I've noticed that most (if not all) MCP (Model Context Protocol) servers written in TypeScript/JavaScript using `npx` as the JavaScript engine. That's... a lot of trust. `npx` gives full access to local system resources, unrestricted network calls, and environment variables--which feels like leaving all your doors and windows open because it's convenient. A far more secure default would be Deno (@deno_land), which flips the model: 🚫 No access to file system, network, or env by default ✅ You explicitly opt-in via flags like `--allow-read=/home/temp` or `--allow-net=api.example.com` This kind of permission model drastically reduces the attack surface--especially critical in the context of tool poisoning attacks (invariantlabs.ai/blog/mcp-se…), or just the general risk of a locally running server going rogue. With Deno, developers can allow access only when it makes sense for that tool to do its job. Of course, Docker can achieve similar objective--but network restrictions aren't nearly as straightforward to configure. WebAssembly is another promising option, but very few servers target it today. Given Deno's "no trust by default" approach, I'm surprised that it isn't the go-to choice.