◾𝗘𝗩𝗠/𝗩𝗩𝗣𝗔𝗧 𝗳𝗶𝗿𝗺𝘄𝗮𝗿𝗲 Pre-installation firmware chain We were told that electoral rolls were protected because the ERO is the statutory authority - decentralised, independent and empowered by law. But then ECINet showed us something deeply troubling, that law may give an officer(ERO) discretion, but programmed 𝘀𝗼𝗳𝘁𝘄𝗮𝗿𝗲,centralized in Delhi, can determine whether that officer(ERO) is actually able to exercise it 𝗧𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝗿𝗮𝗶𝘀𝗲𝘀 𝗮 𝗺𝘂𝗰𝗵 𝗯𝗶𝗴𝗴𝗲𝗿 𝗾𝘂𝗲𝘀𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗮𝗯𝗼𝘂𝘁 𝗜𝗻𝗱𝗶𝗮'𝘀 𝗲𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝘁𝗲𝗰𝗵𝗻𝗼𝗹𝗼𝗴𝘆. ◾𝗘𝗩𝗠/𝗩𝗩𝗣𝗔𝗧 𝗳𝗶𝗿𝗺𝘄𝗮𝗿𝗲 𝗶𝘀 𝗱𝗲𝘃𝗲𝗹𝗼𝗽𝗲𝗱 𝘄𝗶𝘁𝗵𝗶𝗻 𝗕𝗘𝗟 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗘𝗖𝗜𝗟. According to the ECI, firmware is loaded into EVM/VVPAT microcontrollers by BEL and ECIL at their manufacturing facilities and then locked in one -time-programmable (OTP) memory. The ECI states that only designated engineers have access during that manufacturing process. The source code is written by a selected group of just 2–3 engineers & subsequently tested before the machine code is loaded into microcontrollers ▪️Whenever 𝗱𝗼𝘂𝗯𝘁𝘀 are raised The ECI's position is that after approved firmware is loaded and the microcontroller is made One-Time Programmable (OTP), that particular chip cannot subsequently be reprogrammed But that answers what happens 𝗔𝗙𝗧𝗘𝗥 the code is burnt ◾But with ECINet, we have already seen how 𝘀𝗼𝗳𝘁𝘄𝗮𝗿𝗲 𝗮𝗿𝗰𝗵𝗶𝘁𝗲𝗰𝘁𝘂𝗿𝗲 can determine what changes are technologically permitted, even where the law vests that discretion in a statutory authority. ◾That makes the QUESTION about 𝗘𝗩𝗠/𝗩𝗩𝗣𝗔𝗧 𝗳𝗶𝗿𝗺𝘄𝗮𝗿𝗲 even more important- 1- What guarantees the integrity of the 𝗰𝗼𝗱𝗲 𝗕𝗘𝗙𝗢𝗥𝗘 it is burnt into the chip? Saying “OTP means it can't be changed afterwards” answers the post-manufacture question. It does not, by itself, answer whether the correct and independently verified program was burnt into the OTP chip in the first place. 2- Who independently verifies the code before OTP? 3 - Could EVM code theoretically be changed at the development- manufacturing end, before firmware is burnt into the chip? 👉🏼Yes - the source code is 𝘀𝗼𝗳𝘁𝘄𝗮𝗿𝗲 and can be changed by whoever is authorised to develop it. If software architecture could constrain the statutory powers of an ERO 4- What independent safeguards ensure that no comparable concentration of technological control exists anywhere in the EVM/VVPAT software during development, firmware verification and deployment chain? 5- Who writes each version of the BEL and ECIL EVM/VVPAT source code? 6-Who can authorise a source-code change? 7-Who controls the source repository and audit logs? 8-Who independently reviews the actual source, rather than merely functional behaviour? 9-Is the final firmware reproducibly built from the reviewed source? 10-Who independently verifies that the firmware burnt into randomly selected production EVMs is bit-for-bit identical to the authenticated approved build? We are witnessing deeply troubling signs of manipulation of the electoral process. Red flags are at every crucial stage, while transparency remains conspicuously absent 👇🏼 ◾𝗧𝗵𝗲𝗿𝗲 𝗵𝗮𝘀 𝗯𝗲𝗲𝗻 𝗮 𝗱𝗼𝗰𝘂𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗱 𝗕𝗝𝗣-𝗮𝗳𝗳𝗶𝗹𝗶𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗼𝘃𝗲𝗿𝘀𝘆 𝗶𝗻𝘃𝗼𝗹𝘃𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗕𝗘𝗟 In January 2024, former Union Secretary E.A.S. Sarma wrote to the Election Commission raising concerns that at least four BEL independent directors allegedly had BJP affiliations. The names reported at the time included -Shyama Singh, Shivnath Yadav, Mansukhbhai Khachariya and P.V. Parthasarathi. ptinews.com/story/national… sjcdeptcomm.wordpress.com/20…… ◾BEL's board has since changed. The current BEL disclosures, the independent directors include Pradeep Tripathi and Bharatsinh Prabhatsinh Parmar. Bharatsinh Prabhatsinh Parmar is a former Rajya Sabha MP, and election affidavit records identify him as having been elected as a BJP candidate. myneta.info/rajsab09aff/ca…