I build stuff. #Bitcoin since block 265705 circa 2013 ⚡️[email protected] ✉️ [email protected] https://xitter.cf/t.co/KaGQ7RKCI0
not there
Joined October 2012
- Tweets12.2K
- Following2.6K
- Followers2.2K
- Likes58.6K
Pinned Tweet
> New website: pseudozach.com
> I help founders and teams ship Bitcoin and Lightning products: architecture, integrations, payments, infrastructure and troubleshooting.
> Available for consulting, implementation or contract engineering.
If you're building, let's talk
pseudozach retweeted
Anonymous VPS
in Switzerland and Panama
Linux & Windows VPS with NVMe SSD and 1 Gbps unmetered. No KYC, no logs, DMCA ignored. Pay with crypto. Live in 60 seconds.
swiss-gs.com/
pseudozach retweeted
Someone has created a vulnerable PHP website, loaded it with a Bitcoin wallet, and challenged the Internet to hack into it and they can keep the Bitcoin. It has a running timer to show if the PHP exploitability was over-hyped. stealmybitcoin.com/
I'm about to be wavelength rich on signet. who wants some?
Wavelength is now live on mainnet! 🌊
Humans and agents can now send and receive bitcoin payments with the Wavelength SDK.
A few API calls, self-custodial from the first command, with no node or liquidity to manage.
Read more and start building: lightning.engineering/posts/…
it finally happened. my clanker took my server down due to a botched firewall update.
another clanker restored access and all services pretty quickly.
All this talk about muse, grok, dot automating stuff.
I gave 2 claims for my pet insurance to dot and entered login info and it's been 5 days, still fails to login and submit this basic request.
Took me 3 minutes via app on a weekend morning.
👎
pseudozach retweeted
It's crazy that there's a tool out there that's become vital to they way I do my job, parent my kids, and make major life decisions; and yet we barely spend more on it than AI
pseudozach retweeted
There has never been a better time to level up your Bitcoin skillset.
Seed Tool is a free, open source page for learning how Bitcoin seeds work. Roll dice into a seed, find a valid last word, derive BIP85 seeds, test a forgotten passphrase and more.
bitcoiner.guide/seed 🫡
pseudozach retweeted
Not a fan of keeping "anything" off chain but interesting development nonetheless
Post-quantum transactions that require only 96 bytes on-chain:
@will_wjk (Imperial College) et al. published a very interesting variant of Shielded CSV, called Compact Shielded CSV.
I've always thought the CSV model is attractive in a PQ setting: the blockchain only stores the nullifier, so miners don't have to verify a signature before it gets into a block. Compact Shielded CSV goes a step further: the on-chain nullifier carries no signature at all, only what they call a "degriefer". Pre-quantum that's more than Shielded CSV's 64 bytes, but post-quantum it's much less.
Unlike Shielded CSV, which operates on top of Bitcoin, Compact is its own blockchain. That matters for the degriefer: a Compact miner who includes a nullifier with an invalid degriefer can't claim the block reward. Shielded CSV could adopt the degriefer, but on Bitcoin there is no such penalty. Anyone who sees your nullifier before it's confirmed can front-run it with bogus copies for ~100 bytes of fees each, and your spending proof then has to show for every one of them that it's invalid. This is something we deliberately avoided in the design of Shielded CSV. With PQ signatures as large as they are, it probably is a reasonable trade-off.
Compact also never discusses reorgs, which are a significant part of the Shielded CSV design. Integrating the degriefer into Shielded CSV would require combining it with the existing reorg handling.
arxiv.org/pdf/2609.32015
pseudozach retweeted
>a hacker finally uses zcash
>gets identified immediately
working as intended
Ledger theft, day two. Since yesterday the thief has pushed ether through Tornado Cash three times, and each time on into Zcash's shielded pool. We followed every lot out the far side. Here is how, step by step.
1. THE SAME BUILD, THREE TIMES
An ether wallet pays a fresh splitter. The splitter pays four fresh wallets. The four drop it into Tornado Cash's 100, 10 and 1 ETH pools. Minutes, every time.
Run 1, yesterday 15:17: 1,254 ETH. Run 2, today 09:42: 1,291 ETH. Run 3, today 11:56: 450 ETH from 0xfa4EaBB840A33C156E600311433AE261CBfCb0e2, in the pools by 12:15.
2. OUT OF TORNADO CASH
The mixer breaks the link between a deposit and a withdrawal. We do not need the link. Our tooling fingerprints the withdrawal transactions themselves: how each one is constructed, who constructs it, and when.
Yesterday's 65 withdrawals (1,084 ETH) and today's 96 (1,726 ETH) all carry the same signature. The six other withdrawals from those pools in today's windows do not. Run 3 came out from 12:18 into 0x0d697aa182801566d87adc86e68e95fd3b2f5f82 (213 ETH) and 0x676b16cc18542f37d202a1a79ac05463395496a4 (122 ETH), and 195 ETH of it was inside a cross-chain swap service by 12:38. Forty-two minutes, end to end.
3. INTO ZCASH, AND OUT AGAIN
The swap service turns the ether into shielded ZEC, where sender, amount and recipient vanish. But the service's own shielding of each lot is public, and from it we derive a value signature for that lot's exit, then scan every transparent exit from the pool. 108 of 108 exits across both days match their lot to the zatoshi. Not one other exit from the pool does.
First lot today: in at 10:18:18, out at 11:06:16 in block 3512847 (8d26a9b095d4d28373527f7a6eb81a3be7f906d1e2190960c0512ff64f369418 and 738c6d1261e79766e4dd16bdbd38dced91b8e3a86ce41dcda83eda1f19208fbf), straight into a ZEC to USDC order.
Today so far: 20 lots ordered (2,379 ZEC, $2.9m), 14 out, 5 inside the pool, 1 still settling. Every exit feeds a ZEC to USDC order paying two wallets born at 11:11, 22 of the 28 paid by 12:43:
0x816D5Ee17DB1495d1409F135b98FF3edc5F3cDf8: 940,561 USDC
0xBA736A4b616e79867B6d586293966b552883f3F3: 852,258 USDC
1.79m USDC, unspent. @Circle can freeze it.
(1/2) 🧵⤵️
This might just be the way. Just gotta find a way to rip out cashu stuff.
During recent discussions about the security of decentralized inference through @routstrai people raised a valid concern: how can we be sure a provider doesn't read our prompts, or alter tool calls to backdoor the machine or the code it generates? Or how do we know the provider does not swap the model for a cheaper one and charge you full price? The usual answer is a TEE, a trusted execution environment. TEEs are hard to audit in practice. You trust the hardware vendor and re-verify a whole software stack after every update. We can do better, and now we do.
Routstr has a confidential mode. Your client talks TLS 1.3 directly to the upstream provider (Venice, for my node), and the Routstr node in between only relays encrypted records. Client and node compute the TLS keys together, so the node can add its API key without ever seeing your prompt or the answer, and it can't change a single byte of the response, tool calls included. Zero-knowledge proofs pin the model and the token cap, and you pay for the usage the provider itself reported. All of this rests on math and on the certificates you already trust, with no enclave or special hardware anywhere.
It works today on routstr.cypherpunk.today, through routstrd (I'm running opencode agents on it) and right in the browser, where the page does every check itself. It's new and experimental, so please try it and tell me what breaks.
Blog: juraj.bednar.io/en/blog-en/2…
Try it in the browser: jooray.github.io/routstr-con…
Paper: github.com/jooray/routstr-co…
Code: github.com/jooray/routstr-co…
pseudozach retweeted
Lightning wizards: thoughts on ECDSA MPC for Lightning node key custody?
Splitting keys can help for server and mobile, and enables policy checkpoints.
I built a signet PoC using @coinbase's open-source MPC: a 2-of-2 👇
@jesseposner @nadav_kohen @VLSProject
🤖 Made with AI
pseudozach retweeted
First off, if you’re going to stop using TLS or post all your Bitcoin seeds in cleartext, or start using Telegram as a secure Messenger — then don’t do that because one researcher posted a casual tweet. That would be dumb and harmful. Encryption is good, use it. 1/
