Elias Melo

The 1842 retreat from Kabul was one of the worst disasters in British imperial history, resulting in the near-total destruction of a 16,000-strong military and civilian column in the frozen mountain passes of Afghanistan... During the First Anglo-Afghan War, British and East India Company (EIC) forces occupied Kabul and installed Shah Shuja Durrani on the throne, angering local populations who viewed him as a foreign puppet. To save money, British officials halted cash payments to local Afghan mountain tribes who controlled safe passage through the strategic passes. In late 1841, a violent uprising broke out led by Akbar Khan (son of deposed Emir Dost Mohammad), resulting in the assassination of British political envoy Sir William Macnaghten and officer Sir Alexander Burnes. On January 6, 1842, indecisive British commander Major-General William Elphinstone led roughly 4,500 soldiers (mostly Indian sepoys of EIC Bengal Army) and 12,000 camp followers (women and children) out of Kabul, relying on a broken promise of safe passage from Akbar Khan. As the column entered narrow, snow-choked gorges like Khurd Kabul and Gandamak passes, Afghan sharpshooters and tribesmen ambushed them from high ground. Freezing winter weather, lack of food, and exhaustion killed thousands before they were even struck down in combat. . . . On January 13, 1842, at a dusty British fort in the foothills of eastern Afghanistan in Jalalabad, a sentry sighted a lone rider desperately galloping towards him. Upon reaching the fort, both the rider and pony collapsed. The man, who had suffered knife wounds to his head, shoulder, knee, and hand, was a British army doctor named William Brydon, and he brought news of a truly stunning disaster. The entire British Army of the Indus - 16,000 soldiers and camp followers - had been wiped out by Afghan tribesmen. While attempting to retreat through the mountain passes from Kabul to India, whole force had been either slaughtered or captured, and only Dr. Brydon had managed to evade Afghan warriors to deliver notice of one of worst disasters in British military history. The arrogance and stupidity of Britain’s top military commanders in the region were entirely to blame for this sad episode, and it would needlessly cost the lives of thousands. All in the name of the Great Game between Britain and Russia, that saw each country trying to push its influence further into Central and South Asia to thwart the other. It was an age of empires; it was an age of paranoia; and it was an age of profound ignorance. . . . By the early 19th century, British East India Company controlled much of the lucrative Indian subcontinent and maintained order with what amounted to private armies composed mainly of native troops commanded by British officers. At the same time, Russia was aggressively pushing into central Asia, and one of the perennial worries of the British was that the Russians would either attempt to invade India through Afghanistan or foment rebellion against the English. In October of 1837, a chance encounter on a mountain road near the border of Iran and Afghanistan seemed to confirm the worst fears of the British. A lieutenant named Rawlinson happened to pass by a small band of horsemen heading toward Afghanistan. Rawlinson recognized the other riders as Cossacks, and in their midst was a Russian political officer. When questioned, Russian pretended not to understand Rawlinson very well but admitted that he was an official representative bearing gifts for shah of Persia. Rawlinson immediately went to the camp of the shah and learned that the Russian, whose name was Vitkevitch, had been sent to open negotiations with the ruler of Afghanistan. Realizing that Vitkevitch’s mission could be the first step in the long-feared Russian campaign to move into Afghanistan, Rawlinson returned to Tehran and announced to his superiors that Russians were dispatching agents into Afghanistan to suborn local leaders. #archaeohistories