Israel’s problem is bigger than Netanyahu, and its election won’t solve it: Haaretz editor-in-chief —— In an article published by Foreign Affairs on 23 October, titled “What Israel’s Election Won’t Change,” Aluf Benn, editor-in-chief of Haaretz, argues that Israel’s 27 October election may determine the future of its domestic institutions, but will do little to alter its policies toward Palestinians or its military aggression across the region. Benn challenges the widespread belief that removing Benjamin Netanyahu would fundamentally change Israel's trajectory, arguing that the country's aggressive military policies and rejection of Palestinian statehood have become a broad political consensus extending well beyond the current government. Netanyahu's main challenger, former military chief Gadi Eisenkot, supports an independent judiciary, free press, and professional civil service. Yet on foreign policy, Benn finds little meaningful difference between the two. Almost all Jewish Israeli political parties oppose Palestinian statehood, defend the war on Gaza, and support Israel's attacks on Iran and its occupation of territory in Lebanon and Syria. Their disagreements concern tactics rather than fundamental objectives. Eisenkot has criticized Netanyahu's handling of the war on Gaza, but has also argued that Israel should have pursued a more aggressive invasion, pledging to 'end Hamas rule' within 18 months. Although he opposes Netanyahu's ambition to overthrow Iran's government, he supported strikes against Iran's military and nuclear infrastructure. Benn traces this consensus to the aftermath of 7 October 2023, which accelerated Israeli society's rejection of Palestinian independence and normalized policies of destruction and occupation. He writes that both political camps share the belief that “Israel is surrounded by merciless enemies and the Palestinians cannot be trusted,” identifying racism as one factor shaping this outlook. Even among so-called 'liberal Israelis' mobilizing against Netanyahu, support for Palestinian statehood remains marginal. Eisenkot himself opposes it, while potential right-wing coalition partners would likely bring down his government if he pursued such a policy. One difference concerns settler violence in the occupied West Bank. While Netanyahu has largely ignored attacks intended to drive Palestinians from their land, Eisenkot has condemned them as “Jewish terror,” opposing the E1 settlement project. Benn suggests these positions reflect concerns over growing instability and international isolation rather than a fundamental shift toward Palestinian rights. The article also warns that Israel's policies are generating mounting diplomatic and economic consequences. International outrage over Gaza and settlement expansion has already produced sanctions, while opposition to unconditional military assistance is growing in Washington, including among Democrats and some Republicans. An Eisenkot government might temporarily improve Israel's international standing through more conciliatory diplomacy and limited policy adjustments. But Benn argues that foreign governments expecting a fundamental reversal would ultimately be disappointed. Regardless of whether Netanyahu retains power, Eisenkot forms a government, or the election produces another political deadlock, Benn concludes that Israel's next leadership will continue occupying neighboring territory and repressing Palestinians, potentially deepening its isolation, increasing its dependence on domestic arms production, and jeopardizing longstanding American diplomatic protection. The article's central warning is that Netanyahu's removal would not resolve the underlying problem: Israel's rejection of Palestinian sovereignty and reliance on military domination are no longer merely the policies of one leader, but positions shared across much of its political establishment. As Benn writes, Israel's next prime minister, regardless of the election's outcome, “will keep occupying parts of its neighbors and brutalizing the Palestinians.”