Electronic Warfare

Exclusive img, dated 28 October 2026, was taken over the Adawi neighbourhood in Damascus at 5:35 PM. It shows an Israeli Zik (Hermes 450) Israeli reconnaissance MALE have been almost constantly present in the skies over Damascus for nearly a month.

Who remembers? During the period between August and November 2024, before the launch of the “Deterrence of Aggression” operation conducted by HTS: During those months, Israel carried out strikes against the SAA’s armament administration warehouses. There was a clear plan to destroy all strategic stockpiles that could be relied upon in long-term wars. The warehouses targeted by Israel during that period included: - “Tal Shanan” warehouses, approximately 20 km east of Homs. - The warehouses in the Palmyra mountains. - Al-Salima warehouses in Harasta, Damascus. - Danha warehouses north of Damascus, near Al-Nabk. They reportedly contained approximately 1,500 ATGMs and were dedicated to ATGM storage. - Al-Qastal warehouses north of Damascus. - Qara warehouses north of Damascus. After that, the SAA emptied the remaining warehouses and moved their contents to non military areas. These newly established ammunition storage sites were subsequently targeted, such as the site in Jabrin, Aleppo, on March 29, 2024; near the entrance to Latakia, at the Transport Corporation, on October 17, 2024; and a third site next to Hmeimim Air Base on October 3, 2024. The ammunition at this last site reportedly came from the emptying of the Al-Samiyah warehouses near Al-Haffah in Latakia. At the time, a close friend of mine who worked in this field even told me that the army was no longer capable of fighting a war lasting more than 20 days. Around 80% of the remaining ammunition was located inside barracks, regiments, and deployment positions, and was not considered strategic ammunition. These stocks could be depleted within just 15–20 days. I cannot interpret this as anything other than an Israeli effort to exhaust the SAA’s primary ammunition reserves. It no longer had the basic means required to withstand the “Deterrence of Aggression” operation. Even by that point, none of the barracks still possessed ATGMs; almost all of them had been sent to Lebanon, with the exception of some SAA deployment areas in the north, the Republican Guard, and the 4th Division. Now, over the course of 25 days, we have seen mysterious explosions at massive ammunition depots in Sarmada, Idlib apparently containing large quantities of ATGMs in addition to rocket artillery and artillery ammunition — Deir ez-Zor, and Al-Eis in Aleppo. Collectively, these incidents resulted in the deaths of more than 50 personnel from the forces of the new authorities. We should also add the Bahramin warehouses in Tartus, which were struck during the first days following the fall of the regime. One of the 62 storage facilities at this site reportedly contained 8,000 220 mm thermobaric rockets for BM-27 multiple rocket launchers. I can only interpret this as another effort to exhaust Syria’s ammunition stockpiles. Perhaps something is coming, and the campaign is not over yet.

A purely accidental photo reveals the unofficial Turk military presence (as of now) in Syria. A candid photo of a beautiful location in Syria, Latakia, circulating among Syrians, taken from within the premises of the Ports Administration. Here a Turkish Kılıç-class missile boat.

A video released by the Yemeni War Media shows the shootdown of a Saudi AH-6I Little Bird helicopter over Najran Province. The AH-6I is the armed reconnaissance and light attack variant of the American MH-6 Little Bird helicopter. Saudi Arabia acknowledged the deaths of the pilot and co-pilot. Detection of the Helicopter - The helicopter appears to have been detected using a thermal imaging camera, possibly one of several Iranian systems, such as the Sadaad-103. - This class of small helicopters is not equipped with sophisticated defensive countermeasure systems. Therefore, the absence of any defensive reaction from the crew is unsurprising. The Missile Used I noticed two important details that, as far as I have seen, have received little attention. Most observers have focused solely on the missile's low speed. The first and most important observation is the apparent absence of an exhaust smoke trail and the lack of a clearly visible hot exhaust plume on the thermal camera. If this observation is accurate, it could indicate that the missile is not powered by a conventional rocket motor. Rocket motors carry both fuel and oxidizer, eliminating the need to draw oxygen from the atmosphere. Their combustion generates extremely high temperatures and produces thrust capable of accelerating missiles to supersonic speeds. In this footage, however, there appears to be no clearly distinguishable thermal signature from the exhaust gases. This raises the possibility that the weapon is powered by a jet engine rather than a conventional rocket motor. Indeed, the Yemenis possess the Iranian hybrid interceptor known as the 358 missile, also referred to by the Yemenis as the Saqr-1. It combines characteristics of an unmanned interceptor with those of a relatively slow-flying missile, consistent with the general characteristics discussed above. The Saqr uses an AMT Titan mini-turbojet engine, manufactured by the Dutch company AMT Netherlands. This is a commercial engine originally developed to power small jet-model aircraft rather than designed specifically as a weapon. The engine weighs approximately 3.5 kg. The engine draws oxygen from the atmosphere and mixes it with fuel inside the combustion chamber. The resulting hot gases pass through a turbine before exiting the exhaust nozzle. Energy extracted by the turbine drives the compressor, allowing the engine to sustain propulsion. The missile reportedly flies at speeds of approximately 400–600 km/h. Its relatively slow speed allows it to loiter while searching for targets and potentially ambush helicopters from the air. The second observation is straightforward: the missile appears to be moving unusually slowly, at a speed inconsistent with that of most conventional air-defense missiles. Additional Information About the 358 Missile The missile uses an imaging infrared (IIR) seeker, rather than a conventional infrared seeker that relies primarily on detecting a target's infrared signature. It can reportedly be employed in two ways. 1. Loitering interception The missile is launched and then loiters, flying in circles while waiting for a target. When an aircraft approaches, the missile's imaging infrared seeker acquires the target and guides the missile toward it at a reported speed of 400–600 km/h. 2. Direct engagement The missile can also be launched directly at a target after the target has been detected and acquired using ground-based optical or radar systems. Laser illumination may be used to measure the target's range, while GNSS coordinates can be programmed into the missile to support satellite-based navigation. If the target is already close and directly in front of the operator, such preprogramming may not be necessary. The system also reportedly incorporates a man-in-the-loop guidance capability, allowing an operator to participate in controlling the engagement. Its reported maximum range is 100 km, while its maximum operational altitude does not exceed 7.5 km.

A brief analysis of a video released by the Houthis showing an alleged engagement involving a Saudi Eurofighter Typhoon, a European-built fighter aircraft (Spain, Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom), on October 14, 2026. I have included illustrative images, and the video will be available in the comments. 1. Target Detection and Tracking Systems First, the aircraft appears to have been detected using a Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR) camera. I believe the system may be one of the air-defense systems displayed by the Houthis during their military parade in Sana'a, reportedly developed with Iranian assistance. One of their most distinctive features is the appearance of a green box that turns red when the system locks onto a target and registers an engagement. Civilian cameras such as the ULTRA-8500, which the Houthis previously used in an engagement involving an F-15, do not feature these graphics. The possible systems include the Shafaq radar, Naba radar, 35 radar, and Ofoq radar, with reported ranges of 15 km, 120 km, 50 km, and 15 km, respectively. These radars are intended to track targets with high precision and support missile guidance. They are therefore likely to operate in the X-band (8–12 GHz), although there is a small possibility that one of the shorter-range systems uses millimeter-wave frequencies in the K or Ka bands, above 18 GHz. The Houthi-operated missiles that may support radar guidance include the Barq-1 and Barq-2. In the configuration I suspect was used, the radar is integrated with an adjacent thermal camera. Both systems track the target simultaneously, with the camera assisting in target acquisition and providing visual documentation of the engagement. The thermal camera could also help control when the radar is switched on and off, reducing the risk of the radar's emissions revealing its position. Under this concept, the radar would be activated only after the thermal camera had acquired a high-value target, and only for the short period necessary to guide the missile. In other words, a passive detection system supporting a concealed air-defense ambush. Note: The thermal camera could potentially operate without the radar, allowing the system to launch an infrared-guided missile at the aircraft. 2. Assessing the Missile Guidance Method In the video, the missile detonates approximately 100 meters in front of the fighter. The center of the explosion appears to be roughly five to six fighter-aircraft widths away, corresponding to a distance of at least 70 meters. In my assessment, this distance makes a small- or medium-sized infrared missile warhead an unlikely explanation for the damage observed. The missile also appears to have approached the fighter head-on rather than pursuing it from behind. This is evidence against a conventional infrared seeker relying primarily on the engine's heat signature, although it does not, by itself, conclusively rule out infrared guidance. We can therefore provisionally exclude conventional infrared-guided missiles such as: - Igla - Strela-1 - Strela-2 - R-60 - R-73, reportedly adapted for ground launch by Yemeni personnel under the designation Thaqib-1 Two main possibilities remain: imaging-infrared (IIR) guidance and radar guidance. 3. Possibility One: Majid AD-08 The Iranian Majid AD-08 air-defense system has a reported engagement range of 8 km and an engagement altitude of 6 km. Its missile uses an imaging-infrared (IIR) seeker, rather than a conventional infrared seeker that primarily tracks the target's infrared signature. An IIR seeker uses a thermal image of the target, allowing it to track the aircraft's image rather than relying exclusively on the engine's heat. This type of seeker can potentially engage an aircraft from the front, consistent with the apparent geometry of the engagement in the video. Barq-1 and Barq-2, medium-range, radar-guided surface-to-air missiles. A variant equipped with an infrared seeker has also been reported.