Flow Foundation Statement on Exchange Coordination Following December 27th Exploit: Since the December 27th exploit, the Flow Foundation and our forensic partners have worked around the clock with global exchanges to protect users and restore normal operations. Kraken, Coinbase, and Upbit have been exceptional partners, with Kraken already resuming regular services. We are concerned by one exchange's handling of this incident. Within hours of the exploit, a single account deposited 150M $FLOW, approximately 10% of total token supply, converted a substantial portion to BTC, and withdrew over $5M within the span of a few hours before the network was halted. This transaction pattern represents an AML/KYC failure that transferred financial risk to users who unknowingly purchased fraudulent tokens. Forensic analysts have identified significant trading irregularities inconsistent with normal market activity on this exchange's $FLOW markets both before and after the network halt. Our requests for clarification about these trading patterns through operational channels have gone unanswered. We urgently call for a meeting at the highest levels of decision-making to address these concerns and identify a path forward that protects users across all platforms. We believe this situation can be resolved constructively, but it requires transparent engagement. Flow Foundation is fully cooperating with law enforcement and ongoing investigations. We remain committed to protecting every user affected by this exploit, regardless of which platform they use.

We’ve identified a security incident affecting Trust Wallet Browser Extension version 2.68 only. Users with Browser Extension 2.68 should disable and upgrade to 2.69. Please refer to the official Chrome Webstore link here: chrome.google.com/webstore/d… Please note: Mobile-only users and all other browser extension versions are not impacted. We understand how concerning this is and our team is actively working on the issue. We’ll keep sharing updates as soon as possible.

A victim (0xcB80) lost $50M due to a copy-paste address mistake. Before transferring 50M $USDT, the victim sent 50 $USDT as a test to his own address 0xbaf4b1aF...B6495F8b5. The scammer immediately spoofed a wallet with the same first and last 4 characters and performed an address poisoning attack. Since many wallets hide the middle part of the address with "..." to make the UI look better. Many users often copy the address from transaction histories, and usually only check the starting and ending letters. This victim likes to do the same. When transferring the remaining 49,999,950 $USDT, the victim copied the fake address from his transaction history. As a result, 49,999,950 $USDT was sent straight to the scammer. A painful lesson! Always double-check the address before making a transfer. Don't copy addresses from your transaction history for convenience. Source: xitter.cf/SpecterAnalyst/status/…

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