This is a strong case against the dev fund. Thank you, @maxdesalle, for a well-reasoned essay and the honest public dialogue. I helped end the last model and proposed the current one, so I'm adding history and context. Disclosure: I opposed the direct funding model (2020-2024). Hard-coding ECC and ZF addresses into the chain was inappropriate for a public good. It also created perverse incentives, as we were funded regardless of performance. Funding isn't bad, but funding without accountability or a community voice is ineffective and inappropriate. So I decided we would not receive funds from any new dev fund that continued that legacy, effectively ending the model. In February 2025, I proposed the C&C model as its successor (forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/p…), which I codified into ZIP 1016 (zips.z.cash/zip-1016). The community adopted it through its polling process. ZODL has submitted an application to fund our Zcash core development work (not wallet work). You argue the fund purchases the silence of those best placed to evaluate it. A counter is that I/ECC, as the dev fund's largest direct recipient, argued against the model that paid us (our only revenue source), and walked away. Criticism from the funded is possible; it just costs something. I'm not advocating for or against its end, and we agree on many points. The current model has a termination date baked in, about two years from now. At that point, proponents must justify renewal or something to replace it. Coinholders can effectively halt disbursement today, because funds move only if they affirmatively vote to disburse them. Coinholders decide if any funds are disbursed at all, based on what they believe has already delivered value. By default, nothing is funded. Retroactive funding pays for shipped work already in use and delivering value. “Value always reveals itself.” The model was intended to bring balance and distribute power. Power was previously too concentrated. The result is more bicameral. My other proposal allowed for competition among grant-making bodies, but it didn't win: forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/p…. The funding model was also intended to support projects that don't have access to power or capital. The challenge with patronage and VCs is that they get to play kingmaker. Often only the already-connected get access. Funders can also influence governance by paying the teams they want to see win. The grants model opens the door to anyone. That's egalitarian rather than limited to those with the connections and ability to raise money. Signal is referenced as the positive example of patronage. However, Signal relies on donations and some revenue from backups, is not currently self-sustainable, and depends on a single benefactor to keep the project alive and true to its mission. A decade in, with a world-class product, it still hangs on one person. Funding can shape governance either way. Well-funded teams influence the direction of the software, whether the money comes from whales, patrons, or a fund. Off-chain, that influence is invisible, but with coinholder polling, at least the values expressed are transparent. And yes, nothing in the ZIP restricts anyone from voting their own coins. It’s by design. Restricting coin-based voice isn't enforceable, and at least this influence is visible. And the model is time-boxed so that we can reevaluate and reassess ahead of any arguments for renewal. Again, the funds don't have to be granted. They could be held in perpetuity. Someone might propose returning them to circulation, or reserving them as a long-term security budget, which speaks to your security concern as issuance declines. If you believe disbursement should end, that case can be made to coinholders, who can then decide to disburse funds or not.

Crosslink is a proposed hybrid PoW/PoS upgrade for Zcash. By standardizing staking bonds into incremental powers of 10, observers are prevented from easily inferring individual staking patterns, preserving privacy and maintaining accountability among finalizers.