Independent applied cryptography research platform PQC migration · PQ-ZK security · Open resources
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The Encryptorium shop is live.
It was surprisingly fun to turn cryptography concepts into designs and think about which ideas still work when you compress them into just a few words.
Have a look:
shop.encryptorium.com/
encryptorium retweeted
Post-quantum migration discussions often begin with a question:
Which post-quantum algorithm should we choose?
I think that is one question too early.
Before selecting ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, or a hybrid construction, an organization first needs to know where cryptography actually lives: in protocols, libraries, certificates, HSMs, signing pipelines, firmware, third-party dependencies, and long-lived data.
That is one of the clearest lessons I took from building the Book of PQC.
All 41 chapters are now published. The book moves from mathematical foundations and from-scratch implementations through cryptanalysis, CBOMs, crypto agility, TLS and PKI migration, post-quantum zero-knowledge systems, and blockchains.
The practical conclusion is simple:
PQC migration is not only an algorithm problem. It is an inventory, dependency, and lifecycle problem.
The entire book is freely available here:
book.encryptorium.com/
For those already working on migration: what has proven hardest to inventory?
#PostQuantumCryptography #Cryptography #Cybersecurity
Classic McEliece's guide dismisses improved asymptotic exponents at §3.4: they measure at t ∈ Θ(n), sizes that "do not appear in the McEliece system".
ePrint 2026/1630 works at t = Θ(n/log n). The guide's own regime.
eprint.iacr.org/2026/1630
An AI audit reportedly found 85 critical-severity bugs across Bitcoin wallet code. The piece names no auditor and no affected implementation, and says not all 85 are public. A count is not a disclosure. Ask what would make it falsifiable. crypto.news/coldcard-rng-fla…
If you are deploying LMS or XMSS for firmware root of trust: SP 800-208 does not let the cryptographic module export the private key. There is no ordinary backup. NIST is revising the document for that reason. Plan signing continuity before you plan the migration.
encryptorium retweeted
New in Claude Code: your sessions can now message each other.
Instead of having to re-explain yourself in another session, you can now tell Claude to do it. It sends a summary (not your history or files), and the other session picks it up mid-task.
encryptorium retweeted
Cleartext is on Kindle Countdown until 10 August, US and UK stores.
A brief book post, then back to cryptography.
It is a techno-thriller about a machine that breaks RSA-4096. I am a cryptologist, so the bar I cared about was whether the technical details would survive someone checking them.
I published a companion essay tracing seven of those details back to their sources; forty-six in all, every one checkable. If you would rather audit the work than buy on a recommendation, read that first. And if something in it is wrong, I would genuinely rather hear it than not.
amazon.com/dp/B0H74MPVWX
Quantum attacks do not affect every ZK system the same way. The result can be a structural break, a replaceable component, or quantitative degradation.
We map that across major deployed ZK architectures: four layers, three impact classes.
encryptorium.com/research/po…
NIST's answer to state reuse in stateful hash-based signatures is not "be careful." SP 800-208 keeps signing keys in non-exportable Level 3 hardware and makes the module persist the next leaf index before releasing a signature. That is the module's job, not the operator's.
AES-256 survives a quantum computer. Your PGP mail may not.
OpenPGP encrypts the message with a fresh session key, then encrypts that key to your RSA public key. Break the envelope: AES stays unbroken, the plaintext walks out.
encryptorium.com/blog/cleart…
PQRA is open source. It assesses an organization's exposure to post-quantum migration and rests on assumptions worth arguing with. Those assumptions are in the repo rather than behind a report.
github.com/Encryptorium/post…
This is one of the most important statements in the article.
encryptorium retweeted
New Anthropic research: Discovering cryptographic weaknesses with Claude.
Claude Mythos Preview has helped our researchers find weaknesses in cryptographic algorithms—the mathematical methods that are used to keep data private.
Read more: anthropic.com/research/disco…
An interesting read. Just keep in mind that HAWK is a third-round candidate, not a standard. No production system relies on it, and Anthropic says plainly that no production software needs to change.
anthropic.com/research/disco…
encryptorium retweeted
"We use STARKs, so we are post-quantum" is not a complete answer. Quantum risk in a deployed proof system depends on which layer carries the assumption and whether you can actually replace it in production.
"We use STARKs, so we are post-quantum" is not a complete answer. Quantum risk in a deployed proof system depends on which layer carries the assumption and whether you can actually replace it in production.
Full analysis, PDF, and LaTeX source: encryptorium.com/research/po…