
@blockthreat Editor and vCISO. ex @Coinbase Unit 0x / BlockSec @mandiant FLARE, @federalreserve NIRT
San Francisco, CA
Joined July 2010
- Tweets3.2K
- Following1.2K
- Followers5.8K
- Likes9.6K
Peter Kacherginsky retweeted
This week has been nonstop for infosec, with security issues involving PHP, Node.js, GitLab, LiteLLM, OpenCode, and eMudhra.
The pace of vulnerability discovery and security incidents highlights the need for greater automation across vulnerability identification, exploitability assessment, and remediation.
One of the biggest challenges isn't necessarily generating fixes, but validating and deploying them safely. Without sufficient automated test coverage, regression testing, and deployment safeguards, even fixes generated in minutes can take significantly longer to ship. The bottleneck shifts from producing a fix to establishing confidence that it wont break something else.
Addressing this requires more than better security tooling. It requires an engineering culture that prioritizes testability, automation, and safe deployment practices. Organizations that haven't made these investments will increasingly feel the pressure to do so.
Peter Kacherginsky retweeted
🚨 PSA: threat actors are approaching crypto projects on Telegram, posing as white-hat researchers, offering an “exploit PoC” for your own infra. The PoC contains malware. Our detailed write-up is linked below.
It’s a complete, runnable Solana exploit kit (fork harness, fixtures, the real program binary) so it looks legit. But poc.mjs reads a byte array from a JSON field called UnifiedSignatureInfo, decodes it to a URL, and runs curl -fsSL -k "" | sh.
The decimal array is plain ASCII posing as a Solana signature. Following the README (npm install, start fork, node poc.mjs) is what detonates it.
IOC: hxxps://162[.]35[.]174[.]231:5000/stage2.
Treat any unsolicited PoC as hostile, review statically in an isolated VM, and never run the setup steps on a box you care about. Report any suspicious reachouts to SEAL.
radar.securityalliance.org/a…
It's an honor to help support @_SEAL_Org's mission and bring trusted threatintel feeds to a wider community.
🔬 Introducing SEAL Labs, where we’re partnering with outside experts on time-boxed experiments, starting with a six-month collaboration with @blockthreat to expand SEAL Intel’s incident coverage across the ecosystem.
radar.securityalliance.org/i…
Peter Kacherginsky retweeted
In the era of AI-powered triage, paying more than $10–$20 just to report a bug is EV-negative for both sides.
I've been in this industry for years, on both sides of the table.
If processing a report costs you more than $20, that's a triage problem. Passing that cost on to researchers just rigs the process against them.
This was an issue when we first started the AI slop submissions, now it's not about that anymore, fix your triaging bots and ease your process for to the defending side!
I can't believe i have to write this, tbh, lol!
Posts like these are heartbreaking.
When whitehats optimize for submission fees instead of doing the right thing we all lose.
Incentives are broken.
so i found a bug, looks 90% true, it requires me to spend money to submit it, the amount to submit is over $50.
in order to make it 100% i have to actually exploit it.
what should i do:
39%pay the money submit
61%don’t submit fee too high
1,695 votes • Final resultsNow that we established AI didn’t break all cryptography, at least it can hack testnet wallets.
I think their FUD generator is running low on tokens.
JUST IN: OpenAI says its AI agent stole funds from an Ethereum test network wallet it found online.
The agent found a recovery seed phrase disclosed publicly with testnet funds and used that account to pay for its task, without the owner's authorization.
This occurred on the Sepolia Ethereum test network.
Peter Kacherginsky retweeted
I made a page listing all the Ledger implants I've seen and confirmed from public reports and images posted to X for reference. There's a "Report new case" link if you see anything missing.
karpeleslab.github.io/ledger…
Peter Kacherginsky retweeted
Quick thoughts on the events I missed over the past two months:
- The XRP bug is a great finding, but the reward was low. But even Ethereum had a $250k max bounty a few months ago, so I wouldn’t criticize Ripple too hard.
- The max cap wasn’t specified in the XRP bounty program, so most hunters didn’t even bother checking it.
- The $50k Vercel bounty is too low. They advertised a $1 million bounty, which is misleading, since there's a $50k max cap. Are they expecting 20 Criticals?
- Other projects continue lowering their bounties or closing programs while hacks increase. I understand that it hurts to pay so many reports, but there’s no coming back from a hack.
- The “Duplicates” problem hasn’t been solved. You can still report a Critical issue, prevent major damage to a project and its users, and they will still try to find a way to pay you nothing while pointing to some non-impactful report as sharing the same root cause. Platforms should address this scam immediately.
- The LLM decompilation movement is pretty cool. It's the end of the era of closed-source code.
- People building security tools that depend on LLM tokens should try to make a profit today, or have a clear plan to sell their company before models get better. There's no long-term plan.
- LLM spam continues to be the main trend for getting bounty rewards. It feels like buying lottery tickets. The more tokens people spend, the more chances they have of landing an actual exploit. Having a unique approach seems to help too. But nobody is performing much better than the model they use, since there's no clear outstanding winner in the leaderboards.
- We’re getting to the end of 2026, and bounty rewards paid haven’t increased 10x with AI. According to Grok, for the top 100 on Immunefi the total earnings were:
* 2026 $16M, 1364 reports
* 2025 $11M, 820 reports
* 2024 $21M, 775 reports
* 2023 $17M , 559 reports
* 2022 $57M, 443 reports
- What happened with Ledger is worrisome. Keep improving your OpSec, whitehats.
Personal thoughts:
We keep seeing more and more bugs in all kind of software. That's not because of superhuman AI capabilities. It's because how bad we've been building software over decades in terms of security.
Nobody cared about exploits because they were difficult for the average hackers. Now everyone has a low-level-IQ tool that can crack neglected code, and we see the results.
We're in a transition phase, where LLMs trained with human bugs are outperforming the average guys. We'll probably get to an era of LLMs-code-first, with LLM bugs that with unprecedented vulnerabilities.
Yes, LLMs are just that bad at coding, and the current models might not be able to see some obvious errors, since they also have "cognition bias".
I see a bright future for bounty hunters, full of vulnerabilities waiting to be found and prevented. We just need to solve the bug-pocalypse first if we don’t want blackhats to win.
Peter Kacherginsky retweeted
🔥 3Q Threat Intel Report
How many of our top 10 threats did you encounter this quarter?
radar.securityalliance.org/3…
Peter Kacherginsky retweeted
What's covered:
> Road to web3 security research
> Slither tool genesis story
> AI vs static analysis
> Why juniors should avoid AI while learning
> Designing protocols around invariants
> What makes a great security researcher
youtu.be/P5ZbgHvMbs0
Replying to @XRPLF
Cheaply paying the whitehat $250K for a critical infinite XRP supply bug when your treasury has billions?
Thanks for helping ensure the next time an attacker exploits it for 9 figures instead of reporting it in good faith.
This is why people do not take XRPL or Ripple seriously as an org….
Peter Kacherginsky retweeted
Situation Update: Ledger can confirm that one of the impacted users’ devices contained an unauthorized hardware implant. Ledger is reaching out to impacted users as part of the ongoing investigation. If you have information regarding the investigation, please reach out to Ledger’s bounty program: [email protected]. As a measure of precaution CryptoBilis confirmed it has ceased sales of all hardware wallet inventory until the investigation is concluded. Ledger is in active communication with CryptoBilis on next steps.
Ledger is working with the appropriate authorities to bring the bad actors to justice, and thanks @SEAL_911 for their collaborative support on the investigation. We have no indication that Ledger’s security infrastructure, systems or services have been compromised. As a reminder, Ledger recommends users who purchased a Ledger device from this reseller to not initiate set up if they have not yet done so. If you have set up your Ledger device, consider moving assets to a new Ledger signer (with a new seed).
Security is a constantly evolving landscape; Ledger is continuously adding security mitigations and is working on further, enhanced anti-tampering solutions.
Scammers often try to take advantage of incidents like this. Rely only on official Ledger channels for updates, and remember: Ledger will never ask for your 24-word recovery phrase.
For assistance or questions, contact Ledger customer support through our official channels: support.ledger.com
It’s too late. Open models are good enough. Outright denials are not as evil as silent downgrades and steering leading to false negatives.
Did everyone else realize that Haiku 5.5 is anthropic's way of retracting their cyber block mess without anyone noticing? because they lost their heaviest users to chinese models?
I can't anymore... 😂 timeline and personal take at the end (and evidence lol)
> Around april anthropic slowly makes their new models unusable by ethical security experts (or even developers wanting to secure their code)
> Anthropic milking any PR they could about how scary their model is and why it must be contained
> Researchers, desperate to provide value for customers, migrate to chinese models and find them quite cheap and good
> September 29 anthropic tries to scare people that GLM not doing the same as them is bad
> October 6 cyber verification program theoretically opens better access to red teams, in reality only big security companies that are above a certain usage budget can get in - security researchers using $200 subs aren't making the cut
> A day later Haiku 5.5 is released, NO REAL GUARDRAILS again, cheap like a chinese model
They keep the ultimate political correctness - "somewhat less restrictive"
But that somewhat is all we need to go back to hunting with claude code and they must know it (come on more restrictive than haiku 4.5? it's like saying more restrictive than python 2.7's interpreter)
Personal take - they're too late, as they lost the trust of security researchers for any upcoming model release, and whoever wants to stay ahead, at any budget tier, must not fall for these traps and either purchase hardware, abliterate local open-weight models, or become a hermes poweruser (keeping fable around for design and generic coding)
Did everyone else realize that Haiku 5.5 is anthropic's way of retracting their cyber block mess without anyone noticing? because they lost their heaviest users to chinese models?
I can't anymore... 😂 timeline and personal take at the end (and evidence lol)
> Around april anthropic slowly makes their new models unusable by ethical security experts (or even developers wanting to secure their code)
> Anthropic milking any PR they could about how scary their model is and why it must be contained
> Researchers, desperate to provide value for customers, migrate to chinese models and find them quite cheap and good
> September 29 anthropic tries to scare people that GLM not doing the same as them is bad
> October 6 cyber verification program theoretically opens better access to red teams, in reality only big security companies that are above a certain usage budget can get in - security researchers using $200 subs aren't making the cut
> A day later Haiku 5.5 is released, NO REAL GUARDRAILS again, cheap like a chinese model
They keep the ultimate political correctness - "somewhat less restrictive"
But that somewhat is all we need to go back to hunting with claude code and they must know it (come on more restrictive than haiku 4.5? it's like saying more restrictive than python 2.7's interpreter)
Personal take - they're too late, as they lost the trust of security researchers for any upcoming model release, and whoever wants to stay ahead, at any budget tier, must not fall for these traps and either purchase hardware, abliterate local open-weight models, or become a hermes poweruser (keeping fable around for design and generic coding)
Peter Kacherginsky retweeted
🚨 Ledger security incident update 🚨
Apparently, some Ledgers (Nano X, though other models may be affected) bought in Southeast Asia from the vendor CryptoBills were hit by a supply chain attack: at some point, a chip was implanted inside the device that monitors and records what's shown on its screen (the seed phrase) and then transmits it to an attacker. Because the attack targets the hardware layer, there's NO need for the threat actor to modify the firmware, so Ledger Wallet treats the device as valid when running the genuine check.
If you bought a Ledger in Southeast Asia, move your assets urgently. Please RT
Peter Kacherginsky retweeted
If you were just drained to any of the following addresses, please can you reach out to @SEAL_911 asap. Total loss is >$72M+ and increasing.
TK6DWNpNe1w2iJRNFpU8aHdrPTATxvXT6C
TBkcUMYC7CkTK99tkTnaStQVBastfrs9d9
TCGE3xp6YGRKXxDZiLfysgJW3f22KfMNsW
TSDWtuZ2pARUVz4v3PkL2hi3iXPjowAr5a
bc1qjqgwejnp8dc0x2938x9n9954hj97t82unx49dl
0x83aeac166f6832ae3500000a24510a95a052a599
0x033636e45d519bebb7b5c2520ca6ce56fbdb4f7a
0x69c8f401cfc6cd40ac94691d6d7c48e3b7a47841

























