Jessica Payne (@jepayneMSFT) profile picture

Security Person at Microsoft, currently in Windows Defender Security Research. Opinions are my own.

Joined October 2015
Photo by Jessica Payne (@jepayneMSFT)Photo by Jessica Payne (@jepayneMSFT)Photo by Jessica Payne (@jepayneMSFT)Photo by Jessica Payne (@jepayneMSFT)Photo by Jessica Payne (@jepayneMSFT)Photo by Jessica Payne (@jepayneMSFT)Photo by Jessica Payne (@jepayneMSFT)Photo by Jessica Payne (@jepayneMSFT)Photo by Jessica Payne (@jepayneMSFT)Photo by Jessica Payne (@jepayneMSFT)
Human Operated Ransomware isn’t slowing down, but payloads are just a stop on a journey attackers are taking through your network. If you focus on the payload you’ll miss actions they performed in your network, and chances to detect and stop them sooner. msft.it/6011Tg9Lx
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Understanding your network,and where credential overlap exists can be the difference between losing one or two less secured machines to an attacker and totally ransomed network. If you’re not sure what accounts are logging in where and why, you can use WEF aka.ms/weffles
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Ransomware payloads are stylistic and interchangeable (to the extent that attackers are even using Wannacrypt sometimes) but focusing on their initial access, credential theft, and lateral movement techniques can give you a map to mitigation. msft.it/6011Tg9Lx
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Which Ransomware payload is deployed at the end of a killchain is pretty much a stylistic choice by the attackers. Human Operated Ransomware campaigns overlap in their entry vectors, C2 tools, and lateral movement techniques- and also in viable defenses. aka.ms/human-operated-ransom…
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Every report on a ransomware payload that digs into encryption methods and code artifacts but neglects the killchain that allowed it to infect an entire network deprives defenders of information to protect themselves. Payloads change, abuse of network configuration can be fixed.
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Jessica Payne retweeted
An insufficiently secured network is distributed computing resources to an attacker. If you have no host firewalls, matching local admin passwords, services that log in as highly privileged accounts and haven’t had an attack yet- it’s likely just because you weren’t selected.
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Jessica Payne retweeted
Credential theft, lateral movement, data exfiltration -terms many don’t associate with ransomware. But that is what happens during these attacks and the mindset needs to shift. Paying a ransom doesn’t remove the attacker, and formatting a ransomed machine doesn’t undo the attack.
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Jessica Payne retweeted
Threat Intelligence reports often ignore ‘commodity’ threats, or fail to explain how a threat can be prevented. We think differently, and want you to know how the most impactful threats work and how you can stop them. Stopping Ransomware is possible, with built in configurations.
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Threat Intelligence reports often ignore ‘commodity’ threats, or fail to explain how a threat can be prevented. We think differently, and want you to know how the most impactful threats work and how you can stop them. Stopping Ransomware is possible, with built in configurations.
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Credential theft, lateral movement, data exfiltration -terms many don’t associate with ransomware. But that is what happens during these attacks and the mindset needs to shift. Paying a ransom doesn’t remove the attacker, and formatting a ransomed machine doesn’t undo the attack.
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An insufficiently secured network is distributed computing resources to an attacker. If you have no host firewalls, matching local admin passwords, services that log in as highly privileged accounts and haven’t had an attack yet- it’s likely just because you weren’t selected.
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Ransomware is often talked about with the same ‘superpower’ and malware focused narrative APTs are. Both are humans usually using psexec, GPOs, and stolen credentials to move laterally and deploy malware. Mitigations exist and networks can be hardened: teapawt.org/jepayneMSFT/status/109…
Some things attackers like: -Domain Admin accounts that do logon type 4 or 5 to workstations -Accounts with weak Kerberos configs like DES encryption or no preauth -GPO settings that allow unexpected admin actions like loading drivers Why not check for these before they do?
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Ransomware is an economic problem - attackers use the same techniques of RDP brute force and lateral movement for years because they still work. Increasing operational security is not only possible using native/builtin tools, it’s becoming a new business continuity requirement.
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When reading reports about fantastically clever and innovative malware, it’s easy to lose sight of the fact a lot of it got installed by attackers with Domain Admin. Don’t forget that the last stage wizardry often is preceded by 90% of the attack you can detect and mitigate.
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If you want to stop an attacker from RDP brute forcing you and deploying ransomware as a domain admin via psexec or group policy you probably want to start by enabling NLA, randomizing your local passwords, and keeping domain admins from logging in to desktops.
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If you want to see if a domain admin has logged in somewhere and exposed credentials (logon types 2,4,5,10) and track down accounts at risk or what might break if you reduce service account privileges you don’t even need fancy tools: teapawt.org/jepaynemsft/status/940…
Build a fast, free, and effective Threat Hunting/Incident Response Console with Windows Event Forwarding and PowerBI: aka.ms/WEFFLES
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