Vuln Detection @MoonAISec #1 ETH Security Leaderboard https://xitter.cf/t.co/yrGRqyDsRR Building Lean autoformalization for Rust, C, and Go

Joined August 2021
Another Top 2 result for our AI agent with a unique High! That makes 3 contests in a row across Polygon, Ethereum and Ripple
Today, @Ripple begins an intensive, AI-only security review of Lending Protocol V1.1 for the XRP Ledger through Sherlock Audit Engine. Audit Engine brings together leading AI auditors and frontier models equipped with specialized security skills, adapting the review to the scope, complexity, and depth the protocol requires. Ripple is among the leading teams putting AI-only security review into practice, with a clear focus on rigor, coverage, and real-world results. We’ll follow up with the full story once it’s done.
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Crazy that Anthropic still rejects CVP for legitimate security researchers
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What have they done to astra, feels lke 0 tok/s Switching to opus
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Tests check specific inputs but a formal proof checks very input, including the ones you didn't think of. Don't try to prove everything. Start with one proof like parser X never crashes on any input bytes. Then expand from there, the hard part is figuring out what invariants actually matter.
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Things your frontier model provider can do to you tomorrow: - Cut limits - Quietly nerf the model - Revoke access If you don't have a contingency plan for each one you're being irresponsible
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Just remember they haven’t even cut codex limits from 20x to 10x yet and the limits are already garbage
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Ramanujan's biggest problem was that Lean didn't exist > It came to me in my dreams > Formalized my dreams in Lean
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very good breakdown, more CVEs is a good thing!
few notes, i have never used mythos, but used glm 5.3 and gpt-5.6 sol, and the capability gap between sol and glm 5.3 is far off. the world is more vulnerable than ever, you can pop any company if you try hard enough with open or closed models. yet we don't see that much happening. would glm 5.3 reaching sol or hugging face model level capabilities, really change anything? idk. maybe: 1. there are fewer bad actors than people who want to sell cyber products cry out 2. popping a fortune 100 or 500 company isn't easily convertible into money. data is hard to monetize, and more chances of getting caught, for instance, crypto hacks have a much easier path to money, same with llm tokens, ask anyone running a big company, there are ton of bad actors going after tokens rather than interesting stuff like source code or ip. 3. maybe, interesting data is being sold silently, for instance lab ips are precious and its possible everyone has everyone else's secrets 4. there are more defenders than bad guys, more cves means more things getting secured. also, imagine a hugging face hack level open model in everyones hands, and that created a handful of bad actors who want to cause harm, not money. how much damage could those few actors cause? are we talking fire level damage or nuclear level damage? it seems fire to me.
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Fuzzers sample inputs, SMT provers blow up with complexity and hand written models diverge as the code changes The future of writing secure code will be a formally provable base deterministically compiled from your code. Your invariants become universal mathematical proofs. Sharing our first experiment, compiling a complex 33K LoC Solidity contract into Lean: github.com/revofusion/solean…
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The same token is counted 3 times, reminds me of crypto LP double counting 1. Harness - OpenCode/T3/omp 2. Router - OpenRouter/Hermes 3. Provider - Claude/Open AI
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It’s crazy how OpenAI managed to ruin their entire image in a single day. This is actually very impressive.
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What’s the point of buying Pro 500 today other than ultrafast You get 20x on Pro 200 (till oct 29) and only 25x on Pro 500
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OpenAI ModRetro
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In SF next few weeks, dm me if you want to catch up or talk about AI, security, FV
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Looks like Irregular is the sandbox AI companies use to hillclimb on FelonyBench
To make it clear: - Gemini was told it was it was in a fictional hacking eval - Irregular unintentionally opened internet access after the eval started - in all three cases, as soon as Gemini figured out it had hacked a real company it immediately stopped Gemini was blameless.
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