AuxReignots

Let's spell out the ethereum:0x57e114b691db790c35207b2e685d4a43181e6061 and $USDE thesis very simply Following the fee switch vote, the only thing that matters for ethereum:0x57e114b691db790c35207b2e685d4a43181e6061 economics is USDE circulation, which is a function of distribution and adoption Market cap has gone up $500M in a month and has been adding $20-$40M daily through the weekends Underlying yield is boosted by greater funding rate arb in crypto and soon to take a stepwise jump when the rumored @tradexyz equity perp funding rate arb partnership kicks in @RobinhoodCrypto Chain added $320M in 2 months. Just getting started. Haven't seen any uplift yet from @EthenaPay but of course that's forthcoming too Every trend says $7.5B is much, much closer than market gives credit for, and of course current valuations give zero value for any of the $10B+ ratchet-ups And you get all this at a 40%+ effective discount by owning the DAT $USDC which most people don't even know is in existence Yeah, we're running $PURR back all over again CC: @tedchenCPC @gdog97_

BREAKING: A breakthrough has been reached between the United States and Iran, both sides have agreed to preliminary measures concerning Iran’s nuclear program, navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and financial incentives for Tehran. China and Russia are set to be guarantors of the agreement, the Iranian delegation has flown to Doha alongside the Qatari mediators to continue negotiations later today, according to Qatari Al Araby Al Jadeed.

Further to my post about @NYSE working to bring @HyperliquidX onshore, major credit to @ChairmanSelig and the Trump administration for making all of this experimentation possible. There’s only one way of finding out if something is useful to the marketplace and I’m excited for us to find out. I do have some questions: 1. What is the benefit of trading perps on-chain on a regulated exchange? Isn’t the main benefit of trading on-chain to operate in a trustless (aka non-kyc’d) environment in order to minimize friction, and/or to be able to enter into atomic transactions in order to receive what you are buying in realtime? Since a perp is not an asset, that obviously isn’t helpful. 2. @standuquesne - are you aware that if you trade on Hyperliquid, the world will be able to track your positions and trades in real time? Do you see that as a benefit? 3. Hyperliquid has priority fees - a mechanism that enables market participants to pay to see information first, or even prioritize orders in front of the queue. Is this consistent with CFTC core principles? 4. Will it be possible to combine the liquidity of the offshore order-book with the onshore order-book? 5. If not, wouldn’t it be better to list perps in a traditional (centralized) order-book on a regulated exchange and not have the inefficiencies that on-chain matching introduces?

The unwind in Hedge Fund equity exposures this year has been the biggest since at least 2017. Active de-grossing (reduction in long + short positions) by global hedge funds has now hit over 8% of total gross exposure since June, according to the Morgan Stanley Prime Brokerage Content team. This has taken gross leverage for US long/short funds down to the 10th percentile versus the last year.

I suspect IBIT is already on North Korea’s shortlist. In February 2025, the attackers behind the Bybit hack compromised a Safe{Wallet} developer’s Mac through a malicious project disguised as legitimate Docker-related tooling. They had access for 17 days before the theft, giving them enough time to manipulate the transaction interface used by Bybit’s signers. The signers believed they were approving a legitimate transaction. Instead, they unknowingly authorized the theft of $1.5 billion from a cold wallet. The keys could stay offline while the signers approved a theft through a compromised interface. TRM Labs attributes the recent Binance incident with high confidence to TraderTraitor, the North Korean group also linked to Bybit and the theft of 4,502.9 BTC from DMM Bitcoin. Binance’s preliminary investigation points to a compromised DevOps engineer’s laptop as the entry point. Binance says there’s no evidence that private keys were leaked, while TRM’s analysis suggests the attackers may have gained control of the signing infrastructure. If confirmed, the attackers could have moved funds through a compromised approval process without extracting the keys. Now imagine the same thing happening to IBIT. BlackRock’s IBIT is the world’s largest Bitcoin ETF, holding roughly 815,000 BTC worth around $63 billion. Coinbase remains its active Bitcoin custodian. Although Anchorage Digital has been appointed as an additional custodian, the fund’s latest quarterly filing says there are currently no plans to transfer any Bitcoin there. That’s an extraordinary concentration of Bitcoin under one custodian. Regardless of how large or well-funded that provider is, a critical failure in its security infrastructure could put the entire fund at risk. A $6 billion theft would wipe out roughly 9.5% of IBIT’s assets, equivalent to around $4 per share at current valuations. Binance managed to freeze some stolen stablecoins. Bitcoin has no such mechanism, making stolen BTC far harder to recover. BlackRock doesn’t separately insure the Bitcoin held by the fund. Coinbase has disclosed $320 million in commercial crime insurance coverage, shared across its customers. Its custody agreement also limits liability to $100 million per cold storage address, with any recovery subject to contractual terms, liability determinations, and other conditions. If a major theft occurred and the fund couldn’t recover the Bitcoin or obtain sufficient compensation, the remaining losses would ultimately be borne by IBIT shareholders. Bitcoin ETFs have made owning Bitcoin much more accessible, and there’s real value in that convenience. But as more capital flows into these products, enormous amounts of Bitcoin are also being concentrated among a handful of custodians and the infrastructure they depend on. The larger these pools become, the more attractive they are to attackers. A compromise at any critical point could have consequences far beyond a single institution. And that’s why security has no finish line. Even the most sophisticated cold storage setup still depends on hardware, software, supply chains, signing workflows, and the people operating them. Keeping private keys offline is essential, but it doesn’t eliminate the risks surrounding the transaction approval process. Spread your assets across independent custody setups. Keep your private keys offline. Verify transaction details on a trusted device screen, independently of the computer initiating the transaction. Continuously review your security architecture, and build it around the assumption that some part of your infrastructure will eventually be compromised. There are no silver bullets in security, and no permanent guarantees. Stay vigilant, keep verifying, and never mistake a clean track record for proof that you’re safe. Bunker mode.

$HYPE will win

I loaded up on ethereum:0x57e114b691db790c35207b2e685d4a43181e6061 at $0.17 CZ has to buy all of this shit back on the open market

Extremely sophisticated. This doesn’t feel like North Korean signature. Disgruntled/deep agent ex-Binance employee?

Binance hack recap for those just waking up 👇 Starting at 4:05 PM EST on Oct 29, an attacker with access to Binance's wallet-signing systems drained more than $6B from Binance hot wallets across Ethereum, Bitcoin, Tron, XRP, Polygon and Avalanche. The main tool was an EIP-7702 authorization signed by Binance Hot Wallet 14, which installed the attacker's code on that wallet and let them sweep dozens of tokens per transaction, plus pull 823M USDC from Hot Wallet 34 using Hot Wallet 14's operator rights, while other Binance wallets signed ordinary transfers straight to the attacker. Binance removed the delegation at 8:10 PM EST, almost four hours after the first sweep. About $2.6B has been frozen: Tether ($1.76B USDT, including inside Binance 14 itself), Circle ($823M USDC), Ripple ($40.5M RLUSD) and Paxos (1,907 PAXG), and token teams clawed back SNX, SAND and BEAM. The rest is moving: the attacker has sold all of its UNI, PEPE, LINK and AAVE and ENA for ETH, swapped 234M USDT into TRX on Tron, and put 60M USDT into Aave to borrow $44M of ETH before Tether's freeze. It still holds about 475K ETH, all 18,270 BTC (split into 1,000 BTC wallets) and 233M XRP.

The Binance hacker has sold 95% of their ethereum:0x57e114b691db790c35207b2e685d4a43181e6061. 205.5M ENA sold in 17 sales between 6:51 and 8:35 PM EST for 14,424 ETH ($32.1M), an average price of $0.1562. The latest sale was 43.93M ENA at 8:35 PM. 12.0M ENA ($2.0M) is still held. etherscan.io/address/0x7f9dc…

It’ll be Binance. They use one single Sig cold wallet for their bitcoin ffs. According to Grok or Google’s LLM

I’ve hacked every major crypto exchange. Reported critical vulnerabilities that would make the news if we disclosed. If you are scared of holding your crypto in cold storage because of the Coldcard hack and is thinking you are better off holding in an exchange, I can tell you one thing with certainty. Do not trust Binance. You WILL lose your funds.