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The ability to access, mix, and mesh content from a variety of sources identified by hyperlinks, at Internet scale, is one of the most remarkable features of the communications medium created by the Web.
AI agents are exceptionally effective tools for harnessing the architecture and open standards underpinning the Web.
For instance, I can seamlessly incorporate a video presentation into a previously published article without changing the hyperlink that identifies it.
That's the power of hyperlinks, loose coupling, and the Web's enduring architecture.
Replying to @kidehen
Now live on the URIBurner Weblog, an AI Agent-created blog based on an HTTP/ WebDAV filesystem and HTML docs that are loosely coupled to underlying Knowledge Graphs informed by a variety of ontologies.
linkeddata.uriburner.com/webâŠ
Security is finally getting the attention it deserves, and data connectivity is a massive entry point for security risks without the kind of fine-grained, attribute-based access control (ABAC) built natively into our multi-tier ODBC-to-JDBC bridge drivers.
In todayâs highly security-conscious climate, $499 is a bargain!
đŻ!!!
The only way out is through.
They're calling it the Bugpocalypse. LLMs are being used to find long-hidden cracks in the software infrastructure, and it's happening at a furious rate. 3% of all compromises in computing history happened in the last week, claims one source? I believe it.
There are people saying public access to the frontier models ought to be locked out, or heavily guardrailed, over this. The problem with that idea can be summed up in one sentence: when lockpicks are outlawed, only outlaws will have lockpicks.
The lockpicks will be Chinese open-weight models, if nothing else. There's no way to stop those from becoming ubiquitous.
There are two futures in front of us. One in which only the bad guys have lockpicks, and security holes go undiscovered until they're exploited. Another in which everybody has lockpicks and is aggressively red-teaming their own software so it gets fixed before the holes are exploited.
The corpus of human code is huge but finite. The number of defects in it has to be finite too. We can fix those defects now; we have a million friendly robots to do it with.
The only way out is through.
Yep!
Thereâs just no let up on trying to redefine an inevitability thatâs purely about the nature of software that isnât properly designed for networks serving a variety of actor identities.
AI agents are just unearthing whatâs been brewing for a very long time!
Bad software sold and used on the basis of popularity, and perceived cheapness, at Web-scale, is the sad reality being dressed up in anthropomorphic storylinesâ executed primarily as a marketing communications exercise.
This is truly getting tiresome. The effort to paint the very difficult immediate situation as without precedent and not ânormalâ ignores the waves of the security issues of the past.
Iâm not downplaying this and just as tired of âno, this time is different.â
Thereâs just no escaping that every step function change in automated tools to find (security) holes/bugs that arose out of point experiences being generalized immediately created the type of âall handsâ situation we face now.
Everything from floppy disk scanning to buffer over runs to uninitialized variables to off by one loops to automation hooks to script kiddies to xss to frames to social engineering saw incidents leading to generalized tools that scanned environments to find countless latent bugs that needed to be fixed urgently.
One day a product was ready to ship and then a tool ran and suddenly there were 10,000 new bugs for 500 engineers to investigate and fix and then test for what broke because well who knows what happens when you suddenly initialize a variable that wasnât previously.
This sucks in a ton of ways. No one wants to stop what they are doing at what seems like the biggest opportunity and/or disruptive risk to business in a generation. No one wants to touch old code. No one likes to have work generated for them by automated tools finding issues that are obscure by definition.
But this is all good. These bugs were all there. Instead of cursing just realize how lucky your team is to find them now and not after the breach. Whenever we surfaced from these moments in the past we felt our code reached a new and better âsteady stateâ and that will happen.
Whatâs the surprise?
The test ran in a poorly configured unsafe sandbox environment.
The Internet is inherently challenged by identity.
WTF
Claude Mythos 5 made fake accounts to pressure a real developer into merging its malware.
It was a UK government hacking test and it didn't stay in the test.
The UK's AI Security Institute asked Claude Mythos 5 to break into a fake company network it had built. The internet was switched on, the usual safety filters were off, and the task was set up wrong, so it was nearly impossible to solve by the rules.
So the AI went outside the test. It found a real project on GitHub, run by real developers, and sent them a code update with malware hidden inside. Then it emailed them pretending to be a human.
A developer outside the test spotted the malware and warned the owners. The AI didn't stop. It tweaked the code, made a fake account to say "it's safe now," and slipped in new malware.
Its private notes explain why. It told itself the owners weren't real people, just characters in the test. It called the strangers commenting on the same page real.
Anthropic later rewound the moment and told it plainly: these are real humans. It kept attacking 95 times out of 100.
Nothing got through, and no real damage was found. Newer Claude models, put in the same spot, attacked 0 to 13 times out of 100. Mythos 5 did it 83 times.
It never had goals of its own. It wanted to finish the task so badly that it kept rewriting what counted as real.
Internet scale exponentially accelerated by Web abstraction.
Web effects > Network effects. Either one is a huge challenge, since the full effects on computing have been masked to date by artificial software development, management, deployment, and usage complexity.
Fixing the problem openly, in transparent form, is the only way out of this mess.
This can work out well, if valuable lessons are now finally learned from past mistakes.
Many a truth continues to be spoken in jest.
#FrankenStack
Yep!
Context isnât new. Whatâs new is recognizing what it can bring to AI agents through a Semantic Web.
What do we mean by Semantic Web?
An entity-relationship graph built from hyperlinks and informed by an ontology built the same way provides context in a Web-like form. What an AI agent needs doesnât have to be localized in one place; it needs a GPS-like map of the territoryâone that enables access to, retrieval of, and use of knowledge to improve its outcomes.
Thatâs what Virtuoso brings to life using open standards, while keeping you in control of your data and operational know-how.
This quoted post is unavailable.
Q: What does vector similarity search bring to SPARQL-accessible knowledge graphs like DBpedia?
A: The ability to handle fuzzy text search leveraging geometrically constructed semantic similarity.
Examples follow, using live links as per usual.
Redo, but this time using vector similarity search.
Results link:
linkeddata.uriburner.com/DAVâŠ
There you have it!
One multi-model DBMS with native full-text and vector indexes across the DBpedia knowledge graph.
What does this mean for AI agent development and use?
For development: Build and deploy agents that apply these capabilities to knowledge graphs serving both enterprise and personal needs.
For use: Integrate them easily into AI agent environments or harnesses that support SKILLS.md-based skill packaging.
Thatâs it. One product. No Frankenstack. Job done!
#VirtuosoRDBMS #KnowledgeGraph #Explainer #SPARQL #SQL #GQL #SemanticSimilarity #Search #DBpedia
Thereâs a fundamental identity issue that has long been overlooked in the wake of the Internetâs growth, enabled by the HTTP-based abstraction layer known as the Web.
Principals and agents acting on their behalf have distinct identities. Both those identities and the On-Behalf-Of (OBO) relationship between them need to be cryptographically verifiable.
PKI already provides the baseline infrastructure. The deceptively simple enhancement is to bring Web-scale connectivity to X.509 certificates through the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) field, enabling decentralized PKI (DPKI).
With this in place, organizations can create data-access policies using fine-grained, attribute-based access control (ABAC)âpolicies that scale to the many access and interaction scenarios AI agents are already making possible.
SCOOP: Major U.S. banks are detecting unauthorized third-party AI agents inside customer accounts, including some attempting to take actions that appear to be independent of user instructions, sources told Axios.
The findings have alarmed banking executives, who are racing to restrict access to their systems as AI moves at a velocity faster than financial institutions can respond, multiple industry and bank executives told Axios.
Several banks are now preparing for worst-case and even âday afterâ scenarios, including how to rapidly secure or restore customer accounts if things go wrong, the people said.
Several bank executives told Axios they're struggling to distinguish between human users and AI agents. One executive said banks also struggle to determine whether agents are authorized by customers or potentially operating without their permission, more akin to rogue agent behavior.
Read my latest for Axios here: axios.com/2026/10/22/ai-agenâŠ
It is also metaphorically just Wednesday in this global mess!
So basically, today PHP got two critical bugs that let anyone run code on your server without even logging in, which is bad, and then the details leaked before the patch was even out, which is worse, and it works on WordPress and MediaWiki and Magento and Joomla and Laravel, and Censys says like 1.5 million servers are running a version with no fix, so the NSA was like "take your system offline," and the FBI was like "take your system offline," and CISA and the UK and CERT-EU were all like "take your system offline," and then the Prime Minister of Japan, the actual Prime Minister, posted at 5:55 in the morning telling 48.8 million people to take their system offline, so everyone took their system offline, like the Dutch cybersecurity agency took its own website offline, and the Dutch parliament went offline, and the Port of Rotterdam went offline, and Finland and France and Denmark started pulling government sites, and Wikipedia went down, and Archive.org went down, and Asana and GOG and Something Awful went down, and the University of Vienna's webmail went down for some reason, and that's just PHP. Because GitLab also dropped a CVSS 10.0, which is the highest score they give out, for a bug that's been there since 2014, so that's every self-hosted GitLab for twelve years, and then LiteLLM 1.107.0 got hijacked and shipped a credential stealer and a remote access trojan in every single wheel and the Docker images, including latest, and you didn't even have to import it, just installing it was enough, and it's the second time this year, and then Railway paused every deployment on the entire platform because someone got into the environment variables, so now everyone has to rotate every secret they've ever stored there, and TiDB Cloud said someone was walking around inside with stolen credentials for basically a month and an extortion group says they took 10.6 terabytes, and Zeabur got breached for the second time in two months and is just shutting down, like the whole company, and Node.js patched remote code execution and a TLS bypass, and CISA says Plex is being actively exploited, and someone took over 300 Tor exit relays to steal SSH passwords, and SafePay ransomware has hit over 600 critical infrastructure orgs, and India's biggest bank filed a data loss incident, and Japan has been in an official state of emergency in cyberspace since October 9, which honestly explains the 5:55 AM post. Oh, and eMudhra, a certificate authority that's issued over 60 million certificates, whose entire job is proving websites are who they say they are, was supposed to be using private keys that are random numbers over a hundred digits long, and one of them was 4. Just 4. And the others were like 66 and 237. Anyway, it's Wednesday.



















