Stefan retweeted
Under U.S. securities laws (specifically Regulation SHO and anti-fraud provisions like Rule 10b-21), naked short selling, also known as counterfeiting shares is illegal, regardless of the fundamental outlook, financial health, or future prospects of the target company.
So called experts can say whatever they want about Torchlight or the assets that MMTLP represented, but even if they are correct, it wouldn't justify illegally engaging in Market Manipulation.
When Torchlight was about to transition to a dividend placeholder representing Torchlight's assets, options were applied for and approved just two weeks before TRCH was to stop trading.
This options activity seemingly allowed for more manipulation, it provided a way to delay settlement of short positions, and it seemingly anticipated that a pathway would be created for the dividend to become tradeable, even though it went against the wishes of the issuer.
Fast forward to just before MMTLP was U3 halted.
It isn't FINRA's role to author the Corporate Action but they did, changing the dates that were made effective by the SEC.
Why is this so easily overlooked?
Then FINRA met with the DTCC without the issuer and revised the Corporate Action unilaterally.
FINRA eventually claimed that the U3 halt was due to the timing and structure of the Corporate Action that they themselves created.
So why didn't FINRA discover the issue during their two Rule 6490 review processes before the publication of each MMTLP Corporate Action?
It's because FINRA and the SEC knew there was a problem and the way FINRA planned their version of the Corporate Action and U3 halt allowed them to hide the imbalance which would've been obvious if brokerages were allowed to force liquidate short positions and conduct position close only transactions on December 9th and December 12th, 2022.
So look at image 1...
Why would it matter what a pumper or influencer said about trading MMTLP if the brokerages were communicating to clients that trading would occur on 12/9 & 12/12? It also says that New Buys wouldn't be allowed after 12/8 so these transactions were about reconciling obligations, not about people buying that wouldn't have settled positions on 12/12.
Image 2...
More evidence of what brokerages had planned based on the Corporate Actions that FINRA published.
FINRA knows that these messages were going to investors, giving them the impression that trading would occur up until 12/12, so why didn't FINRA provide clarity instead of just halting trading?
Image 3...
FINRA suspected the issuer of fraud/manipulation and initiated a blue sheet investigation on 12/5/22, one day before publishing the first MMTLP Corporate Action.
The problem here is that based on FINRA's Rule 6490 and common sense, how are you protecting investors by proceeding with the Corporate Action while simultaneously suspecting the issuers of fraud/manipulation?
Image 4 provides a clue!
The FIF which represents the broker-dealers that traded MMTLP, admitted to the SEC that FINRA's U3 halt prevented addressing MMTLP shares out on loan. This is what is referenced in images 1 & 2 concerning the Position Close Only trading and forced liquidations that would've occurred if FINRA didn't U3 halt trading.
Stefan retweeted
Greg McCabe, chairman and CEO of Next Bridge Hydrocarbons, breaks three and a half years of public silence on the extraordinary failures of U.S. market regulation and blatant corruption at FINRA and the SEC. McCabe describes unauthorized trading of company shares, massive naked short selling, and a devastating FINRA trading halt that froze assets of 124,000 shareholders. Despite receiving SEC approval for share registration after three years, short sellers have refused to settle. McCabe calls for transparency, accountability, and government intervention to protect retail investors.
00:00:00 The Tip of the Iceberg: How Naked Short Selling Is Destroying American Companies
00:01:13 David vs. Goliath: Greg McCabe's Fight Against Wall Street Corruption
00:03:45 The Unauthorized Trading Scandal: How MMT LP Was Created Without Permission
00:07:47 Short Attacks Explained: The Organized Destruction of American Businesses
00:15:35 Naked Short Selling: The Counterfeit Share Scheme Bigger Than GameStop
00:17:15 Finra's Smoking Gun: The Illegal U3 Halt That Froze 124,000 Investors
00:28:05 The Cover-Up: 13,000 Pages of Hidden Communications and Gary Gensler's Lies
00:41:21 One Billion Counterfeit Shares: The Share Count They Don't Want You to See
00:46:33 The SEC Obstruction: Three and a Half Years to Approve a Simple S-1
00:51:21 Broker Dealers Caught Counterfeiting Shares Instead of Settling Debts
01:01:17 Death Threats, Suicides, and Shattered Retirements: The Human Cost of Market Fraud
01:20:44 The Path to Justice: What Greg McCabe Wants from Trump, the SEC, and America
@GoingRoguewLara
Stefan retweeted
Breaking Silence: The MMTLP / NextBridge Saga with Lara Logan and NBH CEO Greg McCabe.
Join us!
Date & Time:
Tuesday, September 22nd at 6:00 PM EST
Co-Host:
@LaraLogan
Featured Speakers:
@nbhydrocarbons
@AnnVandersteel
@Beardvet
@bleedblue18
@JunkSavvy
@Notarighty12
teapawt.org/i/spaces/1nKOLQo…
Stefan retweeted
Next Bridge Hydrocarbons Provides Update on Continued Efforts to Engage Regulators
prnewswire.com/news-releases…
Stefan retweeted
Corruption/fraud in the stock market. Time for FINRA, the SEC, and the broker/dealer lobby (FIF) to be held to account for what they have done here. The MMTLP issue affects at least 65,000 investors, including veterans.
President Trump’s Administration has a letter for him to sign on the MMTLP issue that I and others have delivered.
The Hundreds of Veterans and Veteran Families deserve answers and accountability 👊🏼🇺🇸
@SusieWiles47 @ChrisLaCivita
Stefan retweeted
Filed a 55-page comment with the SEC today in File No. S7-2026-20 opposing the proposed rescission of Rules 611 and 610(e). Full math on this one.
The Commission quantifies the benefits of rescission down to the EXACT dollar ($54–77M/year in compliance savings) and leaves the costs to retail investors in prose. That... is the asymmetry the D.C. Circuit struck down in Business Roundtable v. SEC (2011).
So.... I built the OTHER side of the ledger. Using the Commission's OWN severity parameters and a Monte Carlo model (see images below) over the unknown exposure fraction, the model produces a BASE CASE of $664M per year in ANNUAL retail-to-wholesaler WEALTH TRANSFER, with a 90% interval of $390M to $1.58B.
The break-even is 11.6%: to justify rescission on its own numbers, the Commission must find, ON the record, that fewer than $1 in $9 of retail marketable order flow is actually price-sensitive to Rule 611. It has NEVER stated the number. Right?
There are twenty-one objections, now preserved for § 25(c)(1) purposes. My submission includes a reproducible wealth-transfer model and a firm-by-firm verified enforcement docket. Next 60 days should be interesting. #BlueLedger
Link to the filed version, comments from the experts and retail welcome. (cover email screenshot also below): dropbox.com/scl/fi/wd6o85rmm…
President Trump’s Administration has a letter for him to sign on the MMTLP issue that I and others have delivered.
The Hundreds of Veterans and Veteran Families deserve answers and accountability 👊🏼🇺🇸
@SusieWiles47 @ChrisLaCivita
Stefan retweeted
Next Bridge Hydrocarbons Announces SEC Declares Effective its S-1 Registration Statement
Company prices and commences a public offering of 40 million shares
prnewswire.com/news-releases…
Stefan retweeted
🚨Breaking news: 🦋
@Nasdaq just LOST its Motion to Quash.
Read that again s l o w l y . . .
The Bankruptcy Court in Nevada has now ordered Nasdaq to produce extensive $MMAT/TRCH trading data under Rule 2004, including RASH and CORE data, order attributes, cancellations, replaces, executions, and related transaction records covering nearly FOUR YEARS.
The Court was NOT persuaded by the ‘undue burden’ argument, noting that producing ~15GB of spreadsheet data is not exactly impossible for… Nasdaq. (One $10 usb stick)
Even more important, the Court explicitly recognized the Trustee’s AUTHORITY to investigate whether wrongdoing occurred on behalf of the estate, including potential claims tied to stock trading activity.
Translation:
This investigation is very much ALIVE.
For months, some people mocked and undermined the Trustee’s efforts, claimed discovery would never happen, and acted like every subpoena didn’t get served initially and that it would be crushed before daylight. Instead, the wall keeps cracking.
FINRA discovery.
Now Nasdaq discovery.
And the Court explicitly referenced separate pending motions involving Citadel, Virtu, and Anson.
Interesting times ahead.
Turns out Rule 2004 is not just a decorative suggestion.
To the Trustee and legal teams, incredible respect.
It takes courage to walk into rooms filled with institutions that have virtually unlimited resources and say:
‘Produce the data’
And to the echo chambers already warming up their spin machines tonight…
You may want to read the actual order first. 🤝
Blessings to all.
Stefan retweeted
⏰🔥Breaking News:
I recently learned that Mrs Samantha Martin, who led the investigative side of the @johnbrda +me SEC case, is NO LONGER with the SEC Fort Worth...
Mr Chris Rogers, who worked under that structure, is also NO LONGER there, they left within weeks from eachother.
When key SEC investigators leave, how is continuity of understanding preserved?
No accusations, just facts
What remains is a trial team holding a file,
working from a record built by people who aren’t in the room anymore.
I am not a lawyer but from what i am told, in complex cases, especially ones involving emerging high-technology and market structure integrity (they called it a novel case), the difference between reading the file and understanding the case is everything.
When institutional knowledge walks out the door,
what remains is interpretation.
And interpretation… is where things get interesting.
Stefan retweeted
What is our fearless CEO up to? Hmmmmmm…
I have my suspicions… But, we will save that for another day.
- Same director name ✅
- Same sole principal
on record ✅
- Same registered address ✅
- Same # of authorized shares ✅
If there’s anything we’ve learned in the #MMTLPfiasco, there are NO coincidences.😉
💥Bonus: FrostBridge, Inc. (FBI) LFGooooooo!!!
#MMTLParmy $MMTLP $MMAT #Relentless #FIF
Stefan retweeted
1/ Dear @SECPaulSAtkins and Commissioner @HesterPeirce @SECGov
Regarding your posts earlier today I think there are important questions arising especially in context with a related FSB report.
I will be discussing below the Operational Classification vs. Legal Classification of #MMTLP, specifically:
The divergence between LEGAL classification and OPERATIONAL handling of MMTLP, and how this mismatch may have contributed to:
1. supervisory fragmentation,
2. regulatory blind spots, and
3. OTC’s ultimate settlement failure.
Key Findings:
While MMTLP was publicly characterized as an OTC equity preferred security, evidence indicates that at least one major broker-dealer (@Fidelity) processed buy-side activity through a fixed income desk, suggesting a MATERIAL divergence between legal classification and operational treatment.
This divergence is NOT merely administrative, it has direct implications for:
1. supervisory responsibility
2. compliance rule application
3. surveillance coverage and
4. settlement risk management
MMTLP wasn’t just an “equity” security that went wrong, it became a cross-system instrument processed through equity, derivatives, and “fixed-income” infrastructure simultaneously, and that fragmentation created a supervisory and settlement blind spot that no single regulator or broker fully controlled, in my opinion.
The SEC seems to be saying, in effect, “15c2-11 is an OTC equity rule, let’s stop pretending it is a general quotation rule for every security”
BUT…
What I find even more interesting is Commissioner @HesterPeirce longer statement 2 hrs ago and this part:
“They highlighted that the 2020 rule amendments relied entirely on OTC equity data and did not even mention the term “fixed income” once. They noted that they were unaware of Rule 15c2-11 ever being applied to fixed income securities. And they warned that the application of the rule would gravely harm the fixed income market and investors, with no discernable reduction in fraud”
The keyword is “fixed income” #MMTLP
There is a more strategic interpretation in my opinion. More to follow, thank you Suzy!
sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-st…
Stefan retweeted
BREAKING… weather forecast for tomorrow:
it’s going to rain very hard. Stay inside, get some nice🥤 and buttery🍿 and watch the new blockbuster movie: “Silence of the 🦝” followed by the all time classic: “Apocalypse Now” #SunshineThroughTheFogOfWar #LFGB
Stefan retweeted
OPEN LETTER TO @SECGov INSPECTOR GENERAL
Subject: Request for Review, FOIA Processing Integrity, MMTLP-Related Requests, Outcome and Delay Disparities
Dear Inspector General,
I am writing to request that the Office of Inspector General review FOIA processing practices affecting requests related to MMTLP and the December 9, 2022 U3 trading halt.
Based on FOIA log analysis and request tracking compiled by the public and community requesters, a large proportion of MMTLP-related FOIAs experience extended delays and procedural parking states, including “Referral Request” and “On Hold,” with some requests remaining pending for more than a year and, in certain categories, with median pending times exceeding two years.
Separately, the updated SEC-wide vs MMTLP roll-up indicates a large outcome disparity, where MMTLP-tagged requests receive full or partial disclosure at a substantially lower rate than SEC-wide FOIAs, while B7 exemption outcomes are substantially more prevalent in MMTLP-tagged requests. These patterns, taken together, raise process-integrity concerns that delay can become functional denial, particularly when information is time-sensitive for oversight, bankruptcy proceedings, or public accountability.
I respectfully request an OIG review focused on:
1.Time-in-status controls: Median and maximum duration in “Referral Request,” “On Hold,” and “Perfected” statuses, and whether escalation triggers exist.
2.Bundling practices: Criteria for bundling, notice to requesters, opt-out availability, and measurable impact of bundling on timeliness and outcomes.
3.Outcome disparity: Comparison of disclosure outcomes and exemption usage between MMTLP-tagged and baseline SEC FOIAs, controlling for request scope and subject matter.
4.Transparency of extensions: Whether the SEC logs and reports extension counts and delay events per request ID, and whether the current system understates delay frequency.
For convenience, I can provide the supporting spreadsheets and PDFs, including top longest-pending and most-delayed request IDs and category-level pending-day statistics.
Thank you for your consideration. I am available to provide the supporting materials, methodology, and any additional context your office may require, you have all my contact information on file.
Sincerely,
George Palikaras
Stefan retweeted
PRESIDENT TRUMP
Demand the total of shares of #MMTLP
This will unravel the Gordian knot created by the SEC and FINRA who refuse to be transparent.
A real financial genius wouldn’t concentrate heavily in illiquid small-cap stocks that later collapsed.
Yet Jeffrey Epstein’s 2014 holdings were heavily concentrated in thinly traded microcap companies whose share prices later collapsed, reverse merged, were delisted, or became defunct, including Rainmaker Systems, Titan Energy Worldwide, ZaZa Energy, Transgenomic, Ziopharm Oncology, and ModusLink Global Solutions. Many of these price collapses occurred while trading was routed through FINRA-controlled market centers.
DOJ-released brokerage records show Epstein actively trading Torchlight Energy Resources (TRCH) in 2014, with the position appearing 67 times in his TD Ameritrade account.
TRCH later reverse merged with Meta Materials. As part of that transaction, TRCH shareholders received a Series A Preferred Dividend that was intended only to represent a future interest in oil and gas assets and was never designed or approved to trade.
Despite that, the dividend began trading publicly under the ticker MMTLP, routed through FINRA-controlled venues, before being halted and deleted without a mandatory close-out, trapping 65,000 plus investors in a security that should never have been tradable.
Epstein’s TD Ameritrade statements were mailed to his U.S. Virgin Islands address, while the trades executed in U.S. markets, raising obvious compliance and AML questions.
The Epstein files themselves reference active trading on the Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board (OTCBB) and include FINRA-related OTC market complaints. The same FINRA-operated OTC infrastructure appears repeatedly in the trading histories of companies whose share prices later collapsed.
If Epstein was a financial genius, why did his documented investments align so closely with companies that collapsed through FINRA-operated OTC markets, and why do those same venues appear inside the Epstein files themselves?
Stefan retweeted
Imagine if a crypto coin was the best kind of marketing for an actual brand , new meta???
One Team 🚀
x.ai/news/xai-joins-spacex
Stefan retweeted
Replying to @kshaughnessy2
Thank you Kristen. We have been running a deep AI dive on $BESS market infrastructure presence...
So far, what I can say is our initial analysis shows at least 92 associated securities with unique identifiers, with 80% are UNLISTED and mostly in America...
(happy to share the list below image is about 1/3 for your information), confirming that these securities were deliberately created and maintained within market infrastructure systems.
However, there is extreme proliferation at the FIGI Composite level, with dozens of structurally distinct instruments referencing the same underlying economic security.
Many of these instruments do not participate in public price discovery, yet persist across jurisdictional and custodial systems, creating ambiguity around true exposure, settlement pathways, and disclosure obligations...
Given the "innocent" CUSIP recycling error in 2023-2024 by one of its shareholder and then separately by the company, that their leadership made we will be closely following this.
This is not financial advice. If I was a $BESS shareholder or $MMTLP participant (looking for some assurances that the two are not associated any more), I would submit some FOIA-style questions about the listed vs unlisted instruments, DTCC eligibility, margin treatment, lifecycle events, and who created or maintained the security master records.
Below is an example structure (for entertainment purposes), whether you’re sending to the SEC, FINRA, or (if applicable) any agency holding market-surveillance records.
Request scope (keep it narrow and mechanical):
example Timeframe: January 1, 2020 to present
example Subject: Security master, identifier creation, and instrument classification for $BESS-related issuer identifiers (list your issuer legal names and tickers)
exam[le Data types: CUSIP, FIGI, Exchange Code, Composite FIGI mapping, eligibility flags, lifecycle status, and associated correspondence
Format request:
“Produce in machine-readable format, including native exports where available, with all metadata fields.”
example Deconfliction request:
“If any portion is deemed overbroad, produce responsive records for the most recent 12 months first, and identify the additional custodians and repositories needed for the remaining period.”
example Expedited processing (optional, if you can justify for example due to the NYSE pending listing, etc):
“This request concerns potential systemic market integrity issues and public confidence, including inconsistencies in security master records and instrument classification that may affect investors.”
2. example FOIA-style questions that may offer useful information or not:
A. Identifier creation and provenance (who created what, when, and why)
For each security object tied to the issuer(s), produce a table containing:
-Identifier type (CUSIP, FIGI, etc.)
-Identifier value
-Security name
-Market / exchange code
-Share class / instrument type
-Date created
-Date modified
-Current status (active, inactive, cancelled)
-Reason code or free-text reason for creation, if maintained
Produce records showing who requested, approved, or initiated creation of each identifier or security master entry, including:
-Request tickets, emails, or internal forms
-System logs indicating user, department, or vendor source
Produce any security master change logs reflecting:
-Renames
-Reclassifications (listed to OTC, equity to other)
-Exchange code changes
-Corporate action mappings
B. FIGI Composite proliferation (why dozens map to the same economic security)
For each FIGI Composite associated with the issuer(s), produce:
-The list of all instrument-level FIGIs mapping to that composite
-The mapping rationale and rules used (documentation or runbook)
-Any flags indicating “primary listing,” “secondary listing,” “OTC,” “reference-only,” or similar
Produce any internal analyses, exception reports, or QA audits referencing:
“composite mapping anomalies”
“duplicate economic exposure”
“multiple instruments per composite”
“orphan FIGIs” or “stale instruments”
C. DTCC / NSCC / DTC eligibility (settlement plumbing)
For each identifier or instrument tied to the issuer(s), produce any fields indicating:
-DTC eligibility
-NSCC eligibility
-CNS eligibility
Any settlement restrictions or chills
Dates eligibility was granted, modified, or removed
The basis for eligibility status
Produce communications between the agency and any of the following regarding eligibility, settlement status, or instrument classification:
-DTCC
-DTC
-NSCC
(If they claim exemption, ask for an index of withheld items.)
D. OTC, grey market, and “non-price-discovery” status
Produce a list of all instruments tied to issuer(s) that were designated:
-OTC
-Grey market
“unlisted”
“reference-only”
“non-tradable”
“when-issued”
“restricted”
including the designation date and basis.
Produce any policy guidance, internal memos, or surveillance references defining how the agency classifies:
“exchange code present but not exchange-traded”
“reference venues”
“internal market codes”
and how those affect reporting and surveillance.
E. Margin, collateral, and netting treatment (where risk hides)
Produce any records showing whether any issuer-tied instruments were:
-Margin-eligible
-Collateral-eligible
-Eligible for netting sets or offsets
-Subject to special haircuts
Produce any communications or surveillance notes where margin, collateral, or netting concerns were raised due to:
-multiple instruments referencing the same underlying security
-unclear float / unclear exposure
-settlement fails or persistent fails
F. Lifecycle cleanup and corporate actions (did anyone ever close the loop)
Produce corporate action mapping records for the issuer(s), including:
-splits, mergers, name changes, cusip changes
-symbol changes
-cancellations / retirements / conversions
and all impacted identifiers.
Produce any exception logs where a corporate action could not be cleanly processed because:
-security master mismatch
-multiple identifiers for the same economic security
-cross-border share class conflicts
G. Cross-border anomalies (foreign ordinary share tied to U.S. issuer)
Produce records identifying any instruments tied to the issuer(s) that were classified as:
-foreign ordinary shares
-ADRs/GDRs
-depositary receipts
-offshore lines
including the rationale for classification.
Produce any communications discussing why a U.S.-centric issuer had a foreign ordinary share instrument in the security master.
H. Surveillance and internal flags (did the system itself complain)
Produce any surveillance alerts, internal flags, or exception reports referencing:
-abnormal number of identifiers for an issuer
-instrument proliferation
-inconsistent share class definitions
-exchange code inconsistency
-stale or orphaned instruments
Produce any internal discussions where personnel debated whether the inconsistency impaired:
-market surveillance
-consolidated audit trail correlation
-blue sheet reconstruction
-short interest computation
-fails-to-deliver analysis
I. Vendor and data-source responsibility (who fed the machine)
Identify the data sources used for security master ingestion for these issuer(s), including:
-vendor names
-internal feeds
-update frequency
-change-control governance
Produce contracts, SLAs, or governance documents (or excerpts) defining:
-responsibility for error correction
-time-to-correct requirements
-audit frequency for security master accuracy
(If contracts are exempt, request the policy/guidance documents and any QA audit summaries.)
in recent FOIAs we have observed how agencies love to block broad requests. The key would be to ask for structured exports and specific logs.
For example, i would use a tiered approach:
-Tier 1 (hard to deny, cheap to produce)
-The security master tables / exports for specific issuer(s)
-Change logs
-Composite mapping list
Tier 2 (if they push back) then i would:
Limit to “the 6 FIGI Composites identified”
Limit to “top 2 composites by instrument count”
Limit to “most recent 12 months”
Tier 3 (correspondence) i would seek:
Only emails/tickets containing:
“FIGI Composite”
“security master”
“CUSIP change”
“orphan”
“reference-only”
“grey market”
“eligibility”
“fails”
“CNS”
4. A short paragraph i would include in my FOIA would go something like this:
This request seeks objective security master and identifier governance records, including creation, modification, classification, eligibility, and lifecycle status fields, as well as mapping records between instrument-level identifiers and composite identifiers. These records should be maintained in structured databases and logs and can be produced as exports without discretionary narrative. If any portion is withheld, please provide a Vaughn-style index describing each withheld item, its date range, custodian, repository, and asserted exemption.































