Interesting coincidences that are not coincidences at all: ◾️ On October 19, Russian deputy prime minister Grigorenko, head of the Russian government’s executive office, was announced to be leaving his post, leaving PM Mishustin effectively without his own people in the government. ◾️ On October 21, the Chairman of the State Council of China met with Mishustin in St. Petersburg. Irina Okladnikova, who at the time was First Deputy Minister of Finance of the Russian Federation, was invited to the meeting. ◾️ On October 24, Okladnikova became deputy prime minister. As we can see, before receiving senior appointments, officials are first introduced to the Chinese representative. This directly points to Russia’s growing dependence on China. ◾️ On October 24, Aleksandr Blikman, Deputy Head of the Electronic Document Management Department of Russia’s Federal Tax Service, was detained. He was an associate of former Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Grigorenko, who, in turn, was Prime Minister Mishustin’s right-hand man in the government. Mishustin has often been described as a potential successor to Putin. According to political analyst Vadym Denysenko, these developments indicate not only Putin’s fear and paranoia. They are also part of an attempt by the FSB to regain the position it held before 2016. In 2016, Putin reshaped the state apparatus and built a technocratic-bureaucratic power structure that became equal in influence to the FSB’s own power structure. The key figures in this technocratic hierarchy were Vaino (Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office), Kiriyenko (First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office), Nabiullina (Governor of the Central Bank of Russia) and Mishustin. Nabiullina is due to leave her post in March 2027. Vaino is untouchable and has direct contacts with Russian security services. Kiriyenko has faced several significant attacks, the most symbolic of which was the arrest of political scientist Kinev. Moreover, the State Duma elections showed that Kiriyenko’s complex political maneuvers are, in fact, no longer wanted by anyone. According to Denysenko, Mishustin appears to be next in line. The FSB cannot arrest figures at Mishustin’s or Kiriyenko’s level, particularly after the failures of the cases involving the Rotenberg brothers and businessman Traber. But the FSB can target people at Blikman’s level to accumulate compromising material. The main question in Russia’s current political power struggle is whether Putin will replace Bortnikov (Director of Russia’s Federal Security Service) in a month. Bortnikov is turning 75, and Putin must either extend his tenure or dismiss him. If he does dismiss him, whom will he choose as his successor? According to Denysenko, a series of fundamental changes is taking place within Russia’s highest levels of government in 2026. The most significant development is the growing influence of the FSB, which has a real chance of reshaping the system of governance to bring it back under its own control. And if it succeeds, Putin himself could be its next victim.