📢Help shape what Keeper builds next. Users, partners and contributors already help improve Keeper. We’re bringing more of that work onto X: requests, progress and the decisions behind them. What’s one thing you’d change? Reply below. 1/3

Hardware wallet incidents can mean different failures. One - Weak seed generation: move to a fresh seed. Two - Leaked customer data: expect targeted phishing and physical risk. Three - Tampered device: stop using it and move to keys generated on verified hardware. And many more. Use multisig to mitigate most of them.

🚨 There’s another concern worth discussing following PHP2Shell and the recent security disclosures. What happens when a bitcoin wallet provider holds one of your signing or recovery keys, and its internet-facing infrastructure is compromised? @Bitkey @CasaHODL @AnchorWatch @unchainedcom @nunchuk_io We understand that a provider-held key alone generally cannot move funds in these multisig setups. But suppose an attacker compromises the web/API infrastructure without obtaining the private key itself. Could they manipulate signing requests, trigger unauthorized co-signatures, bypass spending policies or abuse recovery workflows? What independent safeguards prevent this? And which guarantees remain intact if the backend itself can’t be trusted? We’re not suggesting any of these services have been affected by PHP2Shell. We’d genuinely appreciate some technical clarity on these trust boundaries. Keeper offers optional server-assisted signing too, so these are questions we need to keep asking ourselves. The more of this we can independently verify, the better.

Appreciate the quick response. Passport is genuinely one of the best devices out there.

⚠️ We’d suggest holding off on non-essential hardware wallet setups and firmware downloads for the next 48 hours. With PHP2Shell and other recent security disclosures, there’s still uncertainty around the broader implications for bitcoin infrastructure. There’s no confirmed compromise of hardware wallet vendors through PHP2Shell that we’re aware of. But a compromised website serving wallet software or firmware is a risk worth taking seriously. A few precautions for now: • Delay routine new wallet setups and firmware downloads where possible. • If you must download, verify signatures using independently trusted keys. • Existing wallets and normal bitcoin transactions can continue. Verify transaction details on your hardware signer. • No reason to panic or move your bitcoin. We’re following developments and would appreciate clarity from wallet manufacturers: @Trezor @COLDCARDwallet @FOUNDATIONdvcs @BitBoxSwiss @Ledger @BlockstreamJade @KeystoneWallet @SeedSigner Have you assessed your exposure, and are your software distribution channels secure? The patches are out. Let’s make sure the infrastructure catches up.

Before signing a bitcoin transaction, verify the destination address and amount on the signing device - not only in the wallet app. If the device shows different details, stop. Its independent display is a key check. sparrowwallet.com/docs/airga…

A BIP39 passphrase isn't a device PIN. With the same seed, changing even one character derives a different wallet. Back up the exact passphrase securely, separately from the seed, and test access before funding. trezor.io/guides/backups-rec…

Bitcoin Keeper is free, open source and community-run. Independent contributors maintain it; voluntary tips and grants fund development, maintenance and security work. If Keeper helps you, consider supporting it: Settings → Support the Developers. bitcoinkeeper.app/

It always was the most tolerant solution.

good comparison table by @bluewalletio 👏 may be add additional entropy (dice or coin) to one of your multis keys and use an app that offers a decoy wallet and you get all ✅

A PSBT (partially signed bitcoin transaction) lets separate signers approve the same spend without bringing their private keys together. Keeper collects the required signatures before broadcasting. Check the destination and amount before signing.