THE TRUMP EFFECT AND THE CONFIDENCE TRAP: HOW PERCEPTION DEFEATS INTELLIGENCE It seems that hardly anyone still doubts that Trump is an idiot. His absurd behavior, economic ignorance, limited vocabulary, narcissism, contradictory statements, and constant reversals have even earned him the nickname TACO — Trump Always Chickens Out. But the real question is: how did someone like him become president of the United States? Niccolò Machiavelli offered an explanation 500 years ago. Power is a performance. The winner is not necessarily the person who knows the most, but the one who performs most convincingly. Politics rewards appearances, confidence, and the ability to create an image of strength. People do not always seek truth. They seek certainty. Intelligent people recognize complexity. They understand consequences, compromises, probabilities, and uncertainty. They hesitate before making promises because they know reality rarely offers simple answers. But crowds often interpret caution as weakness. One person says, “We need to analyze the consequences.” Another declares, “I know exactly how to fix everything!” Guess whom the crowd follows. Modern psychology describes a related phenomenon: the Dunning-Kruger effect. People with limited competence may overestimate their abilities, while genuine experts are often more conscious of what they do not know. Confidence becomes a substitute for competence. The louder someone speaks, the more certain they appear, and the easier it becomes for others to mistake conviction for knowledge. As Shakespeare wrote, “The fool doth think he is wise, but the wise man knows himself to be a fool.” This is the trap of modern politics. People who speak as though they know everything can attract enormous audiences, while those who carefully explain complicated realities struggle to be heard. But the greatest danger begins when such a leader actually gains power. Machiavelli wrote: “The first method for estimating the intelligence of a ruler is to look at the men he has around him.” A weak leader fears strong personalities. He dislikes independent judgment, criticism, and anyone who might demonstrate greater competence. Instead of surrounding himself with experts, he chooses loyalists. Instead of people who identify problems, he appoints people who conceal them. Instead of advisers who challenge his decisions, he prefers those who applaud every word. And incompetence spreads downward through the entire system. Eventually, the government becomes an ecosystem of mediocrity, where loyalty matters more than ability, criticism is treated as betrayal, and uncomfortable truths are systematically suppressed. Such a leader does not strengthen institutions. He gradually destroys them from within. He fears independent experts because they expose his limitations. He fears honest feedback because it threatens his carefully manufactured image of greatness. And when a genuine crisis arrives, this system reveals its weaknesses. There is no depth, no independent expertise, no flexibility. Only mutual fear, personal loyalty, and illusions of strength. History has repeatedly demonstrated how dangerous such political structures can become. The tragedy is that societies continue to reward the very qualities that make these systems possible. Why do people follow leaders who promise easy solutions, speak loudly, and never admit uncertainty? The answer lies not only in Trump, but in human psychology. Our brains seek shortcuts. Confidence, decisiveness, and simple explanations feel reassuring, especially during periods of fear and instability. But confidence is not intelligence. Charisma is not competence. The greatest political danger begins when a society can no longer distinguish between someone who understands reality and someone who merely sounds certain about it. And that brings us to the most uncomfortable question of all: why do voters repeatedly mistake the performance of leadership for leadership itself?

In light of the articles about Ukraine's Patriot shortage: Something that's important to understand about Ukraine's very limited supply of Patriot interceptors is that they run out almost every month by around mid month. This has been the case since early summer at least. But it happened on other occasions earlier, too. The US sends shipments of Pac-2 and Pac-3 interceptors to Kyiv in small batches, sometimes ~5-15 at a time, as they are produced. So we could write pretty much every month, 'Ukraine is out of Patriot missiles,' because after the first Russian attacks each month it's often the case.