On October 20, 2026, in Mumbai, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio proposed that Indian refiners—particularly Reliance Industries—process more Venezuelan crude and explore oil production there. India must examine the terms carefully. Buying crude, rebuilding Venezuela’s oil industry and reducing Russian supplies are three separate decisions, with very different costs and risks. Before committing, New Delhi needs answers to seven questions. 1️⃣ WHAT MORE DOES WASHINGTON WANT? India is already diversifying. • Venezuelan crude imports jumped from $255 million in FY2026 to nearly $3.6 billion in April–August 2026. • U.S. crude purchases rose from $405 million in July to $790 million in August. • Russian purchases fell about 25%, from $7.3 billion to $5.4 billion, reducing Russia’s share from 51% to 45%. With this shift already underway, what additional commitments does Washington seek—and what would India gain? 2️⃣ WHY THE FOCUS ON RELIANCE? Reliance accounted for 74.3% of India’s $3,585.6 million Venezuelan crude imports in April–August: • SEZ Jamnagar: $1,695.3 million—47.3%. • Sikka: $968.2 million—27%. The remainder came through Indian Oil’s Paradip facility, $421.3 million; Mundra storage terminals operated by HPCL and others, $405.8 million; and Nayara’s Vadinar facility, $95 million. Reliance is already the dominant buyer. Any further commitment must make commercial sense for the company. 3️⃣ DOES CHEAPER CRUDE MEAN CHEAPER FUEL? During April–August, India paid an average $612 per tonne for Venezuelan crude, compared with $821 for Saudi crude. But the discount is only the starting point. Venezuela’s mostly extra-heavy crude requires specialised diluents, upgrading and transport infrastructure. Lower yields and higher handling and refining costs can absorb part of the price advantage. India has the capability: Reliance’s Jamnagar complex, Nayara’s Vadinar refinery and suitable IOC and HPCL facilities can process heavy crude. The test is the final refining margin, supply reliability and delivered cost. 4️⃣ IS INDIA BEING ASKED TO BUY OIL—OR FINANCE RECONSTRUCTION? Venezuela produces roughly 1.1–1.2 million barrels a day and exports about 650,000–750,000 barrels. Restoring production above its historical peak of 3 million barrels a day could take 7–10 years and $75 billion to more than $100 billion. That means rebuilding upgraders, restoring power and repairing export facilities. India must establish whether Rubio’s proposal offers reliable crude supplies or seeks Indian capital to rehabilitate Venezuela’s damaged oil industry. The investment burden, ownership terms, payment security and expected returns must be explicit. 5️⃣ WHO BEARS THE COST IF U.S. POLICY REVERSES AGAIN? India has already experienced this risk. U.S. sanctions disrupted ONGC Videsh’s Venezuelan investments. Restrictions on Venezuelan state oil firm PDVSA, culminating in the 2019 oil embargo, also pushed Indian refiners to stop purchases. Hundreds of millions of dollars in Indian dividend earnings were stranded, production from equity investments was effectively frozen and expansion plans were abandoned. Washington once discouraged Venezuelan oil purchases. It now encourages them. What protects Indian investments if it changes direction again? 6️⃣ WHY MUST INDIA REDUCE RUSSIAN PURCHASES WHILE THE U.S. BUYS RUSSIAN DIESEL? On October 9, Washington agreed to buy Russian diesel to improve domestic availability. The arrangement provided sanctions relief until April 7, 2027, potentially generating dollar earnings for Russian producers, including Rosneft and Lukoil. Washington must explain why its energy needs justify Russian purchases while India faces pressure to reduce its own. India’s sourcing decisions must serve its energy security and commercial interests. 7️⃣ HOW MUCH MORE CAN RELIANCE COMMIT? On March 11, 2026, President Trump announced a $300 billion refinery project involving Reliance at Brownsville, Texas. Any request for Reliance to invest in Venezuelan oilfields must be assessed alongside its existing commitments, financing capacity and execution risks. India should seek clear terms on pricing, supply continuity, investment obligations, commercial returns, sanctions protection and how long Washington’s support will last. Buy Venezuelan crude where the economics work. Assess oilfield investment on its own merits. Decide Russian sourcing according to India’s needs. An American invitation is no guarantee that Indian capital—or India’s energy security—will be protected.