
I used to do boring legal stuff until #Bitcoin came. Doing cool stuff since then | @Advisorn_io
Switzerland
Joined May 2008
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Thomas C retweeted
The FBI published 628 addresses for the Binance theft yesterday and asked exchanges, DeFi services and analytics firms to block them. They are in our data as of this morning, master and read replica.
None of them is on a sanctions list.
That makes them a different compliance case: an attribution by law enforcement, not a designation. A designation may well follow. Until it does, these addresses need handling of their own, not a sanctions flag.
Thomas C retweeted
The Aave v3 position is still open on day two. An address attributed to the Binance attacker has 60,019,216.06 aUSDT supplied and 19,764.33 WETH borrowed against it, read at 14:14 UTC.
In 24 hours: +10,771.38 collateral, +1.13 WETH of debt. Nothing deposited, nothing repaid, nothing withdrawn. It just accrued on both sides.
The borrower's own ETH went from 0.0988 to 0.0000089. It can no longer pay for a transaction.
Thomas C retweeted
The last issuer freeze in this case did not land where our own label set said it did. It was Circle, USDC, $123,175.53 at 04:11:35 UTC on 30 Oct, on an address a public explorer calls Exploiter 22 and we had not yet written down.
So we walked one hop out from every attributed address: 185 counterparties, 35 on Ethereum, 5 on Tron. Two freezes, both on that one address.
Thomas C retweeted
3,984.49 ETH in a wallet with nonce 0. It has never sent a transaction, never paid gas, never tested the way out.
It only receives. Today it took 747.769155 ETH more, in four transfers between 12:55 and 14:07 UTC.
None of those four senders could pay for gas either, until one address gave each of them exactly 0.05 ETH first.
Thomas C retweeted
A second Binance hot wallet is blacklisted. Circle froze "Binance: Hot Wallet 34" on six chains in 38 seconds on 29 Oct.
We re-read it at 14:26 UTC today. On Base: balanceOf 60,000,000.000978 USDC, isBlacklisted true. $62,956,105.66 across six chains, still frozen.
Check any address yourself: blockchainanalysis.io/tools/…
Thomas C retweeted
Eight posts, one lesson.
The Binance attacker lost $2.40B and kept $2.61B. The difference was not speed, or skill, or which chain they picked. It was whether the asset had an issuer.
Stablecoins have a phone number. ETH, BTC and SOL do not.
And the line can be crossed. 60M of USDT went into a lending pool as collateral and came back out as 19,762 ETH of debt, in the minutes before the blacklist landed. A loan nobody intends to repay is a sale.
Freezable in, unfreezable out.
If you hold custody, the part worth keeping is the clock. Everything that could be frozen was frozen inside the first hour, most of it in twenty minutes, while the theft was still running. A recovery plan that
starts the next morning is not a plan.
And it gets harder one step out. On the collector address you are freezing something already known. One hop downstream you are freezing an address somebody has to identify first, and that is where the time goes.
Every freeze we have on record, back to November 2017:
blockchainanalysis.io/sancti…
Thomas C retweeted
People are saying the attacker's stablecoins were frozen inside Aave. That is not what happened, and the real version is more interesting.
They deposited 60,004,324 USDT into Aave V3 and borrowed 19,762.89 ETH against it. Tether blacklisted the address 72 seconds after the first freeze — and caught nothing. Our ledger records that freeze at $0, because the USDT was already in the pool. The address holds aEthUSDT, not USDT.
Nothing in Aave is frozen. The collateral sits in the pool, untouched, and no other user is affected. The borrower's address is blacklisted, so the deposit is stranded, not seized.
A loan nobody intends to repay is not a loan. It is a sale: 60M of USDT that was about to be blacklisted, exchanged for $44.3M of ETH that cannot be.
Balances read on Ethereum at 06:10 UTC today. Address attributed, not confirmed.
blockchainanalysis.io/a/eth/…
Thomas C retweeted
$66.0M of USDT on Tron, frozen by Tether at 21:21:12 UTC.
The last of the large freezes. Nineteen minutes and 37 seconds after the first one.
Everything that came later was small change: four more events, $11.2M between them, the last at 01:06 UTC. The window that mattered had already closed.
Address attributed, not confirmed.
blockchainanalysis.io/a/tron…
Thomas C retweeted
$175.0M of USDT, frozen by Tether at 21:14:59 UTC.
This one is not the collector address. It is a hop downstream, one the money had already been moved to.
That is the harder case: by the time funds are a step away, you are no longer freezing a known address, you are freezing one somebody had to identify first. It was frozen before it could move again.
Address attributed, not confirmed.
blockchainanalysis.io/a/eth/…
Thomas C retweeted
$312.7M of USDT on Tron, frozen by Tether at 21:09:12 UTC.
Eight minutes after the first freeze on Ethereum.
Moving to another chain is usually what buys an attacker time. Here it bought none: the same issuer controls the blacklist on both, so the second chain closed almost as fast as the first.
Address attributed, not confirmed.
blockchainanalysis.io/a/tron…
Thomas C retweeted
$823.0M of USDC, frozen by Circle at 21:04:59 UTC.
Same address as the $971.1M Tether freeze three minutes earlier.
Two issuers, two separate blacklists, one address, under four minutes apart.
Whatever coordination happened that night, it happened fast.
Address attributed, not confirmed.
blockchainanalysis.io/a/eth/…
Thomas C retweeted
$971.1M of USDT, frozen by Tether at 21:01:35 UTC.
It is the largest single freeze in our ledger, which goes back to November 2017.
It landed on the collector address 51 minutes after the first outflow reported for the attack, with the theft still running.
Everything the attacker had moved into USDT on Ethereum stopped in one transaction.
Address attributed, not confirmed.
blockchainanalysis.io/a/eth/…
Thomas C retweeted
Yesterday was the biggest day by value in our freeze ledger, and it is not close.
Tether and Circle froze $2.46B across 38 addresses on seven chains. The next biggest day on record is 20 November 2023, at $225M. Eleven times smaller.
$2.40B of that sits on addresses attributed to the Binance attacker, so 97.5% of the day is this one case.
We capture these from the issuers' own on-chain blacklist events, so it is the record of the enforcement itself, not an estimate of it.
Every address, every transaction hash:
blockchainanalysis.io/sancti…
Thomas C retweeted
The Binance attacker's money split almost in half, along one line: whether the asset had an issuer to call.
$2.40B in stablecoins was frozen. Tether, Circle and First Digital blacklisted the addresses on-chain, and 99.7% of it was locked inside twenty minutes, while the theft was still running.
$2.61B is still sitting there: 480,715 ETH, 18,270 BTC, 970,549 SOL. Nobody can freeze a native coin.
Balances read at 06:10 UTC today. Addresses attributed, not confirmed.
blockchainanalysis.io/sancti…
Thomas C retweeted
Proving control of a self-hosted wallet shouldn't take a screenshot or a test transfer.
BA | Signet: the counterparty signs one message. You get a verifiable certificate, anchored on-chain.
Free: unlimited verifications + 3 anchored proofs a month.
basignet.com/?utm_source=x2
Thomas C retweeted
Who really holds these tokenized RWAs?
We catalogued 766 of them and built a free tool to screen the holder base behind any: sanctions, mixer and high-risk exposure, and concentration, across every chain it lives on.
No login 👇
blockchainanalysis.io/tools/…
Thomas C retweeted
Agents can move money onchain now. Most can't tell if the wallet they're paying is sanctioned, a scam, or already frozen.
One line fixes that:
npx skills add blockchainanalysis/skills
Compliance + token-safety skills for Claude Code, Codex, Cursor & 30+ tools.
Thomas C retweeted
Can you defend it?
Not the screening itself. The moment a year later when an auditor, a regulator, or opposing counsel asks why you cleared that deposit, and the answer has to hold up without you in the room.
Five things that decision needs. One platform.


















