The most important takeaway from the Canada-China trade deal on canola and EVs isn’t the short-term relief. It’s the precedent. Canada got limited concessions. Beijing kept the leverage. And what this demonstrates to the Chinese Communist Party is that pressure worked. That’s a lesson China is unlikely to forget, especially when it’s deciding where to apply pressure next. More in my interview with @VassyKapelos on @ctvqp. Full clip linked in the comments.

As Canadian Prime Minister @MarkJCarney pushes for stronger economic ties on his first official visit to China next week, he should make sure to uphold universal values and his own and his country's integrity, and take a strategic approach that prioritizes holistic national interests, rather than just looking at relations deal by deal and agreement by agreement, I told @CanadianPress. While the visit could build interpersonal relations and expand trade and investment in sectors like energy and agriculture, it comes with risks because Chinese negotiators will try to extract concessions, I explained to @withfilesfrom. Canadian officials can be prudent about when and how they speak out on PRC policies and behaviour — but if Canadians stay quiet about egregious acts in exchange for economic benefits, it will allow Beijing to condition the nation into silence. That's a delicate diplomatic dance. The delegation should push for better treatment and more consular access, particularly for detained Canadians the Party-state has held for years — like Huseyin Celil. The PM and Foreign Minister @AnitaAnandMP should also advocate for clemency for Hong Kong publisher Jimmy Lai, and press for Beijing to stop materially supporting Russia's invasion of Ukraine and taking aggressive and coercive measures against neighbours such as Taiwan, the Philippines and Japan. That will require signalling that not doing so will impede progress in relations and could bring costs. Aside from the removal of countervailing duties and better market access, Carney's goals can include a better mutual understanding of where Canada and China can and can't co-operate, and ensuring that General Secretary Xi Jinping continues sending internal signals that he now wants his government to address obstacles in relations with Canada. Success could be measured by signs of easing in PRC trade barriers, clearer communication and expanding dialogue and dispute resolution mechanisms, and greater moderation and predictability in Party-state officials' tone and behaviour toward Canada. I welcome your own predictions on outcomes! Full article and short video interview in the comments.

The PRC may try to use Canadian Prime Minister @MarkJCarney’s visit to Beijing next week to drive a wedge between Ottawa and Washington, I told @CTVNews' @MarciaMacMillan. General Secretary Xi's invitation for Carney to make the first visit by a Canadian PM in nearly a decade reflects a recognition on the Chinese side that it’s not in their interests to keep Canada frozen out. So this is definitely an opportunity to resolve some problems, but China still is and will remain a very complicated challenge for Canada, even more so in the current context. This is a restoration of top-level diplomacy and a reopening of senior-level dialogues, but that doesn’t mean that trust is being restored. It’s about rebuilding channels so that Canada and China can try to resolve differences diplomatically. China wants to expand trade, particularly to get market access to Canada for its manufactured goods. It’s looking to source energy, minerals, agricultural products, and other natural resources. For Canada, the baseline objective should be to stabilize a fraught relationship without appearing naive or subordinate. The Canadian delegation has to be careful not to seem to want too much, too quickly in economic relations. Patience is key, and Canadians and other observers should have modest expectations about substantive outcomes. The visit is an important step, but managing relations is a process. The meeting in South Korea last year set the broad direction, this one will be about starting to negotiate on the details of trade and investment. But that has to be accompanied by guardrails and strict boundaries, given that the CCP and the Canadian government really have diametrically opposed interests in a whole range of areas. Deeper economic relations have to come with more robust defences against transnational repression, foreign interference, elite capture, espionage, weaponized interdependence, and other darker aspects of dealing with China. What do you think each side wants out of the meetings, and what can they get? Join the conversation! Link in the comments.

China has dramatically expanded its presence and influence across the Pacific Islands with the intent to strategically align the region more closely with its own interests, I argue in a new essay for @ForeignAffairs based on two years of research for @CrisisGroup. While China’s deepening involvement is expanding economic opportunities, its statecraft is also undermining Pacific nations’ democratic governance, accountability and national sovereignty, inducing corruption and elite capture, and roiling Pacific geopolitics. The Pacific Islands depend on foreign aid and see strategic rivalry between major powers as a means of attracting attention and resources. China is promoting itself as an alternative to traditional partners as it seeks to establish a regional sphere of maritime dominance, prevent Western rivals from deterring or constraining it, and burnish its credentials with developing countries. I think it’s part of a PRC island chain strategy that aims to dominate the first island chain, disrupt Western powers in the second, and eventually be able to divert and distract them in the third. The twelve sovereign Pacific Island countries and several territories are strategically important for global fisheries, maritime security and a stable Asia-Pacific balance of power. For Western powers, increased Chinese influence, strategic infrastructure and militarisation there could complicate intervention in potential conflicts over flashpoints such as the South China Sea and Taiwan, sap resources and put stress on alliances. To balance and constrain China’s expanding influence, Pacific Islands and their other partners should do more to implement the Pacific Islands Forum’s Boe Declaration, 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, and new Ocean of Peace Declaration, all of which reflect the Pacific consensus on priorities. Together, they should work to strengthen governance, transparency and regional cohesion, step up efforts to enhance expertise on China and national security, support independent media and civil society, and counter foreign propaganda and interference. Direct article link in the comments. Thanks to Joseph Widacki and Patricia Xavier for research assistance! #ChinaPacific #PacificIslands #BluePacific #OceanOfPeace #Oceania #CCP #IndoPacific #ChinaAustralia #ChinaNewZealand #ChinaUS #geopolitics #navy #SLOC #StrategicRivalry