Smemm

WSJ feels the timing on this one. Kushner, dialing into a meeting remotely because he was sick, told Zelensky to hold off on strikes since he and Witkoff are burning time and jet fuel brokering with Moscow, and a 30-day pause on refinery strikes would be Ukraine's way of saying thanks, per a WSJ source. wsj.com/world/ukraine-pauses…

In UN diplo circles there is wide-spread speculation that Lana Nusseibeh will prevail in the race for UN Secretary General. Except China, I'm told, remains committed to supporting a candidate from Latin American or the Caribbean, raising prospect that race is still open.

#NoToLana Ireland’s Sinn Féin party calls on the Irish government to oppose Lana Nusseibeh’s bid to lead the UN, citing UAE complicity in RSF atrocities in Sudan and her repeated denials of that support. sinnfein.ie/news/government-…

White House Halloween Event: 2023 vs 2026

Unbelievable investigation into the RSF female contingent and its female commander's "incitement to rape" across Northern state. Ever investigation into RSF actions during the war reveals a more inhuman and ghoulish approach. Shocking stuff. aljazeera.com/features/2026/…

Arab parties in Israel could face the same political trap as the pro-Kurdish HDP in Turkey’s 2015 elections. Both gained enough seats to become kingmakers but struggled to turn their electoral success into political power. In Turkey, failed coalition talks were followed by months of violence and repeat elections, in which the HDP lost votes and the ruling AKP regained its majority. Now, if coalition talks fail in Israel, renewed elections and a possible escalation of violence in Iran, West Bank or Gaza, could similarly weaken the Arab parties' political advantage. What happened in Turkey in 2015, and what lessons does it offer for Israel in 2026? ETHNIC PARTIES AS POTENTIAL KINGMAKERS In Turkey’s 2015 elections, the pro-Kurdish HDP won a historic 13.1% of the vote, putting it in a position to become a kingmaker. The ruling AKP received 40.9%, while the two main opposition parties, CHP and MHP, together received 41.3%. However, the HDP became a negative rather than a conventional positive kingmaker, similar to Ra’am and Joint List in Israel today. Its success prevented the AKP from governing alone, but it did not make the HDP an acceptable partner for the other parties. The nationalist MHP refused to cooperate with the HDP to remove the AKP from power and form a new government. Interestingly, for the first time, the pro-Kurdish HDP also attracted significant support from non-Kurdish voters, particularly those who wanted to remove the government. The HDP had softened its Kurdish nationalist discourse and presented itself as the "party of the whole of Turkey," with an ethnic Turkish co-chair, Figen Yüksekdağ. In Israel’s October 2026 elections, the Arab parties, Ra’am and the Joint List, won a historic 19 seats (8 and 11, respectively), putting them in a similar kingmaker position. Netanyahu’s ruling bloc secured 53 seats, while the opposition bloc led by Gadi Eisenkot won 48. With the Arab parties, the opposition could reach 67 seats in the 120-member Knesset, well above the 61 needed for a majority. However, just as in Turkey in 2015, this was a negative rather than a positive kingmaker position. The success of the Arab parties prevented Netanyahu’s bloc from securing a majority, but it did not make them acceptable coalition partners for the Jewish-led opposition. Eisenkot, Naftali Bennett and Avigdor Lieberman ruled out forming a government with Arab parties, even though their seats could be crucial to replacing Netanyahu. Another interesting similarity is the attempt to reach voters beyond their own ethnic communities. Just as the HDP tried to appeal to non-Kurdish voters by “Turkeyification” , Ra’am, led by Mansour Abbas, adopted a more pragmatic approach focused on Jewish–Arab cooperation. It even placed Jewish politician and former deputy minister Yoav Segalovitz second on its electoral list. The Joint List also included Jewish politician Ofer Cassif through Hadash. ETHNIC PARTIES AND THEIR POSITIONS ON ARMED ETHNIC MOVEMENTS Another striking similarity is the refusal of ethnic minority parties to label armed groups associated with the ethnic armed movements as terrorist organizations, even while trying to appeal to a wider electorate and become part of the government. In 2015, despite gaining unprecedented support from secular, liberal and left-wing ethnic Turkish voters, the HDP refused to recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization. At the same time, its leaders condemned violence against civilians and called for a peaceful solution to the Kurdish conflict. Similarly, after Israel’s 2026 elections, leaders of Ra’am and the Joint List declined to explicitly call Hamas a terrorist organization, despite condemning the October 7 attacks against civilians. In both cases, this position became another obstacle to turning electoral success into real political influence. For Turkish nationalist parties, especially the MHP, cooperating with the HDP came with a high political cost because of its perceived links to the PKK. Similarly, Israeli opposition parties face strong resistance from Jewish voters to cooperating with Arab parties whose leaders refuse to call Hamas a terrorist organization. As a result, minority parties that had enough seats to become kingmakers found themselves politically isolated because of their positions on armed organizations. Their electoral success created a contradiction: their seats were needed to form an alternative government, but their positions on sensitive national-security issues made other parties reluctant to work with them. VIOLENCE BETWEEN REPEAT ELECTIONS AND THE LOSS OF VOTES BY ETHNIC PARTIES Turkey’s experience in 2015 offers another important lesson for Arab parties in Israel about what can happen when coalition talks fail and new elections are called. After the parties failed to form a government following the June 7 elections, President Erdoğan called for new elections after five months. During those five months, Turkey experienced a sharp rise in violence. On July 20, an ISIS suicide bombing in Suruç killed 32 people. Two days later, on July 22, two Turkish police officers were killed in Ceylanpınar. The peace process with the PKK collapsed, and the Turkish military resumed operations in mainly Kurdish areas. Hundreds of HDP offices were attacked, while several Kurdish cities faced military operations and curfews. Then, on October 10, an ISIS suicide bombing at a peace rally in Ankara killed more than 100 people, including many supporters of the pro-Kurdish movement. As terrorism and national security came to dominate the political debate, the AKP campaigned on promises of security and stability. In the November elections, its vote share jumped from 40.9% to 49.5%, allowing it to regain its parliamentary majority. Meanwhile, the HDP’s vote share fell from 13.1% to 10.8%, and its seats dropped from 80 to 59. Of course, this shift was not only about violence. Changes in nationalist voting patterns and voter turnout also played a role. Still, the violent atmosphere seriously limited the HDP’s ability to campaign and pushed national security to the center of the election. The consequences continued long after the vote. On November 4, 2016, both HDP co-chairs, Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ, were arrested on terrorism-related charges and remained in prison as of October 2026. Although the pro-Kurdish movement continued to receive significant support in later elections, its ability to influence government formation was weakened by political exclusion, criminal prosecutions and growing state pressure. A similar scenario is worth considering after Israel’s October 2026 elections. Neither Netanyahu’s bloc nor the Jewish-led opposition has enough seats to form a government alone. If coalition negotiations fail, Israel could face another election in six months. Until then, Netanyahu would remain prime minister of a caretaker government, keeping considerable control over national-security decisions, although still subject to legal limits and institutional oversight. As in Turkey in 2015, a period of political deadlock could also become or coincide with a period of rising violence. This could involve another military confrontation with Iran or worsening security in the West Bank and Gaza. Such developments could push voters to put security first, strengthen nationalist narratives and make cooperation between Jewish opposition parties and Arab parties even more difficult. However, this would not automatically benefit Netanyahu, since voters might also blame his government for the renewed insecurity but still can increase votes of right wing parties. Meanwhile, political pressure on Arab parties has already taken on a legal and security dimension. Following allegations of possible foreign interference involving Qatari funding aimed at influencing Arab voter turnout, Israel’s Shin Bet opened an investigation. National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir also publicly called for the arrest of Arab party leaders suspected of involvement. The investigation into possible foreign interference is separate from the criminal investigation into suspected vote-buying involving Ra’am supporters. Still, these developments show how legal accusations and national-security issues can become closely tied to coalition politics. The Turkish experience therefore raises an important question for Israel: Could prolonged coalition deadlock, combined with rising violence and pressure on Arab political leaders, weaken the parliamentary influence that Arab parties have gained through their historic electoral success? Or will this pressure lead Arab parties and “rak lo Bibi” (anything but Bibi) bloc to form a government leaving all their preconditions aside?

أعلنت لجنة التواصل الدرزية (عرب 48)، في بيان صدر الخميس، أن النيابة العامة الإسرائيلية قدّمت لائحة اتهام إلى محكمة الصلح في حيفا ضد رئيس اللجنة الشيخ أبو محمد علي محمد معدّي، وذلك على خلفية زيارته الدينية والاجتماعية إلى لبنان قبل نحو ثلاثة أعوام. وبحسب البيان، شملت الزيارة أماكن مقدسة للطائفة الدرزية، من بينها خلوات البيّاضة ومقام النبي أيوب ومقامات أخرى، إضافة إلى لقاءات مع مرجعيات دينية ومشايخ وأقارب وعدد من الشخصيات والفعاليات الدرزية في لبنان. ويُعد الشيخ معدّي، المقيم في بلدة يركا، من أبرز الشخصيات الدرزية الناشطة في ملف التواصل مع أبناء الطائفة في لبنان وسوريا ودول أخرى.