YouTuber & Mapper (currently covering wars in Israel/Gaza; Russia/Ukraine). DMs open to sources.
Joined January 2023
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Here is my best attempt at mapping the war in Israel - will update in the coming hours: google.com/maps/d/u/0/viewer…
This move makes sense. Trump won Kansas by +16% and Iowa by +13%. Even if the generic ballot favors Democrats by 8%, both of these states should lean towards the GOP by 4-7%. The fact they aren't is a testament to the poor candidate quality of Ashley Hinson, both Turek and Hamilton punching above their weight, and diesel prices and tariffs playing an outsized role in local politics.
The bottom line is that the GOP is hemorrhaging support in areas Trump cruised in 2024, and the only person who can at least salvage some Republican turnout is Trump himself. But this is only beneficial in states where Trump has a positive or neutral approval rating. In traditional swing states like Michigan the electorate is skewed towards high-propensity left-leaning voters, and mentioning Trump ultimately hurts the Republican, even if it energizes the base a little.
Full details on El Salvador's military buildup in Haiti:
- So far 2,500 personnel deployed, which is more than the entire UN peacekeeping contingent in Haiti. Before this deployment surge there were 124 Salvadoran personnel in Haiti as a part of the UN-approved Gang Suppression Force, largely consisting of medics and aviation technicians.
- Forces involved in the mission include special forces specialized in search-and-resuce operations, marines, an infantry company, logistics, and other support personnel. For now the cap is 2,500, but the number can easily double or reach upwards of 6,000, depending on operational needs.
- 5 Salvadoran MD500E light attack/recon helicopters and 2 Black Hawks were refueled at Fortaleza El Rodeo, a Dominican military installation near the Haitian border in Jimaní. Last year the US transferred 2 UH-1N Twin Hueys to El Salvador for their peacekeeping force.
- El Salvador has deployed dozens of APCs and tactical vehicles, such as the Tygor B7 and Plasan Yagu. Equipment was airlifted on American and Colombian C-130 Hercules aircraft and Boeing 747s, with these aircraft landing at the Toussaint Louverture International Airport in Port-au-Prince.
- The Salvadoran HQ is near the American embassy and they're largely active in the Croix-des-Bouquets commune (east of Port-au-Prince), with an emphasis on the Santo neighborhood. The focus is on weakening the gangs controlling the Cul-de-Sac Plain, including 400 Mawozo and Chèn Mechan.
Postmortem on my Knesset election predictions:
The day before the election, this was my projection for how many mandates each party would get. In parentheses, I’ll show the difference compared to the actual results.
Coalition:
Likud: 23 (−4)
UTJ: 8 (+1)
Shas: 8 (+2)
OY: 7 (=)
RZP: 7 (+1)
53 seats (=)
Opposition:
Yashar: 21 (=)
Beyachad: 15 (+3)
Democrats: 8 (=)
YB: 8 (+1)
52 seats (+4)
Arab Parties:
Joint List: 9 (−2)
Ra’am: 6 (−2)
15 seats (−4)
On its face, my biggest success was projecting the exact proportion of voters that would support the coalition bloc. However, I underestimated how large a share of the coalition would be comprised of Likud itself. I must admit I drank some of the kool-aid from MSM polls that showed Likud hemorrhaging support. In the end they lost 5 seats, but still gained an additional 52,000 votes compared to 2022.
Likud’s relative success came at the expense of other coalition partners, most notably Shas. Due to polling data and demography, I expected the party to lose some support compared to the 11 seats it won in 2022, but still receive 8. The truth is that Shas is a dying party. It doesn’t pass the electoral threshold among first-time voters, the new generation of Mizrahi religious Zionists prefer Ben-Gvir, and many traditional voters from the periphery opted for Netanyahu. I was aware of these trends but didn’t anticipate such a significant drop.
I slightly overestimated Smotrich’s performance, as I was expecting Religious Zionists to come out to vote at slightly higher proportions in Beit Shemesh, Jerusalem, and Ma’ale Adumim. Smotrich and especially Feiglin’s bases are higher propensity, so it makes sense that some polls over-indexed their support.
As for the opposition, I assumed they would accrue a larger proportion of both the overall and Jewish vote. I nailed Yashar and the Democrats’ performance, but the error stems from my severe overestimation of Bennett’s performance. Again, I drank the Kool-Aid from MSM polls about a Beyachad rebound in the final two weeks of the election. Part of this can be explained by my lack of accounting for record-high Arab turnout.
I must admit I thought Bennett would garner a small but nevertheless notable contingent of ’22 Netanyahu voters, primarily upscale secular center-right Jews from areas like Hod Hasharon, Ra’anana, and Kfar Saba (I know these areas have always supported the opposition, but I thought Bennett could flip some votes from the Likud in those areas). I think my error was due to a subconscious bias as I'm terminally online and Bennett did a good job promoting his list on social media.
And I didn’t foresee 78% Arab turnout, neither among northern or southern Bedouins, let alone the Arabs in the Galilee or the center.
Today Ethiopia announced the delivery of the first batch of 12 Su-35 multirole fighter jets from Russia. Rosoboronexport, Russia's state-owned arms exporter, claims that only two Su-35s were handed to the Ethiopian Air Force today. These deliveries are nearly a year ahead of schedule.
Documents from Rostec initially showed that Ethiopia was slated to receive 6 Su-35s, but it seems like the contract has since expanded. Footage from Abiy Ahmed's visit to the Zhukovsky Airport showcases an Il-78MK-90A aerial refueling tanker, although it was likely just there on display and there isn't any information about Ethiopia acquiring the aircraft, although China is interested in purchasing 20 such units.
Ahmed also announced that Ethiopia will receive 4 S-400 air defense batteries. It's unclear whether the usage of the word "battery" was colloquial or technical, because taken at face value it would likely total 32 individual launchers. There aren't any details on the contract value or timeline. S-400s would significantly buttress Ethiopia's present air defense array which consists of S-75/S-125/Pantsir-S1/HQ-64/SPYDER.
Israeli-Argentinian military cooperation continues to strengthen, but there is still a long way to go:
On October 8th both countries signed a Defense Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding in Buenos Aires. This paves the way for additional exchanges of equipment, technology, research and development, and efforts to strengthen operational readiness. The agreement followed earlier conversations about working together on cybersecurity, satellite communications, and UAVs.
In June 2026 a government-to-government agreement was signed under which Argentina acquired ARAD-5 and ARAD-7 assault rifles from Israel Weapon Industries. The first order included 700 ARAD-7 rifles and their accessories, along with 167 blank-firing devices. The first batch of deliveries arrived on September 29th and included 50 ARAD-7s for the Argentine Army, 100 ARAD-5s for the Argentine Air Force, and 100 ARAD-5s for the Naval Infantry. The rifles were fitted with Meprolight Mepro M5 red-dot sights. IWI began training Argentine personnel in October. Another batch is expected in the first quarter of 2027, with a total of 1,600 rifles due for shipment. Argentina aims to gradually phase out its FN FAL and M16 rifles and is looking into setting up a local production line.
Israeli defense contractor Elbit Systems is assisting with the modernization of the TAM tanks to the TAM 2C-A2 standard. The program covers 74 tanks and includes a new digital fire-control computer, thermal sights, laser warning sensors, electric turret drives, improved stabilization, and an auxiliary power unit. So far 20 refurbished tanks have been delivered to the 8th Tank Cavalry Regiment, while the remainder are scheduled to arrive between 2026 and 2028 under a contract valued at about $115 million.
Argentina is considering the future acquisition of 36 ATMOS 2000 wheeled 155mm self-propelled howitzers. Evaluations conducted in 2024 concluded that the system was preferable to the French CAESAR. The package could reach around 160 million USD, and preparations are already underway within the 10th Artillery Group.
Argentina is also looking into purchasing Hermes 450/650/900 MALE UAVs, particularly after the signing of the recent memorandum. However, no concrete agreements have been reached yet.
So far these ties remain relatively modest, although further improvement in military relations is expected over time. Elbit has already presented Argentina with upgrade options for the 24 F-16s purchased from Denmark, of which 12 have already arrived. Possible areas include avionics, electronic warfare, airborne self-protection suites, and air-to-ground munitions. Rampage has been mentioned in some reports, but this remains unconfirmed for now. Some aircraft already carry the Litening G4 targeting pod, which was developed by the Israeli company Rafael. The pod provides electro-optical and infrared sensors, a laser designator, image processing, and air-to-ground data links.
Looking ahead, Argentina may pursue further UAVs, EW systems, additional upgrades to tanks and armored vehicles, precision munitions, ATGMs, intelligence cooperation, training, and joint cyber projects.
Following the shooting attack at Yehuda Checkpoint, which killed two Israeli soldiers from the 775th Search and Rescue Battalion, Netanyahu ordered a full lockdown of the city of Hebron. All entry and exit points from Route 35 into Hebron have been cordoned off. Additional vehicle checkpoints have been set up across the city’s perimeter, with the “Gray Bolt” procedure in place, which mandates detailed searches and identity checks of Palestinian vehicles entering major roads. Nearby towns north of Hebron, such as Halhul, have also been cut off.
Israel’s political echelon ordered the demolition of dozens of Palestinian structures near the attack site that were deemed unauthorized. The IDF and Border Police are operating inside the Farsh al-Hawa neighborhood on the northwestern outskirts of Hebron (marked in yellow, while the attack site is marked with the green star). So far, bulldozers have razed over 10 structures, including several encampments, three-storey apartment buildings, and storefronts.
These clearances are happening independently of the future destruction of the homes of the two attackers, Hamouda Wael Mohammed Jaaba and Firas Samir Mohammed Jaaba. Raids and searches for additional suspects have already occurred inside the property of the perpetrators and the surrounding areas. Their houses are being sealed and mapped, but the demolitions will only unfold once legal proceedings are completed.
Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz announced that a larger operation has commenced that will encompass the entirety of the neighborhood from where the attackers originated. It is not clear whether this means a heavy-handed approach will be taken in Farsh al-Hawa, Ein Deir Baha (where much of the Jaaba family resides, marked with light blue on the map), or both.
This expanded operation will follow the model of previous IDF incursions into dense West Bank neighborhoods and refugee camps, such as those in Jenin, Tulkarm, and Nur Shams. This includes evacuating residents, conducting house-to-house searches, confiscating weapons, and the mass leveling of structures that are either used by armed groups or impede the IDF’s ability to easily maneuver with vehicles throughout residential areas.
Current predictions for the 2026 governor races
Had you asked me a week ago I still would've maintained that Vivek could eke out a victory, despite all the polling data pointing to the contrary. But this odious move reeks of desperation, and seemingly proves that Vivek's campaign is aware their chances of victory are scant, so they're willing to stoop to new lows.
Had you asked me a week ago I still would've maintained that Vivek could eke out a victory, despite all the polling data pointing to the contrary. But this odious move reeks of desperation, and seemingly proves that Vivek's campaign is aware their chances of victory are scant, so they're willing to stoop to new lows.
Theti Mapping retweeted
If ever there were a metaphor for why our nations are in ruin, it's a bunch of Boomers dancing on the banks of the Seine while the sons of the third world burn Paris to the ground.
Theti Mapping retweeted
I’m seeing a huge wave of posts claiming the US has abandoned us and failed to warn Ukraine about yesterday’s ballistic missile launches toward Kyiv.
But almost nobody is looking at this from a technical perspective.
🧵 Here’s what you need to understand.
1/5
🚨Ethiopia Update 10/12:
- ENDF expanded past Adi Dairo, advancing 10km along the local road to the outskirts of Adi Nebreid and the encampment surrounding the Hawelti Bayto Seyemti Adiabo monument.
- ENDF advanced east of Shire on the B30 road, capturing Wkro and Aksum, Ethiopia's 32nd largest city. ENDF is at most 10km away from Adwa, the largest city remaining under TPLF control, and will likely enter the city in the coming hours if they haven't already.
- ENDF/TPF advanced 40km from Abiy Addi to Adi Selam. From there Ethiopian forces pushed northeastwards, capturing Indaba Tsahma and Feres May. Feres May is less than 12km away from Inticho, one of the final major command nodes for the TPLF besides Adwa. ENDF will also continue advancing along the local road from Adi Selam to southeastern Adwa.
- Ethiopia pushed over 20km northwest of Hawzen, capturing Nebelet. From here they're only 22km away from Inticho. They also advanced north of Adigrat along the B20 road, seizing Fadi and approaching Zelambessa, which served as a coordination point between Eritrea and TPLF.
Given the rapid ENDF advances along key regional roadways, and the TPLF's inability and unwillingness to confront Ethiopian forces in head-on engagements within urban clusters, ENDF certainly controls more territory than I'm depicting. But I'm waiting for confirmation on several notable towns over the next 24 hours before making additional changes.
There are also many TPLF pockets and salients sandwiched between the ENDF's attack vectors, primarily located in the Tigrayan section of the Ethiopian Highlands, that I continue to mark red.
Map update on the current situation in Ethiopia. Yesterday the ENDF captured Adigrat and continues to push northwards along the B20 road towards Fadi. But the more significant attack vector is further westwards, with the ENDF capturing Hawzen 2 days ago. Since then they have likely reached Nebelet.
Over the past 3 days ENDF has advanced along the Mekele-Abiy Addi road all the way to Adi Selam, with the eventual goal being Adwa on the A2 Highway. On the western front, the ENDF is pushing along the B30 from Shire towards Adi Dairo.
Clashes have also erupted on the Sudanese-Ethiopian border, as TPLF-affiliated Army 70 is attacking ENDF positions in the Welkait region, including Sherarina.
The claim that the Houthis didn't invest sufficient efforts into targeting Israel completely ignores the practical realities of the past 3 years.
1) Obviously the Houthis are concentrating far more firepower on its other adversaries. It's in an open state of war against the PLC and has every reason to conduct tactical strikes with short-range ballistic missiles, both within Yemeni territory and on military infrastructure on the Saudi side of the border. Longer range strikes on Saudi export terminals, airports, pipelines, and refineries and meant to impose costs on Saudi Arabia for continuing/potentially expanding the ground war in Yemen, and for imposing an aerial/naval blockade for the past 11 years.
2) The Houthis have at least many hundreds of ballistic missiles that can conduct strikes on Saudi Arabia but not on Israel (Scud-B/C, Qaher-1/2M, Burkan-1/2/2H/3, Asif.) Compare this to the limited number of long range BMs actually capable of reaching Eilat, let alone Tel Aviv. After Rough Rider their long-range stockpiles hovered around 80-100, and the Houthis also expended over 130 MRBMs on attacks aimed at Israel, leaving them with a diminished stockpile requiring rejuvenation. Boosting production of MRBMs (Hatem-1/2, Toufan, Palestine 2) is highly dependent on tenuous supply routes from Iran.
3) By now the Houthis likely have 150-200 MRBMs, but they have no reason to waste them on Israel. After all they tied a cessation of attacks on Israel to an enduring ceasefire in Gaza, and later on to the continuation of a ceasefire in Iran. Like any other self-preserving entity, they need to ration these highly-potent tools for immediate threats.
4) Even after firing over 130 MRBMs, the direct damage inflicted on Israel was minimal. The Port of Eilat accounted for less than 1% of Israel's unloaded maritime goods, although it did account for nearly half of the country's vehicle imports. Only the Palestine-2 could consistently reach Ben Gurion Airport, and even if the Houthis fired all of them at the airport, either in a single wave or in increments, it wouldn't been enough to overwhelm Israel's AD array to the degree necessary to cause any major disruptions.
5) Again, the Houthis need to focus on their own self-preservation before being able to effecuate change 2000km away. Attacking Israel now would achieve nothing besides inviting an asymmetric Israeli response targeting Ansarallah's military and political echelon, along with any remaining viable industries. It would also push them closer to Saudi Arabia at a time when Saudi is already trying to court more intimate support from Pakistan, Turkey, and the US.
Here's my current prediction for the Senate elections, as of October 9th. The one race I'm extremely iffy about is Alaska due to RCV shenanigans. Polling is likely overestimating Democrats in key races by 2-3%.
Safe = 15%+
Likely = 5-15%
Lean 1.5-5%
Tilt <1.5%
We're now inching ever closer to a direct confrontation between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Reports of Eritrean convoys crossing over the international border into TPLF controlled territory in Adigrat (20km from Eritrea) remain unconfirmed, although western outlets such as DW Amharic reported on this, citing local sources.
AFP reports that Eritrean soldiers have been present in Adigrat since October 3rd, with military provisions and armored vehicles being moved further southwards to Idaga Hamus (32k from Eritrea.) Reuters and ACLED report that Eritrean troops crossed the international border at Zelambessa.
This is backed up by satellite imagery showing the movement of heavy equipment in the Adi Keyh military base in Eritrea, located just 30km from the border. Ethiopia allegedly carried out UAV strikes on their vehicles and ammunition in Guada on the night between October 7th and 8th.
Ethiopia's Foreign Minister went as far as saying that Eritrean forces are located 60km deep. The Ethiopian estimate is that 8,000 Eritrean troops crossed the border so far. It's important to note that Eritrea flat-out denies these claims, while accusing Ethiopia of pursuing a "war of aggression" for over 3 years.
BBC reported that Eritrean personnel and trucks have been filmed as far south as Wukro (77km deep) before being pushed back by the ENDF and Tigray Peace Force to Adigrat.
The two countries severed diplomatic relations on October 1st, but today the situation deteriorated even further. Ethiopia sent a letter to the UN saying Eritrea has launched an "all out invasion," leaving them no choice but to defend itself.
All the major parties in this conflict have an interest in further escalation. Eritrea already anticipates an all-out Ethiopian attack and wants to secure a buffer zone, TPFL needs all the help it can get, and Ethiopia wants secure port access to the Red Sea.
This post is more relevant than ever. With the recent loss of the eastern flank of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait to the Houthis, Eritrea's coastline has become even more important in Red Sea power politics. Just this month, Eritrean Foreign Minister Osman Saleh said they "decided we didn’t want their [Israeli] embassy here." The Israeli embassy in Asmara has been closed since 2022, while Eritrea still maintains a small diplomatic outpost in Tel Aviv (as a means of exerting control over the 17,000-20,000 Eritrean diaspora.)
Israeli-Eritrean ties used to be relatively warm, especially in the 1990s. But the two countries gradually drifted apart as Israel prioritized its partnership with Ethiopia, Eritrean President Afwerki grew suspicious of Israeli activities in the Horn of Africa, and the Eritrean refugee crisis turned into a domestic political headache.
Likewise, the UAE used to have strong dealings with Eritrea. In 2015 the Emiratis started setting up port infrastructure in Assab to assist in their operations in Yemen and for economic purposes. A 30-year lease was signed on the Assab Port and airfield, but by 2021 the UAE's presence in Eritrea totally evaporated. This was due to a combination of factors, including a decrease in Emirati activities in Yemen, closer links in Yemen which caused them to double down on port infrastructure in Somaliland, and Afwerki's skepticism of foreign investment.
Since 2018, but in particular 2021, Emirati-Ethiopian alignment has become more intimate. UAE has poured billions in FDI into Addis Ababa, the Emirati company DP World facilitates Ethiopian coastal access through the Ports of Berbera and Bosaso, while Ethiopia serves as a training and logistics hub for the RSF in Sudan.
Now all the interests are colliding against Eritrea. One of Ethiopia's highest strategic priorities is securing port access, with Eritrea's Assab and Massawa Ports being the most obvious targets. The UAE is looking to reassert itself in the Red Sea after being kicked out of Yemen by the Saudis in January, and the Southern Giants Brigades being pushed out of Bab al-Mandeb by the Houthis recently. The Emiratis are also looking to buttress their supply lines to the RSF and their African gold-and-airlift system, which already encompasses Ethiopia, Somaliland, Puntland, Jubaland, South Sudan, the RSF, Haftar's LNA, Chad, and CAR.
Meanwhile Israel wants to guarantee commercial freedom in the Red Sea while expanding its military footprint around the Houthis. As a reminder Israel used to clandestinely operate on UAE-controlled military infrastructure in southern Yemen, including the airstrip on Mayyun Island, so now there needs to be a replacement.
There's also the additional layer of Egyptian-Ethiopian ties. Egypt is working on expanding its own presence in the Port of Assab and Djibouti's Port Doraleh in order to box in Ethiopia. This is meant to pressure Ethiopia into changing its policy on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which restricts the flow of water from the Blue Nile downstream to Egypt.
All of this means there is renewed interest in regime change in Eritrea, although this is coming at a difficult time as Trump just lifted Tigray War-era sanctions. Eritrea's population stands at a mere 3.7 million, while the diaspora numbers nearly 1.5 million. Many of those who fled were trying to evade mandatory state services for 18-40 year olds. Naturally these diasporoids (defo not all) have a bone to pick with Afwerki's government.
This has manifested in Brigade Nhamedu, an oppositionist group led by @BeyeneGerezghe1 that aims to depose Afwerki and the PFDJ. Brigade Nhamedu has recently discussed establishing a base in Ethiopia, and the movement has been openly hosted by Ethiopia since 2025. Even Gerezghe himself frequents the country frequently.
Now Israel is allowing the opposition group to hold meetings and elections out in the open in Ness Ziona. There's scant evidence of overt Israeli support, but I suspect this will change in the coming months. Anti-Afwerki networks are also active in Canada, USA, Sweden, Norway, Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland.
Theti Mapping retweeted
She simultaneously claims that she was so drunk that she's not responsible for consenting to an orgy, AND that her own recollections of the night are more reliable than the men who she claims were more sober than her. Totally incoherent. And through all of this, there is no evidence or even accusation of any force or threats being used against her. She was there because she wanted to be. Regretting it after the fact doesn't change that. This whole case is a sham.
Israeli Army Radio reports that the attempt to assassinate Ali al-Amoudi most likely failed. Channel 14 reports he either left the apartment building before the strike, or the intelligence on his whereabouts was faulty.
Overnight an Israeli airstrike targeted Ali al-Amoudi, the de facto Chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau in Gaza. At 1:30am, the strike targeted the ground floor of the "Al-Asala" residential apartment building on Al-Muassasat Street, near the Haydar roundabout in the al-Rimal neighborhood, western Gaza City.
The attack killed five people, including Maria Hafez Abu Dawood and her daughter, Maysa Abu Dawood. They were members of Gaza's Greek Orthodox community. The strike also killed, Yasmin Khmeis Al-Bobo, head of the multimedia department at Palestine University, along with her mother, Haloum Al-Bobo. The only male mentioned is 21 year old Muhammad Abu Odeh. At least 6 other people were injured. Ali al-Amoudi wasn't mentioned by local sources. Regardless, Channel 12 reports that the official Israeli assessment is that his chanes of survival are slim.
al-Amoudi was released from prison in Israel in the 2011 Gilad Shalit deal. He personally ran Yahya Sinwar's office from 2017-2021. Following Hamas's 2021 internal elections, he was added as a member of the party's politburo and was put in charge of the media and communications department. Following Sinwar's death, Khalil al-Hayya took the reigns as Chairman of Hamas's Political Bureau in Gaza, even though he lives in Qatar.
But in July 2026 al-Hayya won the overall Hamas leadership election, putting him in charge of the entire organization's political wing. This left the head of the Gaza Politburo position vacant. At the time al-Amoudi served as al-Hayya's deputy in Gaza, so it's assumed that he took over the leader of Hamas's political echelon inside of Gaza. Some sources claim he is competing for power with Nizar Awadallah in Gaza.
Besides al-Amoudi, the highest ranking targets being hunted by the IDF in Gaza include Imad Aqel, Muhannad Rajab, Mohammed al-Bream, & Fayez Baroud.
