Hansel Ang

Introducing Leon and the Black Lion Club. 1B LEON tokens pre-TGE sale now on, limited to 100 people for 5% token supply. DMs open.

The Republicans are so retarded they're doing a forensic audit on their loss and never understood that hatred is the most powerful motivator in the world. James Carville just says the reason and it explains everything. Democrats don't hate low gas prices or high gas prices, they would do either to get Trump. They don't love war or hate war, they've done both to get Trump. They don't love or hate women, gays, blacks, Ai, churches... until Trump does it then they have their marching orders. The RINOs and Neocons can't see this well-demonstrated presupposition because they hate Trump too.

Las personas anteriormente religiosas muestran los niveles más altos de autoritarismo de izquierdas: Cuando alguien abandona la religión, suele dejar atrás las ideas conservadoras que antes defendía, pero no siempre abandona la forma rígida y autoritaria de pensar. Este estudio ha encontrado que las personas que en el pasado fueron religiosas muestran los niveles más altos de autoritarismo de izquierdas, por encima tanto de quienes siguen siendo religiosos como de quienes nunca lo han sido. Los investigadores trabajaron con 804 adultos estadounidenses a los que dividieron en tres grupos: los que se consideran actualmente religiosos, los que lo fueron en el pasado y los que nunca se han identificado con ninguna religión. A todos les pasaron dos cuestionarios. Uno medía el autoritarismo de derechas, es decir, la tendencia a preferir la obediencia a las autoridades tradicionales, a exigir conformidad con las normas conservadoras y a castigar a quienes se salen de ellas. El otro medía el autoritarismo de izquierdas, que funciona de manera parecida (deseo de conformidad y de castigar a los que no se ajustan), pero dirigido hacia normas y autoridades de carácter progresista: se rechazan las jerarquías tradicionales y se apoya el uso de la autoridad para silenciar a los oponentes ideológicos. Como era de esperar, las personas actualmente religiosas puntuaron más alto en autoritarismo de derechas. En cambio, tanto las que habían dejado la religión como las que nunca la habían tenido mostraron niveles bajos y muy similares en esa medida. El resultado más llamativo apareció en el autoritarismo de izquierdas: aquí fueron los antiguos creyentes quienes obtuvieron las puntuaciones más elevadas, claramente por encima de los otros dos grupos. Los autores interpretan estos datos como la combinación de dos procesos. Por un lado, la “reactancia” psicológica: al abandonar la religión, la persona tiende a adoptar ideas opuestas a las que antes sostenía, lo que explica el desplazamiento desde el conservadurismo hacia posiciones de izquierda. Por otro lado, el “residuo religioso”: aunque cambia el contenido de las creencias, se mantiene el estilo cognitivo estricto y autoritario con el que se sostenían. Es decir, se cambia de bando ideológico, pero se conserva la misma forma rígida de pensar y la misma inclinación a exigir conformidad y a sancionar a quienes discrepan. El estudio tiene sus limitaciones a tener en cuenta. Es una fotografía tomada en un solo momento (no sigue a las mismas personas a lo largo de los años) y se basa en respuestas autoinformadas. Por otro lado, se realizó únicamente en Estados Unidos, por lo que no es extrapolable a otros lugares.

There is a fundamental difference between living somewhere and feeling responsible for it. In clan-based societies, loyalty can be concentrated within the extended family or tribe, leaving weaker obligations toward strangers and shared institutions. But a similar problem can emerge at the opposite ideological extreme: among people who consider themselves citizens of the world, yet feel little particular obligation toward the nation in which they live. One places the clan above the country. The other places humanity above it. Both risk neglecting the institutions and common spaces on which everyone depends. Ownership changes behavior. People maintain what they believe belongs to them and what they expect their children to inherit. They are more cautious about spending resources they must replenish, accepting risks they must personally bear, and dismantling institutions they will need tomorrow. This is the problem with governance increasingly detached from accountability. Bureaucrats administering other people’s money, supranational institutions making decisions whose consequences are experienced locally, and political movements that regard their own countries primarily as historical injustices can all weaken the connection between decision-making and stewardship. Immigration policy exposes this tension particularly clearly. The 1951 Refugee Convention emerged from the devastation of World War II, when Europe faced millions of displaced people, survivors of persecution, and refugees from totalitarian regimes. Its original scope was restricted to displacement arising from events before January 1951, with an option for states to limit their obligations geographically to Europe. In 1967, those restrictions were removed, transforming a historically bounded protection framework into a universal one. The principle was understandable: people fleeing persecution deserve protection. But the scale and circumstances of modern displacement raise questions the original architects could scarcely have anticipated. Protecting individuals from persecution is not the same undertaking as integrating large populations into societies with fundamentally different political and legal traditions. Particularly where Islamist political movements reject secular law, religious freedom, equality before the law, or the separation of religion and state, the challenge extends beyond economics and humanitarian assistance. It concerns the institutions and values that make a liberal democracy possible. This is a distinction between ideology and identity, not between Muslims and non-Muslims. Indeed, many refugees are themselves escaping Islamist repression. Yet the debate too often treats humanitarian intentions as sufficient evidence of sound policy, while questions about integration, institutional capacity, social cohesion, and long-term consequences become secondary. A country has finite resources, finite institutional capacity, and a legitimate responsibility to the people already depending on it. Acknowledging those limits does not negate humanitarian obligations. It makes those obligations sustainable. You cannot save the entire world by relocating its problems into a handful of countries. You cannot boil the ocean. And you cannot preserve a civilization if responsibility for its survival is perpetually subordinated to ambitions that recognize no practical limits. We can do our share to help people in need. But we do not owe the world unlimited assistance, nor are we obligated to sacrifice our own security, prosperity, or social cohesion to solve every crisis beyond our borders. The question is whether we can fulfill those obligations while neglecting what we owe to the societies that make such generosity possible.

Maine’s Secretary of State just got busted for election fraud. Authorities found a box of 250 ballots in her office that she or her staff had personally submitted — then pulled from the official count. Fraud at every level. In every state. This time it’s Maine. #ElectionFraud #Maine #ElectionIntegrity

Exactly, they gamed it perfectly out. Either Trump and his team go to jail on trumped up charges or he goes to jail for "insurrection". This is President Trump's Rubicon moment. The third way out is county sheriffs and governors start arrresting traitors in the fraud.