntary assimilation peaking during the Turkeyification years under the AKP.
In Öcalan’s own words, democratic confederalism leaves the Turkish state untouched. “The institutions and existing borders of the Republic of Turkey are considered legitimate. Issues such as whether it should be unitary, federal or confederal are not discussed, and it is not even recommended to bring them up.” “Yes to state reform, no to opposition to the state.” A completely stateless democracy is “adventurism”. “I am not saying that Turkey should become confederal. I am saying that it should be a democratic republic without losing its unitary structure.” Kurds should build their confederalism “without touching the borders”. The 2005 KCK Social Pact declares that three legal systems will now apply in Kurdistan: EU law, unitary state law and democratic confederal law. Öcalan describes the KCK as a civil society body that belongs “within the totality of the people or nation of Turkey”. He calls it parallel and complementary to the unitary state, and says its flexible idea of the nation will block “the problem-causing potential of federalist solutions”. He calls the nation-state fascist and compares it to Hitler and Mussolini, yet he declares the Turkish nation-state legitimate by calling it a republic. France, the first modern nation-state, was also a republic. Real multinational states such as Switzerland and Belgium rest on decentralisation and constitutional multilingualism, the very things Öcalan rules out.
On where the KCK came from, the İmralı notes are blunt. “We want to be a fundamental democratic element of this state… I built the KCK on this condition during Emre’s time.” Emre Taner was then head of Turkish intelligence (MİT). Öcalan describes five exhausting years of negotiations with Taner and a 156-page roadmap that was rejected. In his 2009 book he calls for “an intensive dialogue with the state’s security forces” to resolve the KCK’s legal questions. The KCK came out of bargaining with the Turkish state, not out of a Bookchinite change of paradigm.
Then there is the Misak-ı Milli. The last Ottoman parliament adopted it in 1920, and it defined Turkey’s borders as the armistice line of 1918. Mustafa Kemal’s own definition ran from south of İskenderun through the Jarablus bridge between Aleppo and Katma to the Euphrates and down to Deir ez-Zor. It included Mosul, Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah, which means South and West Kurdistan. He wrote to Talat Pasha that “all our provinces where Turkish and Kurdish are spoken will belong to us”. He told parliament that “the line that we will determine with our strength and power will be the border”. Turkey annexed Hatay on the same logic in 1939, and Erdoğan invoked the Pact over Mosul in 2016.
Öcalan presents this pact as a Kurdish-Turkish brotherhood. He writes that its borders were “built on the unity of Kurds and Turks”. He says its break-up after 1925 “is actually the fragmentation of the Kurds” and that “when we mention the Middle East Confederation, it is about reviving this”. He says he does not see it as “an imperial event”. He tells the PKK: “All Kurds will establish a strong alliance with Turkey. The National Pact Commission will discuss this… This alliance has existed since the Hittites.” He describes the KCK as an umbrella for “all Kurds of the Middle East within the framework of Turkey’s national integrity”. He builds a thousand-year history for this alliance, from Manzikert in 1071 to the Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin in 1639, which he calls a betrayal of it. He says he pitched the Mitanni-Hittite alliance to Emre Taner and the Battle of Manzikert to Taner’s successor, Hakan Fidan. He also claims Kemal’s speech of 23 April 1920 described Kurds and Turks respecting each other’s rights. The parliamentary minutes show that Kemal never mentioned Kurds. He spoke of Turks, Circassians and “Islamic elements” and put off all details until “after our existence is saved”.
The plan was put into practice through the Kurdish National Congress. “This Kurdish congress will be the thing that determines the Misak-ı Milli,” Öcalan told a pro-Kurdish delegation. He proposed four conferences. One was in Diyarbakır and open even to Hizbullah and Kemal Burkay. One was in Ankara under the HDP, one in Europe, and one in Erbil, which “should approach it within the framework of the National Pact”, with Kurds from Syria taking part. When Selahattin Demirtaş asked for a message for the Erbil conference, Öcalan told him to explain “the issue of Misak-ı Milli in the right form”. HDP MP Nursel Aydoğan put it plainly: Öcalan “is the main obstacle to the establishment of a Kurdish state”, and every negotiation on İmralı aimed to resolve the Kurdish issue within the framework of the Misak-ı Milli. The whole project fits the AKP’s neo-Ottoman foreign policy.
Öcalan says Jewish lobbies first planned “a proto-Israeli project” in South Kurdistan. Later they “got rid of Saddam” in order to take over the Kurds through Kurdish nationalism. He recasts Sheikh Said’s 1925 revolt as a British-provoked attempt to restore the caliphate, which reverses his earlier view that it was a religious and national uprising against near-genocidal attacks. He calls Iraqi Kurdish self-rule “a bomb” placed at “the very bottom of Turkey’s belly” and the Kurdistan Region “a cheap collaborator state”, likening it to Enkidu. In the Social Pact, self-determination shrinks to villages, neighbourhoods and cities managing their own affairs, and the UN system is dismissed as a failed model built on nation-states.
From 2004 the Kurds stop being a nation in his writing and become a people, and Kurdish becomes “the local language”. By 2011 he questions whether Kurds have even “reached the stage of nationhood”, while Turks remain “the Turkish nation”. He writes that “considering the Kurds as a sociological phenomenon serves the interests of the Turkish nation better” and that “leaving social phenomena to natural assimilation” has been humanity’s basic tendency. His “fraternal unity” comes with a guarantee: “With this approach, there is no danger of Kurdish becoming the official language, followed by a federation.” He dismisses insistence on nation and language as “dogmatic values” and writes that he was “born into a society that has not really progressed beyond Neolithic culture”. He calls this policy Türkiyeleşme (Turkeyification) and presents it as Atatürk’s own inclusive idea of a “nation of Turkey”. In reality Kemal used “Turkish State” and “Republic of Turkey” interchangeably, spoke of the “Turkish nation”, and called Kurdish identity an “incorrect label” left over from despotic times. Turkeyification is voluntary Turkification.
The İmralı notes from 2013 show where this leads. When pro-Kurdish MPs pressed for state-funded Kurdish education, Öcalan replied: “Asking the state is a mistake. This is not the duty of the state but of society. If you cannot teach your mother tongue to your own child, how can you ask the state?” He said there is “a principle of equality in the constitution”, so such education “cannot be demanded”. He said boycotts only inflame things and that the MPs should open model schools in Diyarbakır instead. A Kurdish school did open there in 2013, and the authorities later sealed it. Elsewhere in the notes he says: “I am not even discussing language education.” When the PKK leadership in Qandil demanded that the new constitution name the existence of the Kurdish people, he refused: “Do not conflate national identity with state citizenship.” The only wording he proposed was “our constitution accepts all historical cultures as the richness of Turkey”. He told MPs “we belong to the state” and borrowed the AKP’s Islamic language of a shared millet. He summed it up: “There is a Turkish nation, and that is a reality… We can call it the nation of Turkey.” Elsewhere he says: “We have no objections to the unitary state, to the republic. Turkish will remain the official language, the flag will of course be there.”
This is the constitution he declared legitimate. Article 66 says that everyone bound to the state by citizenship is a Turk. Article 42 says no language other than Turkish may be taught as a mother tongue. The preamble places sovereignty in the Turkish nation alone, and Article 301 of the penal code makes “insulting Turkishness” a crime. It is the system İsmet İnönü summed up as “our task is to Turkify everyone, no matter what the cost”. Iran’s constitution allows regional languages in the media and the teaching of their literature in schools, which is more than Öcalan asks for. His position also falls short of UN standards on language rights. It is a neoliberal position: a self-declared enemy of “capitalist modernity” leaving the survival of Kurdish to the market.
In 2003 he wrote that forced assimilation should end and “voluntariness should be the basis”, because “the necessities of life take care of one’s own language”. He warned that forcing Kurds to count as Turks damages “Turkish purity” and produces “an ugly hybridisation”. In 2004 he described assimilation before the Republic as “peaceful and culturally enriching”. The results can be measured. A 2023 Kurdish Studies Center survey found that only 30% of Kurds in Turkey are proficient in Kurdish, 30% have intermediate skills and 40% do not use it in daily life. More than half the children of fluent parents know little or no Kurdish, and nearly 60% of respondents report discrimination. Öcalan’s prescription leads to language death from the top down. He says that Kurdish can only be encouraged at primary level, and he treated Turkish as the sole official language.
Öcalan opposes a Kurdish state, not the nation-state. His proposal asks Turkey to tolerate the physical existence of Kurds and to replace forced assimilation with voluntary assimilation, and in return he promises that Kurds will not seek federalism or official status for their language. The result is a “civil society of subjects” under colonial sovereignty.
Şêrê Mirîd retweeted
MAJOR development. After several years of on and off attempts, I have finally solved the etymology of the ethnonym Kurd, which currently has no solution in academia. It comes from Proto-Indo-European *kr̥t-í- “cut” → Proto-Indo-Iranian *kr̥ti- → Proto-Iranian *kr̥ti- → *kur(ə)ti- (“cut”, but also an outer “garment”) → *Kurt(i)- (adopted as a tribal name) → *Kurt → *Kurd (by the 3rd c. CE) → Kurd (from a tribal identity to an ethnonym).
The first image, an etymological tree, sets out and justifies each sound change, if you want to see how the derivation is linguistically proven. It also contains the historical details on each form where attested. X reduces image resolution, so to read it clearly, expand the image and open it in a new tab. The second image shows the garment in question: the thick, tent-like traditional shepherd’s cloak made of dense felted wool, or wool mixed with goat hair.
Specifically, the name Kurd comes from this outer-garment sense, which was later adopted as a tribal name. Among Iranian languages, the garment word first appears in Avestan as kərəti-, in instructions on how Zoroastrians should wear it together with the sacred shirt and belt. In Parthian, kórt-ēn was the garment boys received as a coming-of-age gift when they reached manhood (which is linguistically a close match to the word Kurd, as the stem's predicted outcome of the Parthian would eventually become Kórd/Kurd since that gloss predates t > d). The word has cognates across the Iranian world, living and extinct, such as Khotanese, Ossetian, Sogdian and Bactrian.
There is historical evidence that Kurd still carried a secondary garment meaning in the early Islamic period, as the word was borrowed into Classical Arabic for a type of garment: kurdī, from the narrator Ibn Abī al-Zinād (d. 790 CE in Baghdad), in Abū Dāwūd 915 (before 889 CE), and kurdiyya in Ibn al-ʿArabī (d. 1148 CE), among others. The hadith reads: “…from ʿĀʾisha, with this report. He said: and he took a kurdī that belonged to Abū Jahm. It was said: O Messenger of God, the khamīṣa was better than the kurdī.” This is important because it shows the t > d form unlike Kurt-(ek), and other forms that passed through west Iranian languages later on via Sogdian. They are still from the same root however.
Tribal names and clans very often come from places, animals, objects and so on. The Kurdish tribe Sanjabi is named after the squirrel fur, Herki is named after a citadel, etc. Kurds are first attested in history specifically as a tribe by Eratosthenes, Strabo and others. The older reading of Kurd as “nomad” has no etymological basis in any Iranian language, and many Kurdologists/Iranologists today regard it as an anti-Kurdish narrative with no basis in the historical record (see Boris James). Some earlier academics unknowingly built on Arabic mistranslations and deliberate misreadings, which are now corrected. There were also at least 11 Iranian nomadic tribal organisations on the plateau before Islam with no Kurdish identification, and 5 Iranian tribal organisations on the plateau that never had a Kurdish tribal affiliation which completely contradicts this narrative.
The main sound-change question left open in my tree is how r̥ became ur, since it normally gives ar or ər. There are several resolutions, but it is not yet clear which one it is. The u-form *kur(ə)ti- may have spread by borrowing, as a garment from the East Iranian lands: ur is the usual outcome in Parachi, Sanglechi-Ishkashmi and Shughni (Clayton 2022), and Sogdian kurθ- probably passed into Persian kurta. Or it may be a regular change in some western dialect, as in Balochi kurt “did” < *kr̥ta- (Korn 2003).
Several scholars already tie the garment word to the root for “cut”. Abaev derives Ossetian kærc “fur coat” from Old Ossetian *karti-, which “corresponds perfectly” to Avestan kərəti- “garment” (that is, *kr̥ti-), perhaps from *(s)ker- “to cut”; he calls Ossetian kuræt a loan. Bailey derives Khotanese kīḍakyä “garment” from kart- “to cut, tailor”, comparing kərəti-. Henning took Sogdian kurθ- “garment” as the same word as kərəti-, and Benveniste linked Persian kurta to the Sogdian. Sims-Williams, publishing Bactrian kuratīg “shirt”, calls it “a word of unknown but probably non-Iranian origin”, which would leave room for a substrate source such as the BMAC (2007: 224). Although Sims-Williams did not gloss through the full extent of the Iranian forms, or look too deeply into it.
I have opted otherwise, and agree with the other scholars who do derive it through Iranian, because of the following reasons. Avestan kərəti-, Ossetian kærc and Khotanese kīḍ- show the regular outcomes of *kr̥ti- at opposite ends of the Iranian world. The root has an Indo-European etymology, *(s)ker-t- “cut”, shared with Vedic kṛtí- “dagger”, and the Pahlavi commentary renders kərəti- as kirrēnīdag “cut”. The forms Sims-Williams compares are the u-forms, and they can all be accounted for within Iranian. The Sogdian θ comes from the regular change ty > θy. Persian kurta, Arabic qurṭaq, Pashto kurta and Ossetian kuræt are loans. A word with a regular Iranian etymology doesn’t need a substrate source.
To clarify for anyone who doesn't know, the stem is important for derivation as it carries the evidence of descent, while the the suffixes don’t necessarily. A stem passes down through Iranian forms and goes through its regular sound changes, so kurt- with t, kurθ- with θ and kurd with d each show where a form sits on the tree. Suffixes are added afresh by each language and are often swapped or borrowed depending on the application and context.
Given this etymology, the identification of the Cyrtians with the Kurds is even stronger than it already was, as the forms are an exact match. Identifications with the Carduchi, Qardu, among other folk proposals have become even more improbable, both linguistically and historically, than they already were.
Şêrê Mirîd retweeted
Reject Marxism. Reject feminism. Reject Jinology.
Put Kurds and Kurdistan first.
God I love the Chinese influx on X. @MFA_China bro just open up internet, let our Chinese brothers in here.
teapawt.org/Turkroach67/status/209…
Şêrê Mirîd retweeted
The Lindsay Clancy stuff is the most blackpilling shit ever. Just pure evil. Women are completely fucked. She chases down her 3 children and strangles them to death and hordes of women are coming out to defend her because the husband gives them the ick. Soulless monsters
Şêrê Mirîd retweeted
Kurds’ Heroic Stand Against Arab-Islamic Expansion and Barbarism in 7th-century
From the Arabian Peninsula, Arab armies under the Rashidun and Umayyad caliphates launched rapid military conquests starting in 632–633 CE, spreading Islam by the sword across the Middle East
This expansion brought harsh treatment to non-Muslims: heavy jizya taxes, second-class status, forced conversions under pressure, destruction of temples and cities, and brutal suppression of revolts
Proud Kurdish tribes refused to surrender their freedom and mountains easily. They fought back fiercely for decades.
Key Battles Where Kurds Resisted
-Battle of al-Qadisiyyah (636 CE)
-Battle of Jalula (637 CE)
-Battle of Nahavand (642 CE)
-Defense of Shahrizor (643 CE)
-Fighting in Ahvaz and Fars (639–642 CE)
-Uprising of 645 CE
-The Kurds of Shahrizor, repeatedly described by historians like Yaqut al-Hamawi as insurgent and never fully subdued by the caliphs. They symbolized unbreakable mountain resistance.
-The Rozaki (Rūzagī) tribe In 837 CE, a Kurdish lord from this tribe established an independent principality around Akhlat (near Lake Wan), showing that resistance continued well into the Abbasid era in the form of de facto autonomy.
Most Kurds converted to Islam only gradually and pragmatically - to escape crushing jizya taxes on non-Muslims, avoid further massacres and enslavement, and survive under the new colonial order
Once the main military phase ended, many Kurdish leaders and tribes accepted Islam pragmatically:
-To escape the burdensome jizya tax imposed on non-Muslims
-To gain equal rights, protection, and the ability to participate in the new order.
-To avoid further devastating military campaigns against their mountain strongholds.
Kurds kept their identity, language, culture, and tribal structure without becoming Arabized, and the celebration of "Newroz" today, which is celebrated by millions of Kurds is evidence of it.
Sources: Al-Tabari’s history, al-Baladhuri, Yaqut al-Hamawi, Ibn al-Balkh
Şêrê Mirîd retweeted
I was called a traitor by my own community for asking a single question.
I grew up in a Shah supporting family. Upper class Iranians who left after the revolution. I was raised a monarchist. I believed all of it.
What turned me wasn't propaganda or the regime. The moment I started asking questions on the issue of foreign policy and wether the Shah should have power. That's all it took. Suddenly I was a traitor, an Islamist, a hezbollaists, a regime supporter. From people I grew up with.
That's when I realized this movement isn't about Iran. It's about a fantasy. A version of Iran that only exists in the heads of people who left 45 years ago and never updated their understanding. That's why when you ask them questions you're an Islamist, show them data and it's fake, disagree and you don't care about Iranians.
Because their beliefs don't hold up to scrutiny, it's built on lies. Any movement that can't survive a single question isn't a movement. It's a cult.
Iranians deserve better than a regime that kills them AND better than a diaspora that would sell them out for a photo op with a flag and a vacation.
You can't claim to love Iran while cheering on the people who want to bomb it. You can't claim to speak for Iranians while attacking every Iranian who disagrees with you. And you definitely can't claim to want freedom while demanding everyone falls in line or gets called a traitor.
Şêrê Mirîd retweeted
Honor hasn’t completely deserted the U.S. Congress. @RepScottPerry spoke harshly and truthfully at the '#Syria at a Crossroads' committee hearing.
w/ Kurmanji & Arabic subtitles
It’s seriously time to finish off the t*rkish agents who call themselves PKK in Qandil. They’ve done their damage and now it’s time to slaughter them once and for all before they damage Kurdistan even more.
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Şêrê Mirîd retweeted
This mf was wiping his shoes off on yall holy relic😭😭😭😭😭😭
🇸🇦🚨#BREAKING: Saudi government sold the Kaaba's covering to Jeffrey Epstein.
It has been revealed that pieces of the Kaaba's covering were purchased by Jeffrey Epstein to be used as carpets in his home.
Şêrê Mirîd retweeted
“Nechirvan Barzani reached out to Franklin Graham, one of the most influential evangelists. Graham wrote a letter dated Jan. 16 to Trump in which he urged the US leader to take measures to prevent the elimination of the Kurdish people. The president responded, "Done. Donald."
With exclusive details on the diplomacy: Kurds, Damascus step back from brink as SDF signs fresh deal with Syrian government al-monitor.com/originals/202… via @AlMonitor
Şêrê Mirîd retweeted
Watching the deteriorating situation in Syria with great concern. The Kurds are under threat from the new Syrian government that is aligned with Turkey.
It would be a disaster for America’s reputation and national security interests to abandon the Kurds, who were the chief ally in destroying the ISIS caliphate.
Therefore, I will be introducing legislation this week designed to impose crippling sanctions on any government or group engaged in hostilities against the Kurds. The Save the Kurds Act, I believe, will receive strong bipartisan support and must have teeth to make it effective.
Stay tuned.
The Iranic civilization is just cooked at this point. Either fanatics of religion be it Sunni or Shia or worshipping useless dogs like Öcalan or Pahlavi.
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Şêrê Mirîd retweeted
Al-Jazeera propaganda exposed! VAR checked!
This person appears on al-Jazeera Live claimed “1m% there is no ISIS… all are civilians [in al-Hol camp and prisons.]”
While the same person appeared in an old ISIS propaganda video declaring his allegiance to ISIS saying that “we are supporting the Islamic State and that [they] do not fight alone, we are with you fighting for the sake of God.”


































