econ phd @mit | prev @stanford mechanism design for ai alignment fan sidequest lover @loonuhlee is my #1 hater everyone else get in line
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ALT We introduce a new approach to measure physical attractiveness—the relative vision embedding (RVE) score. The score maps a face to a vector in the embedding space of a pre-trained deep vision model and measures its proximity to a reference set of celebrity faces. It requires no additional training or fine-tuning, no hand-crafted features, and no human raters; it is continuous, inexpensive, scalable, and fully reproducible. Using publicly available photographs with human attractiveness ratings, we show that the RVE scores correlate strongly with human ratings and that rankings are consistent across several off-the-shelf vision models. We apply the measure to administrative hiring data from a research-oriented economics department, complemented by hand-collected photographs of the job applicants. Higher RVE scores are associated with better job-market outcomes, though the association is not robust across all specifications. In contrast, the association with reference-letter length and se
ALT We study when players can truthfully share private information through a mediator. Our analysis focuses on symmetric linear-quadratic games with strategic complements and independent private values. We characterize when mediated communication is informative, meaning that it can induce an outcome different from the unique Bayes-Nash outcome without communication. A sharp dichotomy emerges. When types that prefer higher own actions benefit less from higher opponent actions, informative communication is impossible regardless of the type distribution. By contrast, when those types benefit more from higher opponent actions, informative communication is possible if and only if the relevant extreme type lies sufficiently far from the mean. In a linear-demand Bertrand oligopoly, informative communication is impossible under private costs but may arise under private demand. Finally, informative communication weakly benefits every type. But whenever information sharing can raise aggregate welfar
