Global Latvian Rifleman retweeted
#OtD 18 Nov 1949 security forces killed 21 striking miners and a bystander at the UK govt-owned coal mine in Enugu, Nigeria. The Labour govt wanted to maximise output to rebuild infrastructure and repay debt after WWII stories.workingclasshistory.…
Global Latvian Rifleman retweeted
A leak of millions of Deutsche Bank documents has revealed that the bank processed a far larger amount of money for Jeffrey Epstein than previously known ft.trib.al/zgFnq9F
I'm shocked i'm truly shocked my dear
Deutsche Bank processed $582mn of suspicious payments linked to Epstein ft.trib.al/SnE7qF1
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Да ладно, ну ничего себе
Forensic expert says his analysis raises doubts about how Epstein died bbc.in/4f9SaQK
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Global Latvian Rifleman retweeted
As the AI bubble leaks, I've been thinking about Edmund Wilson's comment after the 1929 crackup: “One couldn’t help being exhilarated at the sudden unexpected collapse of that stupid gigantic fraud.” There were, to be sure, some unpleasant sequelae.
Молодость и радость. Бедный Иен.
1983年のニュー・オーダー #BlueMonday。こっちの方がヒリヒリしててさらにカッコいい。お客さんにお尻を向けることに何ら躊躇いがないのもまたイイ。楽曲中に(Emulatorの)フロッピーディスクを交換するところもシビれる。
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Global Latvian Rifleman retweeted
Wally Wood’s cover art for "Undersea City" by Frederik Pohl and Jack Williamson, Gnome Press, 1958.
Global Latvian Rifleman retweeted
Japanese soldiers in combat against Chinese troops in downtown Shanghai in the summer of 1937.
Global Latvian Rifleman retweeted
to me the Nvidia scandal/Huang takedown has echoes of the Banker Wars under Late Yeltsin, when so much power was concentrated in so few hands that the oligarchs eventually went to war against each other using kompromat to destroy each other—and themselves. teapawt.org/RnaudBertrand/status/2…
This is the biggest irony of the whole Alice Huang / Nvidia saga: the Chinese government actually doesn't want Nvidia chips and is actively keeping them out of the country.
Last year it even ordered Alibaba and ByteDance to cancel their Nvidia orders (bloomberg.com/news/articles/…) and sent customs teams to the ports to check every advanced chip coming in (ng.investing.com/news/stock-…).
And right now 600,000 Nvidia H200s are stuck in Hong Kong because Beijing won’t let them into the country (reuters.com/world/china/nvid…)👇
Nvidia also explicitly frames this as a threat to its business in its latest annual report to the SEC: "The Chinese government has encouraged customers to purchase from our China-based competitors and discouraged customers from purchasing, importing, or using our data center products" (sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/…).
Why does China do that? Because every Nvidia chip a Chinese company buys is one that Huawei or Cambricon doesn’t sell, and domestic chips can only catch up if people actually buy them (which means money for R&D, etc.).
Which means that the notion that Chinese intelligence was running honeytraps to get more Nvidia chips into China gets the whole thing exactly backwards.
In fact, it looks like Megaspeed - Alice Huang's company - was a counter-reaction to official Chinese policy: a private sector workaround to these efforts by the Chinese government to curtail Nvidia.
As was widely reported - including by Western media - Megaspeed built data centers in Southeast Asia and rented their computing power to Alibaba, which the New York Times called "a backdoor way of getting access" to Nvidia chips (nytimes.com/2026/11/06/us/po…).
That is a backdoor not only - allegedly - around Washington’s export controls, but also around China's own efforts to wean its companies off Nvidia.
I can’t believe the Chinese government was too thrilled about it: it'd make just about zero sense for it to run countless domestic measures to prevent Alibaba from using Nvidia chips, yet at the same time have its top spy agency help the same Alibaba get Nvidia chips through the back door in Southeast Asia 🤷
At the end of the day, as with all such stories, you always need to look at "cui bono?": who benefits? Who benefitted is pretty clear:
- Nvidia itself: it's in the business of selling chips so a customer willing to spend billions of dollars on chips in Southeast Asia is a godsend. Again, as they themselves state in their SEC filings, not being able to tap into Chinese demand would have "a material and adverse impact on our business" (sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/…).
- Chinese companies like Alibaba: facts are, 1) Chinese chips haven't yet caught up, 2) Chinese chip companies' production capabilities are still limited and 3) Chinese tech firms' historical tech stack runs on Nvidia’s CUDA ecosystem, and rewriting years of code for Huawei chips is painful. Renting Nvidia chips in Southeast Asia is the easy way to stay competitive and serve customer demand in the meantime.
- The US, according to core members of the Trump administration: back in July last year, US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick explained that the point of letting Nvidia sell more chips to China was to get Chinese developers "addicted to the American technology stack" (techradar.com/pro/china-coul…).
Who does NOT benefit, according to official Chinese policy, is the Chinese state, which has made tech self-reliance one of its foremost priorities.
Which means that, to believe the spy story, you have to believe that a person - Alice Huang - was effectively a spy paid by her own government while simultaneously sabotaging its tech self-reliance drive, which it has spent years and trillions of dollars on - pretty senseless.
Stranger things have happened, I guess, but it doesn't pass the smell test.
And there is another absolutely major contradiction in the media story. According to a Financial Times article published yesterday (ft.com/content/3238d92b-4074…), "a person who knows [Alice Huang] said they had been asked by MSS for information about her earlier this year after news emerged that Singapore was investigating the company in relation to chip-smuggling allegations. The agency wanted to find out more information about Huang, including the nature of her business and connections, the person said."
Which raises a damn obvious question: if she were indeed an MSS asset, why on earth would the MSS need to ask the people around her who she was and the nature of her business?
It's a complete contradiction with the spy story - but very much not a contradiction with what I described above: a private businesswoman running a workaround to Beijing’s own policy, which the Chinese security apparatus would naturally want to look into.
Especially since, around about the same time, Shanghai police detained her business partner, reportedly her husband, in a stock manipulation case (caixinglobal.com/2026-11-10/…): also coherent with Chinese authorities looking into her network, and much harder to square with her being a prized MSS asset.
And, to top it all, there is - to this day - not a shred of evidence that's been published that she is, in fact, a Chinese spy: just anonymous intelligence officials, repeated by journalists who never verified it, as I detailed here (teapawt.org/RnaudBertrand/status/2…) and here (teapawt.org/RnaudBertrand/status/2…) with one of the key FT journalists on this story actually admitting that he has no idea what evidence US intelligence actually has.
So the claim went to print without anyone seeing the evidence, without anyone being able to check it, and without anyone knowing whether it even exists.
And given everything above, from Beijing blocking the very chips she was supposedly recruited to help get into China, to the MSS asking around about her, to her partner being detained in Shanghai, my bet is that the evidence doesn’t exist at all. If anything, everything we can check points the other way.
Global Latvian Rifleman retweeted
IAN CURTIS. FOREVER MANCHESTER. FOREVER MADCHESTER.
Joy Division and New Order are among the 2026 Rock & Roll Hall of Fame inductees.
Without Joy Division, the story of Manchester music would look very different.
Global Latvian Rifleman retweeted
This graph speaks volumes and should be cause for concern, globally.
Global Latvian Rifleman retweeted
❁ Gennady Pavlishin é um premiado artista de Khabarovsk que alcançou reconhecimento mundial por suas ilustrações incrivelmente detalhadas sobre a vida cotidiana, o folclore e os trajes tradicionais dos povos indígenas da região do Amur, no Extremo Oriente Russo.
Segue o fio🧶⬇️
Global Latvian Rifleman retweeted
One article from the first issue of The Ukrainian Forum that I would like everyone to read is by Anna Ivanova. It is a brilliant, wide-ranging essay on the ever more evident bankruptcy of the knowledge production on Ukraine, which renders invisible, and cannot analyze or even recognize, the primary roots of the most urgent problems. Anna is certainly among the brightest Ukrainian social scientists of the youngest cohort, maybe even the brightest. Because when most social science studies on Ukraine have gone into the reproduction of nationalism, one must be anti-nationalist to do any critical social science at all. Some fragments are below, but there is so much more in the full text.
ukrainianforum.org/ufj/artic…
"Following much of the contemporary academic and political debate on Ukraine, one quickly discovers that the only ideologically acceptable answer to the question “What has gone wrong in Ukraine?” is: Russia. It is not only the war itself that is analyzed exclusively through the lens of Russian imperialism – though this framing crowds out diverging accounts so insistently, that over four hundred prominent scholars of East European Studies have called to “read less about Ukrainian domestic politics and international relations" in order to “understand the sources of the Russo-Ukrainian War.”1 Ukraine's domestic problems and international relations, too, are often attributed to Russia across different regis-ters: corruption at the highest levels of government is framed as a Soviet institutional legacy; criticism of domestic policy is dismissed as Kremlin narrative; Russophone Ukrainian citizens are described as victims of Russification; and even disputes with neighboring Poland over historical memory are not rarely attributed to Moscow's manipulation rather than to the unresolved complexities of a shared past and present of two neighboring states. The claim of Russia's responsibility over Ukrainian problems extends far into history – the most expansive accounts locate the original breaking point in the times of Kyivan Rus – and spreads across every domain of analysis, functioning as an ontological premise underlying the dominant explanatory framework for what Ukraine as a state and society is.
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After the outbreak of the 2022 Russian invasion, legal restrictions in language use were accom-panied by open stigmatization of Russian-speaking Ukrainians in public discourse. Depending on the context, these people appeared as victims of Russification who needed cultural rehabilitation, as carriers of foreign influence, as potential collaborators, as remnants of the Soviet past, or as a group that did not exist.70.The minister of education has pointed at a “correlation” between missile strikes on Ukraine and the Russian language.71 A columnist in the country's largest online outlet argued that "there are no Russian-speaking Ukrainians, only Russified ones," simultaneously placing on them "a share of responsibility for this war.”72 The mayor of Ivano-Frankivsk has supported the launch of lan-guage patrols to monitor Russian use in public spaces.73 A well-known actor proposed beating children for speaking Russian; a writer called for publicly reprimanding parents of "Russified" children.74 The current Commissioner for the Protection of the State Language went so far as to question whether people who had not switched to Ukrainian could be considered homo sapiens at all.75 What is striking about these representations is that they assign Russian-speaking Ukrainians virtually every possible status except that of ordinary citizens capable of defining their subjectivities themselves. They may be victims, security risks, colonial subjects, or historical anomalies – what they increasingly cease to be is a segment of population whose existence can be taken for granted.
Every time I hear that Russian-speaking Ukrainians are a “political construct,”76 I find myself won-dering who exactly the people around whom I spent my entire life were. Were my parents, whose bedtime fairy tales gave me a sense of security, and my grandparents, whose accounts of their own lives gave me a sense of continuity, simply victims who had failed to realize their true identity? The teachers in my kindergarten and school or the professors at my university, who taught me to doubt, to ask questions, to be curious, to analyze and to understand, were they at least “homo sapiens”? Were my neighbors at the apartment block, who solidarily supported one another when times were hard, and my great-grandparents in the village, who lived through every upheaval of the twentieth century, nothing more than remnants of Russification? Were my friends, with whom I shared childhood secrets, first loves, and discoveries of various kinds – in Russian, always – colonized subjects unable to eman-cipate? Did all these people exist at all? Do I exist?
The question is not rhetorical. From a sociological perspective, what is unfolding can be understood as a movement from ontological exclusion toward erasure.77 Exclusion presupposes the existence of a group that within a given picture of the world is denied rights, resources, or recognition. Erasure refuses to accept the very existence of the group itself. If Russophone Ukrainians do not exist, then there can be no legitimate representation of their interests, no claims-making on their behalf, and no collective grievances requiring political attention. The disappearance of the category removes the pos-sibility of political contestation altogether: one cannot organize, or demand recognition, as a member of a group that official discourse insists is not there. This foreclosure has a determinate social address. Attachment to Russian has not disappeared since February 2022, but it has become concentrated: it persists most strongly among the working class, for whom questions of language and symbols remain "far from pressing problems."78 What presents itself as cultural policy operates as a "social struggle on the basis of language"79 – that is, a form of class struggle, an instrument through which a ruling class consolidates its symbolic and institutional authority, and whose costs fall on those least equipped to contest them.
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The consequences of this affective climate are recognized in the field of knowledge production. Fear increasingly structures academic life in Ukrainian studies at every level. The choice of research topic, the formulation of research questions, the language in which findings are presented – all are shaped by the anticipation of consequences. Entire domains of social life that generate significant tension – violent mobilization, draft evasion, illegal border crossing, political imprisonment, language conflicts – remain effectively underresearched because engaging with them carries political risk. Re-spondents hesitate to express views that diverge from socially approved narratives or refuse to answer altogether – the rate of non-response to sensitive questions in surveys and interviews has reached lev-els that themselves constitute a finding about the state of public affairs.92 Academic disagreements are transformed into campaigns of denunciation, public shaming, and demands for ideological conform-ity, expressed by the collective letter against “inconvenient” researchers, the blacklisting of academ-ic publications, campaigns against lectures deemed politically inconvenient. One begins to wonder whether a colleague has come to a conference to engage in debate or to report ideological deviations. One hesitates before submitting a manuscript, uncertain whether a particular formulation violates an existing law or will provoke accusations of disloyalty. Peer-review process is evolving into a means of conveying threats. Even well-established scholars privately admit to self-censoring out of fear of marginalization or misinterpretation. The implicit assumption behind every research is that the only legitimate scholarly commitment during wartime is to serve the interests of the nation. Knowledge production is subject to police-style surveillance, the borders of which are defined by political loyalty.
A public sphere governed by fear cannot reliably generate knowledge about itself, nor can schol-arship produce reliable knowledge about the society it studies. A scholarship in which fear forecloses departure from the dominant approach cannot avoid stagnation, as it loses the capacity to innovate. Younger researchers will reproduce the same mode of thinking rather than propose new approaches to the problems that matter. More broadly, the more dangerous certain questions become, the less capable a society is of understanding its own condition, and the less capable it becomes of imagining alterna-tives to that condition, or even improvements upon it. I include my own position in this description not as a dramatic gesture. In writing this text I do not know how to establish whether I have violated a law and have already become a criminal, or whether I will still be permitted to remain a sociologist who asks questions about Ukrainian society and looks for answers to them. The fact that I cannot de-termine this is not a private difficulty but an illustration of the state of the legal system that the Venice Commission identified as “vague” when it issued its conclusions on the “decommunization” laws.
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The war unleashed by Russia is, obviously, an enormous threat that is destroying Ukrainian soci-ety and the Ukrainian state, and only its immediate end can significantly improve Ukraine's position. But is there anything within the sphere of responsibility of Ukrainian actors that might have been organized differently? This essay has been an attempt to identify some of those areas. Yet what it describes only points to what has gone wrong. It maps the symptoms of a structural crisis; the next step would be to examine their causes in depth. A proper diagnosis would require locating the source of the crisis and formulating the means of addressing it. That demands answering not only what went wrong but why: why these choices were made, who benefited from them and who lost, what alterna-tives were foreclosed and by whom, and what social forces might yet produce different outcomes. It would, moreover, be insufficient and ultimately unfair to direct this question exclusively at Ukraine. As Ishchenko argues in this issue, Ukraine is not an anomaly but a norm, or even "the vanguard of the world in crisis":96 a country moving at the forefront of dynamics visible, perhaps, in less acute form, across much of the globe, and showing the most extreme futures that may await other societies if the trajectory remains unchanged. The hollowing out of democratic deliberation, the replacement of the politics of redistribution by the politics of recognition,97 the securitization of dissent, the concentration of wealth amid the erosion of public institutions – none of these is uniquely Ukrainian. In this sense, the question "what has gone wrong in Ukraine?" is a version of a larger question about what is going wrong in the world of “democratic capitalism” after "the end of history" – and the urgency of asking it is not diminished by the difficulty of doing so.
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I am finishing this text in Kharkiv, as the fifth year of the war draws to a close. I write these final lines on the day two Russian FPV drones fly into my neighbors' cars and kill them on the only road into our district – the road where I know every tree at the verge and every crack in the surface, the road that felt like the most mundane part of my existence and therefore, by definition, the one that could hide no danger. These days I am afraid to drive home. Looking for a safer detour, of which there is none, I think: yes, something in Ukraine has indeed gone wrong, if the safest place I have ever known feels unsafe. Are the obvious crimes committed by Russia a sufficient reason to stop speaking about Ukraine altogether or to postpone the study of Ukrainian society until the violence ends? Does this fear cancel out all the others I have described in this essay? If anything, it sharpens them. Fear of what comes from outside – bombs, missiles, drones, occupation – is compounded by fear of what may come from within: prison terms for likes, violent conscription in the streets, expulsion from the ranks of "homo sapiens" on grounds of language. Both narrow what people in Ukraine are able to do with their lives. Precisely for this reason we must retain every opportunity to study what is happening in our society, to discuss it, and to formulate alternatives. We cannot af-ford to "read less" about Ukraine. We must attend to it constantly, in every dimension, while doing everything possible to end the war immediately."
Global Latvian Rifleman retweeted
“The law voted by the Bundestag on Friday grants the German foreign (BND) and domestic intelligence (BfV) agencies extensive new surveillance powers and, for the first time in their postwar history, allows them to carry out operations to disrupt, deceive and manipulate adversaries.”
ft.com/content/6c55228c-ac59…
We have garrisoned the entire planet. Anything could at any time become contraband. Most commodities flows are under sanctions. Most countries on earth are under sanctions of one sort of another.
Half the humans are forbidden from traveling to most of the planet. Half the world has erected walls around it. It is now more likely that refugees fleeing violence will be shot rather than let in.
Everyone is being watched from thousands of satellites and drones in the skies — not a single car moves without being tracked. Everything you do is being watched by hundreds of security agencies, most of whom are not even known to exist. Then you have thousands of private surveillance firms. Practically every electronic device on the planet is tapped.
They balkanized and garrisoned the entire internet and nobody even batted an eyelid. IDs, fingerprints, eye scans, cloudfare, cookies; soon they will begin tracking the very thoughts in your brains: nytimes.com/2026/11/12/opini….
We live in a barbaric world; a great prison that we have constructed for ourselves. Sure, let’s not use the F word.
Global Latvian Rifleman retweeted
Fixed this headline for you, @Reuters.
Global Latvian Rifleman retweeted
🇻🇪 The State Department on Thursday released a heavily redacted 53-page report on Venezuelan oil and mineral revenue the US has controlled since US forces abducted President Nicolás Maduro on Jan. 3.
Under an executive order President Trump signed in January, US-approved buyers of Venezuelan exports have paid into US-controlled accounts rather than to Venezuela, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio deciding how the money is spent.
From Jan. 3 to Sept. 30, those accounts took in more than $12.26 billion: over $12.1 billion from oil, petroleum and gas sales, plus $108 million from gold, $22 million from minerals and $24.6 million from fertilizer. About $12.11 billion was paid out, mostly to Venezuelan banks for foreign exchange auctions meant to prop up the bolivar, leaving about $169 million in the Treasury account.
The names of the roughly 20 depositors are redacted, but The New York Times reported most of the money came from commodity traders Trafigura and Vitol, which got special US licenses to sell Venezuelan oil. Reuters has reported that a Vitol trader's ties to Vice President JD Vance helped the company win its license.
1/8 Bird flu strains in Asia and the West may be gaining function through 'assortment' - a natural mixing process. At the same time, human cases and fatality rates are increasing, with 14 cases recorded globally so far this year. Chart from @Airfinity






































