Thompson Paine (@dtompaine) header
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@AnthropicAI | Adjunct faculty @vanderbiltlaw on US-China tech competition | Previously @Stripe @Atlas @StateDept Beijing | GBO🍊| Go Heels

Joined March 2011
Photo by Thompson Paine (@dtompaine)Photo by Thompson Paine (@dtompaine)Photo by Thompson Paine (@dtompaine)Photo by Thompson Paine (@dtompaine)Photo by Thompson Paine (@dtompaine)
Thompson Paine retweeted
I have a major result to share. I’ve found conclusive forensic evidence that the top 4 Chinese AI labs—DeepSeek, Moonshot, MiniMax and Ant Group—have built their newest models on NVIDIA’s most advanced Blackwell chips, which are barred from export to China. This sounds insane, but I discovered that almost every AI model carries a hidden signature of the GPU that trained it. When a model is first set up, the starting values of its weights are laid out in a pattern that depends on the exact GPU. Each combination of GPU and seed number produces a unique pattern—a sort of fingerprint of the hardware used to create the model. Traces of that pattern survive training into the published model. Again, this evidence isn’t based on any insider information or leaking. It’s based on a forensic analysis of the model weights released by the companies themselves. I searched more than six trillion combinations of chip layout and seed number and matched them to open-weights models. In doing so, I found conclusive evidence that six Chinese AI models—including DeepSeek-V4-Pro, Kimi K3, and MiniMax-M3—were initialized on NVIDIA Blackwell systems. Four of the models match Grace Blackwell, the GB200 and GB300 parts in NVIDIA’s flagship liquid-cooled rack-scale systems. I then verified these results on real hardware. Running unmodified PyTorch with the seeds I’d recovered, a Blackwell B300 reproduced DeepSeek-V4-Flash’s untouched starting weights bit for bit, and a rented GB200 reproduced Kimi K3’s to a correlation of 0.999995. A Hopper H100 reproduced none of DeepSeek-V4-Flash’s, and changing the seed by one broke the match. (DeepSeek’s seed is 953049583 by the way.) The method also was verified to match 24 known open-weights models to the hardware that developers said they used. It is exceedingly unlikely that these results are a coincidence. Across six trillion combinations, the best accidental match should reach only about 8 sigma (i.e., eight standard deviations above what random chance would produce). The real matches range from 49 to 1,385 sigma, and even the weakest single test hits 20. These were data-center-scale training runs. With some analysis of release schedules and model details, I estimate that the largest, Kimi K3 and DeepSeek-V4-Pro, used 2,000 to 3,000 Blackwell GPUs each. Clusters of this size cost on the order of $150 to $200 million each to buy, and across these labs alone would add up to more than half a billion dollars of export-controlled GPUs, not counting experimental compute or otherwise. It’s quite likely that we see multi-billion dollar expenditure on export-controlled GPUs. I am highly confident in this result, and it has been independently verified by senior researchers at OpenAI and Anthropic. You can read the full report at unemploymentlabs.com/checkpo…. There is much more I’ve identified about these models through other forms of checkpoint forensics like this, and will have more to share soon.
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Thompson Paine retweeted
I led AI policy in the Biden administration, and my colleague @tantumscollins was Director for Technology on the National Security Council. Our book on AI and national security -- THE BITTER STRUGGLE -- comes out in 11 days. @tylercowen said it “will become the standard source” on the history of the China chip bans and Biden-era AI policy. @crmiller1 said it is “essential reading for understanding how AI will impact geopolitics and how the great powers are shaping AI.” We wrote this book because the decisions shaping AI -- and the future for all of us -- are too important to only be debated behind closed doors. If you're planning on reading it, pre-ordering is one of the best ways to help us bring this conversation to a broader audience. penguinrandomhouse.com/books…
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Thompson Paine retweeted
Important point from the report: Due to short-run supply constraints on AI chip production, cutting off remote access to cloud services for Chinese AI companies would result in more compute for American AI companies.
Big new IFP report from @GeorgiaCAdamson, @KonstantinPilz, and me on the US-China AI competition. We spent the last 6 months digging into how Chinese AI companies’ access to compute and distillation of American models translate into the current US-China capabilities gap. The result is a 23k-word research report, including an interactive analytical model that visualizes changes in the US AI lead under different policy interventions. Our findings: 1. The US AI lead over China is currently only around 6 months. 2. The US could roughly double this lead, to over a year, using authorities already available to the federal government. 3. On chips: China’s access to AI chips will roughly double over the next year, with chips housed in data centers overseas accounting for roughly half of China’s 2027 compute. 4. On distillation: the current ~16x US training compute advantage would normally yield a 13-month lead. But we estimate adversarial distillation halves this to around 6.5 months. 5. Increasing the lead would have some obvious benefits: - Give the US broadly a greater cyberdefensive advantage against Chinese threat actors. - Give US AI companies breathing room to spend more R&D resources on making their systems safer and more secure, without fear of being overtaken by less safety-conscious Chinese competitors. 6. Provide the US government more leverage in negotiations with China about the future of AI. 7. The two most important interventions are: - For BIS: Create a new end-use control to restrict China’s remote access to training clusters abroad — China’s largest and fastest-growing source of frontier-scale compute. - For DOJ/FTC: Create a narrow safe harbor to allow US companies to coordinate on countering Chinese adversarial distillation. 8. Both interventions (and all the others we discuss in the report) are things the federal government could do today. 9. To estimate the effects of each policy intervention, we model the US lead as a function of its compute advantage over China and China’s ability to adversarially distill the capabilities of the US frontier. 10. The model makes many simplifying assumptions, but provides a useful way to assess and rank the impact of different policy interventions at a high level. Read the full report here: ifp.org/how-to-increase-amer…
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Thompson Paine retweeted
Big new IFP report from @GeorgiaCAdamson, @KonstantinPilz, and me on the US-China AI competition. We spent the last 6 months digging into how Chinese AI companies’ access to compute and distillation of American models translate into the current US-China capabilities gap. The result is a 23k-word research report, including an interactive analytical model that visualizes changes in the US AI lead under different policy interventions. Our findings: 1. The US AI lead over China is currently only around 6 months. 2. The US could roughly double this lead, to over a year, using authorities already available to the federal government. 3. On chips: China’s access to AI chips will roughly double over the next year, with chips housed in data centers overseas accounting for roughly half of China’s 2027 compute. 4. On distillation: the current ~16x US training compute advantage would normally yield a 13-month lead. But we estimate adversarial distillation halves this to around 6.5 months. 5. Increasing the lead would have some obvious benefits: - Give the US broadly a greater cyberdefensive advantage against Chinese threat actors. - Give US AI companies breathing room to spend more R&D resources on making their systems safer and more secure, without fear of being overtaken by less safety-conscious Chinese competitors. 6. Provide the US government more leverage in negotiations with China about the future of AI. 7. The two most important interventions are: - For BIS: Create a new end-use control to restrict China’s remote access to training clusters abroad — China’s largest and fastest-growing source of frontier-scale compute. - For DOJ/FTC: Create a narrow safe harbor to allow US companies to coordinate on countering Chinese adversarial distillation. 8. Both interventions (and all the others we discuss in the report) are things the federal government could do today. 9. To estimate the effects of each policy intervention, we model the US lead as a function of its compute advantage over China and China’s ability to adversarially distill the capabilities of the US frontier. 10. The model makes many simplifying assumptions, but provides a useful way to assess and rank the impact of different policy interventions at a high level. Read the full report here: ifp.org/how-to-increase-amer…
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Thompson Paine retweeted
Beijing’s biggest coup in recent years is convincing western analysts that it’ll burn down the global economy if liberal democracies take actions that are in their self-interest. I don’t think China will shut down the global SME industry in response to MATCH. Here’s why:
This is what Match act proponents are missing. If China is fully shut off from machines, they can and will shut off the flow of critical material to US/NL/JP equipment makers and then production grinds to a halt. No one will get them.
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Thompson Paine retweeted
This is a great opportunity to help shape Anthropic’s policy positions. @manaltdanhas has been a great partner to the alignment team in thinking through how to design policies that help with loss of control risk
Come work with me! My team at Anthropic is hiring someone to help develop our public policy positions on frontier AI safety: topics like loss-of-control, automation of AI R&D, monitorability, and independent evaluation. We’re looking for someone with deep expertise in some of these areas and familiarity with the technical AI safety/governance landscape. You’d develop new policy positions, participate in cross-company fora, give feedback on AI safety legislation, and work closely with our technical teams. It’ll be a blast. job-boards.greenhouse.io/ant…
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Thompson Paine retweeted
While AI chip exports get more attention, whether China can continue to import ASML’s DUV immersion (DUVi) lithography machines will be the decisive factor in US-China AI competition over the next decade. @techstatecraft has published a 30,000-word report that models how continued DUVi exports may let Huawei and other Chinese chipmakers scale AI chip production to compete with leading US AI chipmakers like NVIDIA. Our core findings: (1) 𝗖𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗮 𝗻𝗲𝗲𝗱𝘀 𝗗𝗨𝗩𝗶 𝗺𝗮𝗰𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗲𝘀 𝘁𝗼 𝗺𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗔𝗜 𝗰𝗵𝗶𝗽𝘀, 𝗯𝘂𝘁 𝗶𝘀 𝘂𝗻𝗹𝗶𝗸𝗲𝗹𝘆 𝘁𝗼 𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗺𝗲𝗿𝗰𝗶𝗮𝗹𝗶𝘇𝗲 𝗶𝘁𝘀 𝗼𝘄𝗻 𝗮𝘁 𝘀𝗰𝗮𝗹𝗲 𝘂𝗻𝘁𝗶𝗹 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗺𝗶𝗱-2030𝘀. This gives the United States and its allies, the sole producers, extraordinary leverage over China’s AI ambitions. (2) 𝗬𝗲𝘁 𝘁𝗼𝗱𝗮𝘆 𝗔𝗺𝗲𝗿𝗶𝗰𝗮 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗶𝘁𝘀 𝗮𝗹𝗹𝗶𝗲𝘀 𝗮𝗿𝗲 𝗴𝗶𝘃𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗮𝘄𝗮𝘆 𝘁𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝗹𝗲𝘃𝗲𝗿𝗮𝗴𝗲 𝗯𝘆 𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗺𝗶𝘁𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗖𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗮 𝘁𝗼 𝗶𝗺𝗽𝗼𝗿𝘁 𝗗𝗨𝗩𝗶 𝘀𝘆𝘀𝘁𝗲𝗺𝘀 𝗰𝗮𝗽𝗮𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝗼𝗳 𝗺𝗮𝗸𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗛𝘂𝗮𝘄𝗲𝗶'𝘀 𝗔𝗜 𝗰𝗵𝗶𝗽𝘀. China has aggressively capitalized on this opening, amassing a large, growing stockpile of these systems as of 2026. If Chinese DUVi imports continue, China could accumulate enough lithography capacity over the next five to ten years to narrow or even erase the currently sizable US-allied advantage in AI chipmaking. (3) 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗨𝗻𝗶𝘁𝗲𝗱 𝗦𝘁𝗮𝘁𝗲𝘀 𝗰𝗮𝗻 𝗽𝗿𝗲𝘃𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝘁𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝗼𝘂𝘁𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗲 𝘄𝗶𝘁𝗵 𝗮 𝘀𝗶𝗺𝗽𝗹𝗲 𝗽𝗼𝗹𝗶𝗰𝘆 𝗰𝗵𝗮𝗻𝗴𝗲: 𝗿𝗲𝗽𝗹𝗮𝗰𝗲 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗰𝘂𝗿𝗿𝗲𝗻𝘁, 𝗽𝗮𝗿𝘁𝗶𝗮𝗹 𝗗𝗨𝗩𝗶 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗼𝗹𝘀 𝘄𝗶𝘁𝗵 𝗮 𝗖𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗮-𝘄𝗶𝗱𝗲 𝗯𝗮𝗻 𝗼𝗻 𝗮𝗹𝗹 𝗗𝗨𝗩𝗶 𝗲𝘅𝗽𝗼𝗿𝘁𝘀, 𝘄𝗶𝘁𝗵 𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗽𝗹𝗲𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗮𝗿𝘆 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗼𝗹𝘀 𝗼𝗻 𝘀𝗽𝗮𝗿𝗲 𝗽𝗮𝗿𝘁𝘀 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝘀𝗲𝗿𝘃𝗶𝗰𝗶𝗻𝗴. This action would secure the US advanced AI chip production advantage (see Figure)—and resulting AI capability advantage—for at least a decade and ensure that the next wave of advanced fabs is built in the United States and its allied countries, not China. The MATCH Act, now before Congress, would establish China-wide controls on DUVi exports. Passing MATCH is arguably the single strongest step the US government can take to ensure a long-term AI advantage over China. We also develop analysis on: - China's lithography indigenization trajectory - The regulatory structure of US, Dutch, and Japanese export controls on SME - China's DUVi imports and installed base - Yields and throughputs obtainable with China’s installed DUVi systems - US and Chinese AI chip production under a range of scenarios See the full report at techstatecraft.org/duv/.
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Thompson Paine retweeted
AI systems are getting more powerful, and they're increasingly being used to build the next version of themselves. We want to illuminate that progress for the public. Today, we're sharing three measurements that help track AI development: 1. How much AI R&D is done by AI. 2. How well AI agents are overseen. 3. How compute is allocated. We provide a snapshot of these metrics from inside Anthropic. Any frontier developer could publish the same measures, and third parties could verify them. As the world considers pacing the frontier, we should do everything possible to minimize the gap between what frontier labs know and what the public knows. This means better measuring the development of AI, publishing our findings, and giving society an opportunity to decide how to use this information. Read the full post and methodology: anthropic.com/institute/meas…
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Thompson Paine retweeted
We’re partnering with Accenture on independent evaluation of frontier AI—part of our recent commitment to embed evaluators at Anthropic. Both we and Accenture expect to invest at least $1 billion to build capacity in this area over the next five years. anthropic.com/news/accenture…
Readers added context they thought people might want to know
Anthropic presents this as an "independent evaluation" but will directly fund Accenture's work and has a prior commercial partnership with the firm for deploying its models, including training ~30,000 Accenture professionals on Claude. anthropic.com/news/accenture… anthropic.com/news/anthropic…
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Thompson Paine retweeted
We Must Pace the Frontier: I’ve written a new essay on why the AI industry should slow down, with a three-part plan for doing so. Anthropic is unilaterally committing to the first of these steps. We’ll provide third-party evaluators with permanent, employee-level access to our systems, so that they can verify adherence to our safety measures, report on incidents, and assess models’ alignment during training. You can read the full post here: darioamodei.com/post/we-must…
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A bunch of people claim that China is catching up to America in AI, that export controls have failed, etc. etc. None of it's true. America is still beating China in the AI race. noahpinion.blog/p/america-is…
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Thompson Paine retweeted
7/7 I would highly encourage every member of Congress to compare and contrast the industry's best attempt at an "argument" against the NDAA export control package with the letter from @AmerCompass @Heritage @JoinFAI. See if you can tell which one is trying to advance policies that will be good for the United States, and then make your own decision accordingly. subscriber.politicopro.com/f… americancompass.org/wp-conte…
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Today, I’m co-founding the Center for Technology & Statecraft; a response to a dawning technological revolution. With the discovery of reasoning models two years ago, AI progress has accelerated beyond its already rapid pace. Within 1–2 years, many of our most important policy decisions will have a major AI component. ANd within this century, I think it’s more likely than not that AI’s impacts will rival the neolithic and industrial revolutions — the first of which was plausibly negative for the average person while the second greatly increased human welfare. Although DC has attracted a wealth of talent over the last few years, AI policy still lags the pace of AI progress. In particular, we’re short on analysis that deeply understands the AI value chain, from semiconductor manufacturing equipment, to the global distribution of AI chips, from the economics of model deployment, to the effects of physical automation on the labor market. To respond to this gap, CTS aims to ambitiously push the knowledge frontier of empirical AI policy. Saif M. Khan, our founding director, is among the most experienced AI policy makers I know. During his government tenure, he achieved outsized impact on early AI policy decisions thanks to the deep empirical understanding of semiconductors and AI he previously built. Between him and the other founding members, we bring deep expertise in both policy and a technical understanding of AI. How are we hoping to make a difference? You can read more about our worldview and agenda in our launch essay at techstatecraft.org/launch
Today I’m launching the Center for Technology & Statecraft (CTS), an initiative inspired by the lessons I learned first as a policy researcher and later in the White House. I'm an optimist about technology. Institutions adapt to disruptions — whether the industrial revolution, computing, the internet — through competition, self-correction, and iteration, and we mostly figure it out in the long run. But we've never had to adapt to a technology that is both this transformative and developing this fast. AI capabilities continue to scale rapidly with no sign of slowing, and it's a full-time job just to keep up with model releases. I worry policy will stay reactive right up until we face immense disruptions — including basic challenges to human agency and relevance in a world of powerful AI. Even still, I believe policy can steer this transition, but only with foresight and the right information. CTS aims to provide just that. Our two initial policy focus areas: 1) How policy can shape virtual and physical automation over the next decade as we reimagine the social contract in light of advanced AI. 2) How to manage long-term strategic US-China AI competition while ensuring stability. These focus areas will build on a deep model of the AI value chain, from chipmaking tools, to the compute, algorithms, and data that make AI, to the tokens, agents and robots that affect the world. For more on our worldview and research philosophy, read techstatecraft.org/launch. I’ve seen firsthand how technical, forward-looking research can inform policy if it’s ready for the policy window. After a decade as an IP and tech lawyer, I joined a think tank, CSET, in 2019 to study AI chips, their supply chains, and AI policy. This was three years before ChatGPT, so these weren't seen as urgent topics at the time. Soon after, AI quickly became an increasingly salient policy issue. From 2021–2025 I served in the White House NSC and the Commerce Department and put new policy ideas into practice (alongside many brilliant colleagues). One goal of CTS is to scale this kind of experience to a whole team: @KonstantinPilz @nchlsbrwn @amelia__michael @mary_clare_m already bring a wealth of technical and policy expertise and we’ll continue to grow to tackle an ambitious research agenda. We're thrilled to be supported by and affiliated with @IFP, and grateful to the advisors and colleagues who helped get CTS off the ground, including @ohlennart, @fiiiiiist, @AlecStapp, and @calebwatney. Our first major reports will launch soon. You can follow us at @techstatecraft.
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Thompson Paine retweeted
Today I’m launching the Center for Technology & Statecraft (CTS), an initiative inspired by the lessons I learned first as a policy researcher and later in the White House. I'm an optimist about technology. Institutions adapt to disruptions — whether the industrial revolution, computing, the internet — through competition, self-correction, and iteration, and we mostly figure it out in the long run. But we've never had to adapt to a technology that is both this transformative and developing this fast. AI capabilities continue to scale rapidly with no sign of slowing, and it's a full-time job just to keep up with model releases. I worry policy will stay reactive right up until we face immense disruptions — including basic challenges to human agency and relevance in a world of powerful AI. Even still, I believe policy can steer this transition, but only with foresight and the right information. CTS aims to provide just that. Our two initial policy focus areas: 1) How policy can shape virtual and physical automation over the next decade as we reimagine the social contract in light of advanced AI. 2) How to manage long-term strategic US-China AI competition while ensuring stability. These focus areas will build on a deep model of the AI value chain, from chipmaking tools, to the compute, algorithms, and data that make AI, to the tokens, agents and robots that affect the world. For more on our worldview and research philosophy, read techstatecraft.org/launch. I’ve seen firsthand how technical, forward-looking research can inform policy if it’s ready for the policy window. After a decade as an IP and tech lawyer, I joined a think tank, CSET, in 2019 to study AI chips, their supply chains, and AI policy. This was three years before ChatGPT, so these weren't seen as urgent topics at the time. Soon after, AI quickly became an increasingly salient policy issue. From 2021–2025 I served in the White House NSC and the Commerce Department and put new policy ideas into practice (alongside many brilliant colleagues). One goal of CTS is to scale this kind of experience to a whole team: @KonstantinPilz @nchlsbrwn @amelia__michael @mary_clare_m already bring a wealth of technical and policy expertise and we’ll continue to grow to tackle an ambitious research agenda. We're thrilled to be supported by and affiliated with @IFP, and grateful to the advisors and colleagues who helped get CTS off the ground, including @ohlennart, @fiiiiiist, @AlecStapp, and @calebwatney. Our first major reports will launch soon. You can follow us at @techstatecraft.
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Thompson Paine retweeted
I was the first White House Special Advisor for AI. My friend Tantum Collins was Director for Technology and National Security, joining government after five years at Google DeepMind. Our jobs were to help make AI safe and ensure that democracies led the way in inventing and using it well. Today, I’m a professor at Johns Hopkins and an advisor to Anthropic and others, and Tantum is the CEO of Inherent. Long before we served in government, we thought that humanity was on track to create AI systems that outperform humans at virtually every cognitive task. This was once a fringe hypothesis. It now seems inevitable. THE BITTER STRUGGLE is our new book about what’s happened, what’s coming, and what’s at stake. From nanometer-scale chips to gigawatt data centers, we will show you why AI is so powerful, and why its progress will accelerate from here in ways that feel like science fiction. We will take you into the Oval Office with President Biden, the Situation Room with the Cabinet, and the Roosevelt Room with leading CEOs — and we will examine what has happened under President Trump. The decisions made in these rooms, and in Silicon Valley, will determine which nations gain a decisive lead in AI. Whoever wields that technology will gain a power unlike any in history. The next few years may decide the next few decades. But, most of all, together we will confront AI’s hardest questions. What is the proper relationship between the companies inventing the technology, the government, and the public? How can we make sure AI is safe and trustworthy? How do democracies win without losing our values? And how can humanity figure all of this out when we are so quickly running out of time? That question is why we wrote this book — and why we believe the answers are too important to only be debated in closed rooms, including the ones we once sat in. We are so excited to finally share our work with you. The book is available for pre-order now and out November 10th from Crown. penguinrandomhouse.com/books…
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Thompson Paine retweeted
1/2 Thanks Gavin for an especially thoughtful exchange. I don't usually spend much time on social media but I wanted to engage here because it really brings out the heart of an important conversation. First, on regulation, I think that “either concentrate it in the hands of a chosen few companies and politicians via regulation or distribute it widely” is a false choice.  I know that there’s a sort of Silicon Valley shorthand where regulation = regulatory capture = concentration of power, but I’ve always found this to be an overly simplified picture of the world.  Many people outside this bubble think of regulation as something that constrains corporate power and benefits ordinary people.  I don’t necessarily agree with that perspective either, rather I think it’s complicated and really depends on what the “regulation” consists of.  But in particular I think that those in the “regulation = regulatory capture = concentration of power” frame often underrate the decentralizing power of objective and fair institutional processes.  A crude analogy is that the formal court system can sometimes feel stuffy and elitist, but it does a much better job of defending the rights of vulnerable individuals than the alternative, mob justice.  At their best, institutions can vest power in ideas rather than people, and thereby decentralize that power. This is why Anthropic has always made its policy proposals very carefully.  We try very hard to make proposals that disadvantage (slow down) frontier AI companies while *advantaging* smaller competitors.  California’s SB53 (which we supported), and even the much-maligned SB 1047 (which we were ambivalent on), completely exempt any company below a certain amount of revenue or model training costs from being covered at all (it was $500M for SB 53, lower for 1047 but we objected to that).  More recently the testing process we’ve advocated for at CAISI and the White House involves more rigorous tests for frontier models than off-frontier models — something that differentially advantages challengers.  Similarly, the “Pacing the Frontier” letter envisions (or at least Anthropic’s preferred implementation of it envisions) modulating the pace of the very best models while not constraining those who are catching up.  This hurts the business interests of the frontier labs and helps challengers, including open-weights! Overall my view is that AI is *structurally* a technology that tends to concentrate power, for reasons that have nothing to do with regulation (more to do with the extreme implications of the scaling laws).  Open-weights do help some with this but are nowhere near a sufficient solution because they simply shift the concentration somewhat to those with the most compute and chips (which are roughly the frontier labs plus maybe hardware providers).  By contrast I think the right “rules of the road” can simultaneously (a) address AI’s cyber/bio/alignment risks, (b) institutionally constrain the power of the frontier AI companies, and (c) leave room for open-weights models while also addressing the specific risks that they bring. BTW I do not think that the events of the last few months have “failed to result in [my] preferred regulatory path”.  The approach that the Trump administration is reported to be taking — pre-deployment testing for frontier models, and also testing of open-weights models when they get closer to the frontier — is one that I am very supportive of, though of course I have to see the details to be sure.  I am also supportive of Demis Hassabis’ ideas around a FINRA-like entity.  This contrasts with six months ago when most of the industry was still pushing for preemption of all state regulation and no apparent federal approach either.
Replying to @_sholtodouglas
Sholto, thank you for setting the record straight. Larger issue is that multiple very serious people in Silicon Valley have heard some variation of this and believe it to be true. And the reason it is believable to so many is that it is consistent with Dario’s public messaging and what he outlined in the essay you shared: this technology *might* be dangerous for humans in multiple ways, could lead to extreme concentration of economic power (as outlined in the essay) and therefore needs to be regulated thoughtfully. I agree with the potential risks and I believe Dario makes all of these arguments in good faith. 
As discussed on the pod, if one agrees that AI *might* be dangerous, there are two ways to address this potential risk. Either concentrate it in the hands of a chosen few companies and politicians via regulation or distribute it widely. Essentially boils down to whether one believes AI is too dangerous to concentrate or too dangerous to distribute. There are reasonable arguments on both sides, but I profoundly agree with Zuckerberg’s statement that: “The notion that AI is so dangerous that the only safe path is an extreme concentration of power seems inherently problematic. Historically, hoping that an absolute power will benevolently provide for humanity if sufficiently enlightened has not led to safe or positive outcomes.” And as Dario says in the aforementioned essay, “some may object that we can simply keep AIs in check with a balance of power between many AI systems, as we do with humans.” I believe this is the best path forward: I want as many AIs as possible to maximize the odds that one shares my own particular values. And as Dario notes, no human has ever been able to take over the world. At this point, I think safe to say that Dario has lost the argument. His messaging has failed to result in his preferred regulatory path. The fact that the only solution to the recent incident where an unreleased advanced OpenAI model hacked Hugging Face was an open-source model likely ended any chance of strict near-term regulation. Essentially every major company other than Anthropic has signed Jensen’s letter. However, Dario’s messaging has been massively helpful to efforts to ban datacenters here in America. I suspect we will see anti-datacenter advocacy groups runnings ads using clips of Dario warning about how dangerous AI could be for humans. His good faith efforts in favor of regulation are now increasing the odds that AI will not be beneficial for Americans and humans everywhere. I believe that there is a reasonable chance AI might help us cure most forms of disease such that we have extended lifespans and can enjoy these long lives in an abundant Star Trek like future. That is the future that I want and I think Dario is decreasing the odds of that future at this point. He is about to be the CEO of one of the most important public companies in the world and given that the pro-regulatory effort has failed (at least for now), I respectfully think he should make an effort to be a more positive advocate for his own industry. And if I am wrong and we do need to regulate this technology, he will be a more effective advocate for this in the future having been open-minded to the alternative. And for the sake of clarity and as I outlined on the pod, I think Anthropic has deep competitive advantages and is an amazing company. Ironically, the main risk I saw to Anthropic a few months ago was nationalization as a result of Dario’s own rhetoric and behavior.
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Well put: "China doesn’t want you to think too hard about what its ascendance will mean for the world. They want to show you the edge of the future. They have two messages they want to sell everybody. One is ‘We are inevitable.’ And the other one is ‘Don’t worry.’"
Grateful to @eosnos for including some of my thoughts in his magisterial piece on China, its ambitions and technological edge, and the shape of the future. I made a three broad points: 1) China is focused on winning the technologies of the futures in ways that could irreversibly change the balance of power while we focus on anachronistic territorial questions and Iran, Venezuela, and Cuba. 2) China will aim to make the world safer for autocracy and is already supporting autocrats' ability to repress their populations and stay in power. 3) China doesn't want us to interrogate the shape of Pax Sinica. "A country tends to create an external order that looks a lot like its internal order....China doesn’t want you to think too hard about what its ascendance will mean for the world. They want to show you the edge of the future. They have two messages they want to sell everybody. One is ‘We are inevitable.’ And the other one is ‘Don’t worry.’"
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Together with the US Center for AI Standards and Innovation (@NIST), we ran evaluations of Kimi K3 focused on its cyber capabilities. Kimi K3 performs below leading US frontier models on our preliminary cyber evaluations.
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Thompson Paine retweeted
So much great OSINT work to be done in in the China AI space. Financial filings, code repos, etc. All full of nuggets. You don't even need to code anymore thanks to AI. But you need to understand what matters. Less tea leaves reading please.
CoAsia’s revenue is spiking again. The last time it spiked like this, @SemiAnalysis_ reported the channel was being used to route export-controlled Samsung HBM into China (Jan–Mar 2025). CoAsia distributes Samsung memory and other products. Their largest segment is "Hong Kong Group"—Greater China is their main market. CoAsia is Samsung's sole HBM distributor for Greater China. They've been Samsung's official foundry agent for the Chinese region for years. On Dec 2, 2024, the US announced new export controls on HBM to China with a Dec 31 compliance date. The surge began in January. In Jan 2025, revenue jumped to 4.87B TWD. Feb 4.79B, Mar 4.86B. Roughly 2x the 2024 baseline. Right after the HBM rules took effect. On Apr 16, 2025, @SemiAnalysis_ published an analysis describing how Samsung HBM was allegedly being routed from CoAsia to Faraday (ASIC design) to SPIL (packager), then diverted to China. This revenue surge later collapsed, probably because someone looked into this and stopped it. Down ~67% from peak within weeks of the SemiAnalysis piece. Now, in March 2026, revenue jumped to 4.63B TWD—basically the same magnitude as the first surge. This could be an upswing given the current memory shortage. But if I wanted to build AI chips—which Chinese designers desperately want to do—I'd be doing everything I could to get my hands on HBM. Worth looking into.
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