Nerd/Techie Fighting A.I & $BTC FUD | $BTC ≠ Crypto | A.I. Super-User | Member: @TNorth | Contributor: @Roxom // @BitcoinForCorps | Data-Driven Analysis
Joined December 2009
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As BTC-TCs, both @Strategy | @Strive rely on robust capital markets access to scale the Treasury Model.
Through Digital Credit, they’ve opened additional capital-raising channels and, in my view, created a new asset class. The resulting preferred securities now trade as their own cohort | block in a secondary market, adjacent to $BTC and their “parent equities”, not separate from them.
My research at True North examines $STRC through that lens: buybacks, market structure, and the transmission channels connecting the offering to the wider complex.
This connection shows up in the data - the following results are from a broader analysis of all five preferred offerings: $STRK | $STRF | $STRD | $STRC | $SATA - using their price histories since inception and rolling attribution models built on matched trading sessions.
The results below are from a 9-4-26 snapshot of that larger analysis: a 60-session window spanning 6-11-26 through 9-4-26, covering the selloff, the pre-buyback rebound, and the buyback execution period.
Within that window, a model built on orthogonal (uncorrelated) factors explained 74.65% of daily price return variance in $STRC. The three largest allocations, expressed as shares of that explained variance, were:
a] Other (Non-STRC) Preferreds: ~44.7%
b] MSTR (ex-BTC): ~39.2%
c] BTC: ~15.7%
Read the full analysis here: tnorth.com/research/strc-buy…
Bitcoin’s volatility can keep large pools of income seeking capital on the sidelines.
Through 10-16-2026, all Digital Credit offerings have outperformed $BTC with lower volatility over their respective periods.
That’s the opportunity for Digital Credit: lower volatility than spot $BTC, offering yields above many traditional alternatives.
That combination will attract investors who would otherwise avoid direct $BTC exposure, expand the TAM of $BTC, and spur new demand over time.
Adrian Morris retweeted
I want a Kung-Fu Legend Guardian to protect me and my $BTC
Check out @PunterJeff going solo dolo on this week's episode on @TNorth - "The Frontier of Credit"
True North Episode 83: The Frontier of Credit xitter.cf/i/broadcasts/1aJbdEawo…
I want a Kung-Fu Legend Guardian to protect me and my $BTC
I wonder how Jamie Dimon feels about this.
Adding $BTC to their Long-Term Capital Markets Assumptions paper is a tacit admittal that $BTC is:
1] Worthy for portfolio consideration
2] Here to stay
$STRC | $1.84B later and with 13 weeks of buybacks through 10-18, $STRC closed Friday 10-16, at $97.72, today hovering between $98-$99, still below par.
From my 9-24-26 research paper on the @TNorth website:
“The open question is not whether Strategy can keep buying, but whether they should, and how much organic demand remains once they stop.”
Strategy can keep buying, but inorganic issuer demand is not the same as organic market demand. I have many thoughts on what can be done, but sometimes doing nothing is the wisest move.
We will see how things play out, updated market read below:
$STRC | Buybacks vs Trading Activity (Part 4)
13 weeks later, through 10-18, Strategy has spent ~$1.84B on $STRC buybacks, retiring obligations on 18.91M shares. Over the ongoing buyback window, that spending is equivalent to [20.06%] of dollar trading volume.
Strategy has also increased its Digital Credit Securities repurchase authorization from $2B to $3B, leaving approximately $1.16B available under the program.
Last week, dollar trading volume increased from ~650M to ~990M, up [52.26%], while buyback spending was essentially unchanged, increasing from $192.4M to $193.1M with, Strategy’s purchases represented [19.49%] of dollar turnover, down from [29.57%].
The lower participation rate did not come from Strategy meaningfully stepping back, there was more trading around a similarly sized issuer bid but despite that bid, STRC closed 10-16 at $97.72.
We have to be fair and note that the 10-15 ex-dividend date saw $0.50 a share paid out so the weekly price decline of [1.94%] overstates the shareholder loss (if we include that dividend entitlement, the decline was approximately [1.44%]).
However this was not just an ex-dividend adjustment; Friday alone saw STRC fall [1.82%], from $99.53 to $97.72. A lot of people ascribe this to MSCI index exclusion fears, but Friday also brought a broad market selloff. Either way, the issuer bid did not insulate $STRC from weakness across the market and Strategy’s capital structure.
The question I keep coming back to (and that many are wrestling with today) is this: if the substantial issuer bid is the main explanation for the recovery in $STRC, why has continued buying still not delivered a return to par? My read remains that many are conflating the recovery with the buybacks, and giving the corporate bid too much credit.
Buybacks retire dividend obligations and might provide support at the margins, but that marginal support doesn't insulate $STRC from the effects of leverage, a repricing across the broader capital structure or the structural market transmission channels namely $BTC, $MSTR and Digital Credit as an asset class.
tnorth.com/research/strc-buy…
$MSTR | $STRC | $BTC: The good that comes from an increase in the Digital Credit Securities Repurchase Program is that it'll allow Strategy to retire more dividend obligations | shares. That is a real benefit to the capital structure.
As far as price? The market controls that.
Strategy has repurchased $193M of $STRC and acquired 267 $BTC. As of 10/18/26, we hold 848,517 BTC and $5.3B of USD Assets. We have also increased the size of our Digital Credit Securities Repurchase Program from $2.0B to $3.0B. $MSTR strategy.com/press/strategy-…
So... Black Monday? Yea?
This aged well.
3 hours into the supposed "Black Monday" stock market crash and Nasdaq 100 futures are now up nearly +1%.
The S&P 500 is set to add +$350 billion in market cap at the open again.
As we stated 24 hours ago: Ignore the noise.
$STRC | $SATA: Digital Credit offerings are "Meta Derivatives".
They are derivatives of their parent equity ($MSTR or $ASST) which itself is a derivative of $BTC: a derivative of a derivative.
They aren't broken, this isn't a flaw, this is how the market will treat them.
Putting this out there now so that it's known: $MSTR common stock buybacks will not work to raise price, and will only serve to raise KPI's like $BTC Per Share. Which have nearly nothing to do with how the market is pricing the equity.
A few people have asked what the conclusions of my $STRC research paper actually rest on. Very simply: if the effects of trading volume dynamics and buybacks are so weak that quantitative models can't distinguish them from zero, they likely aren't having a strong impact on price activity. In the paper, I broke that down into 4 statements, 2 of which don't rely on regression results:
“...( i ) The recovery in STRC began before repurchase executions ( ii ) The other Strategy Preferred Offerings (and SATA) also recovered before repurchases occurred | without share repurchases ( iii ) Trading Volume | Short Volume Flow are in the model, and their coefficients are not statistically distinguishable from zero over the observed window ( iv ) Share Buybacks as a proxy (when evenly allocated by session) are not statistically distinguishable from zero once BTC, MSTR, and the other preferred offerings are in the model. Given ( i - iv) above, while the results of this analysis do not claim that the effect of buybacks was zero, there is evidence that they were not the main explanation for the STRC price rebound over this observed window…”
Some thoughts on $MSTR | @MSCI_Inc Index Exclusion
Last November, I challenged the framing of a potential $2.8B MSCI outflow as an “existential threat” to @Strategy.
MSCI now seems to be adopting its “non-operating company” exclusion framework. The updated impact list identifies @Strategy for potential removal. The timeline to watch is as follows:
10-15-26: Results from Consultation on the Eligibility of Non-Operating Companies.
11-11-26: Final Constituent Changes
11-30-26: Implementation
The risk has become real, but we need to differentiate the FUD and fear-mongering from actual potential impact on trading and capital markets access.
$MSTR Trading Volume | EoW 10-09-26: $15.29B
$MSTR Averages:
$565.25B in Dollar Trading Volume YTD
$2.91B Average Daily Dollar Volume
$13.79B Average Weekly Dollar Volume
$56.53B Average Monthly Dollar Volume
Using the JP Morgan $2.8B “forced sell-off” estimate from last year as a scenario, that represents:
0.96 Average Trading Days of Volume
18.3% of the Last Week’s Volume
0.50% of YTD Volume
I share these numbers to establish scale, not to predict zero price impact, but claims that highlight this as a massive risk to $MSTR are overstated. Any forced selling will be into trading flow, around re-blances, etc. This will not be a market dump event. $MSTR has the liquidity and turnover to absorb this selling with little issue IMO.
This is a near term ripple to deal with, not an existential threat to $MSTR.
Today's announcement for reference: msci.com/indexes/index-resou…
MSCI $MSTR DE-LISTING FEAR MONGERING: THE $2.8 BILLION LIE
First: Strategy is at ZERO risk of being delisted from other indices. Second: J.P. Morgan says an MSCI delisting would trigger a $2.8 Billion forced sell off. They are banking on you not knowing the math.
I assessed their "nuclear warning" against actual $MSTR trading volume.
The Context: $MSTR has had over $1 TRILLION in Trading Volume YTD. Meaning that -
Average Daily Volume: The "catastrophic" outflow is less than ONE AVERAGE DAY of trading.
Average Weekly Volume: It is just ~12% of a standard week.
Average Monthly Volume: It is a ~3% rounding error.
YTD Volume: It is a microscopic 0.26% of the flow.
The Reality: They are screaming about an "existential event" that is actually a standard Tuesday afternoon. This isn't a liquidity crisis. It's a scare tactic.
Don't let them scare you with numbers that sound big to you but are invisible to the market.
A few people have asked what the conclusions of my $STRC research paper actually rest on. Very simply: if the effects of trading volume dynamics and buybacks are so weak that quantitative models can't distinguish them from zero, they likely aren't having a strong impact on price activity. In the paper, I broke that down into 4 statements, 2 of which don't rely on regression results:
“...( i ) The recovery in STRC began before repurchase executions ( ii ) The other Strategy Preferred Offerings (and SATA) also recovered before repurchases occurred | without share repurchases ( iii ) Trading Volume | Short Volume Flow are in the model, and their coefficients are not statistically distinguishable from zero over the observed window ( iv ) Share Buybacks as a proxy (when evenly allocated by session) are not statistically distinguishable from zero once BTC, MSTR, and the other preferred offerings are in the model. Given ( i - iv) above, while the results of this analysis do not claim that the effect of buybacks was zero, there is evidence that they were not the main explanation for the STRC price rebound over this observed window…”
As BTC-TCs, both @Strategy | @Strive rely on robust capital markets access to scale the Treasury Model.
Through Digital Credit, they’ve opened additional capital-raising channels and, in my view, created a new asset class. The resulting preferred securities now trade as their own cohort | block in a secondary market, adjacent to $BTC and their “parent equities”, not separate from them.
My research at True North examines $STRC through that lens: buybacks, market structure, and the transmission channels connecting the offering to the wider complex.
This connection shows up in the data - the following results are from a broader analysis of all five preferred offerings: $STRK | $STRF | $STRD | $STRC | $SATA - using their price histories since inception and rolling attribution models built on matched trading sessions.
The results below are from a 9-4-26 snapshot of that larger analysis: a 60-session window spanning 6-11-26 through 9-4-26, covering the selloff, the pre-buyback rebound, and the buyback execution period.
Within that window, a model built on orthogonal (uncorrelated) factors explained 74.65% of daily price return variance in $STRC. The three largest allocations, expressed as shares of that explained variance, were:
a] Other (Non-STRC) Preferreds: ~44.7%
b] MSTR (ex-BTC): ~39.2%
c] BTC: ~15.7%
Read the full analysis here: tnorth.com/research/strc-buy…