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🇹🇭 SCRL - Blockchain & Web3 Smart Contract Audit Firm, KYC, Investigation, Request: https://teapawt.org/t.co/HRL2gKks9J More than 65+ quality audit report

Thailand
Joined June 2018
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🚨 Launching a Web3 project? You need real cybersecurity experts. 🛡️ Smart Contract Audits 🧾 KYC for Projects 🕵️‍♂️ Blockchain Incident Investigations ✅ Affordable / Reasonable pricing ✅ Proven cybersecurity expertise #BNB #Ethereum #BaseChain #EVM #Solana
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SCRL retweeted
Indian law enforcement froze $3M from an innocent Chinese investor after mistaking a crypto bridge for a pig butchering scam. Now an Indian court has ordered Gate to hand his funds to a person they never belonged to. My analysis of how Indian LE traced through an unlabeled service and wrongly froze @xxxkeym's Gate account: The case stems from a pig butchering victim who allegedly lost $1.7M of BTC, USDT, DOGE & SOL in May 2025. Andhra Pradesh CID registered it as Cr. No. 10/2025 and filed a charge sheet in March 2026. In July 2025, xxxkeym had Gate deposit address 17mpajZ6Nq3dG3T6wUhaXxYF4Qy9HJnYx5 frozen after depositing 15 BTC from 3NcBhqK in the following transaction: 885f3afab562251b222363cf12095e864ddb94636674b01f0cdb05997e5a54a0 This is one transaction Indian LE cites in its notice. 3NcBhqK was funded by xxxkeym's own OKX & Binance withdrawals in Jan 2023 and the coins sat dormant for years until the Gate deposit. Indian LE never froze his OKX or Binance accounts, the actual source of the 15 BTC, which tells you how flawed their justification is. Gate froze his entire account, which held roughly $3M at the time and about $1.5M today. The Indian court order hands all of it to the complainant. Gate deposit address 17mpajZ also received two deposits for 15 BTC total in 2025 from bc1pkkwqyxn3rm608ryuqg9hyqna0syq4jx5pxkr7pzg8n3usx6tyqfst5u966, which is also controlled by xxxkeym. Shortly before the deposits to Gate, bc1pkkw was funded in three transactions by bc1quzwkggdf6ly06mrrnnled0qdr57w770k45n5n7 & bc1qtu66zfqxj6pam6e0zunwnggh87f5pjr7vdr5cd. bc1quzw & bc1qtu66z were reported as alibarbit[.]bit, the same scam named in Indian LE's press release. That was a mistake. Both belong to the Merlin Chain bridge, which is unlabeled in most compliance tools. xxxkeym is simply a normal Merlin user trading tokens on the L2. This wrong label is the only place the scam touches his transaction history. Below is the blockchain data showing each Merlin withdrawal by xxxkeym matched to a BTC payout from those addresses, plus screenshots of the bridge activity. xxxkeym bridged 50 BTC into Merlin on March 28, 2024, over a year before the alleged May 2025 theft. His three withdrawals came out of that balance. I found zero onchain connections between xxxkeym and the theft. Separately on July 15, 2025 xxxkeym had a 7 BTC private key compromise theft which was reported to local police and also SlowMist was engaged. His stolen funds flowed to Wasabi. This is embarrassing incompetence by Indian LE, who seem incapable of reviewing basic blockchain data. Indian LE, the prosecutor and the judge all signed off on this, Gate froze the account, and LE did a full press release about it recently, while the real victim here (the Gate user) hasn't had access to his funds for nearly 16 months. My hot take is VASPs need to challenge weak jurisdictions like India, Canada, etc due to repeated negligence in criminal cases. Merlin source transactions from xxxkeym 10.1368 BTC - March 25, 2025 0x975081c2a62355019561c3ec0d01c72bf0dadf7121d46764bbb13ac0013a9a06 4.9071 BTC - May 6, 2025 0xa30f7b770e2e8e2e2d0fc0d390aa800e7f880e8e129d1b705dbc4167fc878769 9.9796 BTC - June 17, 2025 0x147429d324520c9ebee8015b0214dbd7bdce97ee37ad25e11819f4b04aecc049 Bitcoin destination transactions to xxxkeym 10.1367 BTC - March 28, 2025 55ab5373c2daa69b1728e6551b59f9dc661d1d78786face798d5251ccbe4685a 4.907 BTC - May 9, 2025 b2222fe38856e65420f15051a4cc419a92868803dec69a218f007948972ea367 9.9795 BTC - June 19, 2025 094f01388638523fb29aac0a0d4f70adf6949fede0847a45cef2c3f930692c73 Merlin Chain bridge bc1quzwkggdf6ly06mrrnnled0qdr57w770k45n5n7 bc1qtu66zfqxj6pam6e0zunwnggh87f5pjr7vdr5cd Gate deposit address - xxxkeym 17mpajZ6Nq3dG3T6wUhaXxYF4Qy9HJnYx5 Other addresses - xxxkeym 3NcBhqKnyo8dfzqfG1p5rbaKJFV8yLnx3u bc1pkkwqyxn3rm608ryuqg9hyqna0syq4jx5pxkr7pzg8n3usx6tyqfst5u966 0x59fd8E3aEca4FAbb53ef6078D2319Dc174fb66a6 July 15, 2025 BTC theft addresses bc1qjmf2e4fc2r97rq762055ag3g9uhypavta0payq bc1q80gq7ctfsm6p9h9jh2k45da87jy6s7a87pj3h0 March 28, 2024 50 M-BTC destination transaction to xxxkeym 0xf1ee67ba1d3f97fb2d4776fa8ffc90f0b7ba7d116de3bf510a2c6aeae7d80def
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The FBI is releasing information advising the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) was responsible for the theft of more than $6 billion USD in virtual assets from cryptocurrency exchange, Binance, on or about October 29, 2026. The FBI refers to this specific North Korean malicious cyber activity as "TraderTraitor." The FBI, together with partners at the USSS and IRS-CI, has observed TraderTraitor actors converting stolen assets primarily into Ethereum (ETH). It is expected these assets will then be further laundered by converting them using DeFi and instant swap services as they prepare them for further laundering stages. How You Can Help: FBI, USSS, and IRS-CI are urging private sector entities including THORNode operators, RPC node operators, instant exchanges, DeFi services, blockchain analytics firms, and other virtual asset service providers to block transactions with or derived from addresses TraderTraitor actors are using to launder these stolen assets. A list of addresses associated with this activity is available here: fbi.gov/investigate/cyber/al…
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🚨 UPDATE: North Korea’s TraderTraitor group, tied to the $388M Bitget exploit, is likely also behind the $6.3B Binance hack, says ZachXBT. Stolen funds from both landed at one address.
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SCRL retweeted
Binance's initial investigation suggests that the security incident may involve a compromised DevOps engineer’s laptop, which allowed an attacker to gain access to a service container and submit unauthorized withdrawal transactions. We have found no evidence of any wallet private key leak. We will share a detailed technical post-mortem once the investigation is complete and the facts are fully verified. The estimated total impact sits at around $6.3B. We have worked with blockchain partners to freeze affected assets, with ~$3 billion frozen on-chain so far. Binance will cover all losses from the SAFU fund and the company’s funds. User funds are safe. We will also publish an updated Proof of Reserves once the remediation is complete. As an immediate precaution, Binance has: - temporarily suspended deposits and withdrawals while security checks are completed; - revoked the affected address authorisation; - engaged law enforcement and blockchain intelligence partners to trace and recover funds. Our teams are working around the clock to resolve this issue safely and thoroughly. We are working closely with our law enforcement partners to confirm the identity of these criminals and bring them to justice. Please rely only on official Binance channels for updates. Please feel free to contact Binance Customer Support if you have any further questions. binance.com/en/support/annou…
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‼️ UPDATE ON THE BINANCE HACK: Whoever emptied a Binance hot wallet had 50 authorisations signed with that wallet's own private key, on-chain data shows. Under Ethereum's EIP-7702, an authorisation is a signed permission that lets a wallet hand control of itself to code. Each one works only for the wallet's next transaction number, its nonce. Binance's wallet was still sending transactions, so that number kept moving. The sender didn't know which number would be live, so they packed all 50 into one transaction, Blockaid says. One matched. That one installed a sweeper contract on the wallet. Blockaid found that only the Tornado Cash-funded sender can operate it. Minutes later it emptied the wallet of $1.6B in USDT, 167,464 ETH and 60+ other tokens. Only that key, or the system that holds it, can produce those signatures. How the sender got them is unknown. Across Ethereum, Bitcoin and Tron, at least $5.57B left Binance-linked wallets. Binance says user funds are "completely safe" but has not explained how.
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SCRL retweeted
We are aware of differing figures circulating publicly regarding the amount frozen, including references to $1.8 billion. For clarity, the current verified total frozen is $2.54 billion. This figure may continue to increase as our teams work closely with law enforcement, issuers, blockchain intelligence firms and industry partners to trace and freeze additional assets. We will only share confirmed figures and will provide further updates as more verified information becomes available.
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SCRL retweeted
Our teams are aware of reports of a potential security issue and are actively investigating. User funds are completely safe. Our security teams are reviewing all relevant information with urgency, and we will provide updates through official Binance channels as soon as we have verified information. Users should remain cautious of scams and should not trust unofficial links, messages, or requests for account information.
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Effective Immediately, all organizations using PHP for their systems are advised to be prepared for an update addressing two critical vulnerabilities. PHP is widely used for web applications. These vulnerabilities often provide a direct path to the server's file system or database. If an immediate update is not feasible, it is recommend that organizations take the system offline until it can be fully mitigated. NSA will follow up shortly with more specific guidance.
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Beware of a ledger supply chain attack. It seems like a cellular module and some critical screen reader components have been added if you buy it in SEA, such as in Malaysia. Please avoid using it.
My spy-implanted ledger came from Malaysia, and had flawless shrink wrap. Even opening it, at first you don't see the implant which is cleverly hidden where the screen's padding is supposed to be. Follow Ledger's guidance to check yours: support.ledger.com/article/4…
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Ledger is investigating reports of loss of funds from users in South East Asia who purchased products from a reseller named CryptoBillis. As a precaution, and pending the results of our investigation, we have asked CryptoBilis to pause all sales and shipments of Ledger devices. We recommend Ledger users who purchased from this reseller in the last 90 days to not initiate set up if you have not done so yet. If you have set up your Ledger device, consider moving assets to a new Ledger signer (with new seed). We will continue to inform customers of updates as the investigation progresses. Reach out to Ledger customer support through official channels with any questions: support.ledger.com/
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Announcement: Scheduled Website Maintenance Our website may be temporarily unavailable. or encountered an error while accessing the website. We apologize for the inconvenience.🙇‍♂️ You can still contact us at [email protected] TG: t.me/scrl_io
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🚨 BREAKING: cPanel and WHM, the control panels behind an estimated 70+ million websites, have a critical security flaw that lets anyone become root admin without a password. CVE-2026-41940 affects every supported version. It’s already being exploited in the wild. watchTowr Labs published the full attack today, after the hosting company KnownHost confirmed the bug was already being used to break into a significant chunk of the internet. If you've never heard of cPanel: it's the dashboard that hosting providers and millions of website owners use to manage their servers, domains, email accounts, databases, and SSL certificates. WHM is the admin version that controls the entire server. If someone gets root access to WHM, they get the keys to the kingdom and to every apartment inside it. How the attack works, in plain English: 🔴 Step 1: The attacker sends a deliberately wrong login. cPanel still creates a temporary "you tried to log in" record on disk and gives the attacker a cookie tied to it. 🔴 Step 2: The attacker tweaks the cookie to disable cPanel's password encryption. Normally cPanel encrypts the password field on disk. With one small change to the cookie, cPanel just stores it as plain text instead. 🔴 Step 3: The attacker sends a fake login attempt where the password field secretly contains hidden line breaks. cPanel does not strip these line breaks out, so they get written straight to the session file. Each line break creates a brand new fake record. The attacker uses this to inject lines that say "this user is root" and "this user already authenticated successfully." 🔴 Step 4: The attacker visits one more random page on the site to nudge cPanel into re-reading the file. cPanel then promotes the injected fake lines into its main session memory. 🔴 Step 5: On the next request, cPanel sees a flag that says "this user already passed the password check." cPanel trusts that flag, skips checking the actual password, and lets the attacker in as root. From start to finish, the attack takes a handful of HTTP requests. If you run cPanel or WHM, the patched versions are: 🔴 cPanel/WHM 110.0.x → 11.110.0.97 🔴 cPanel/WHM 118.0.x → 11.118.0.63 🔴 cPanel/WHM 126.0.x → 11.126.0.54 🔴 cPanel/WHM 132.0.x → 11.132.0.29 🔴 cPanel/WHM 134.0.x → 11.134.0.20 🔴 cPanel/WHM 136.0.x → 11.136.0.5 If your version is older than these, assume someone has already broken in and act accordingly. Patch right now, then rotate every password and key the server touched: root passwords, API tokens, SSL private keys, SSH keys, mail passwords, and database passwords.
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The Rhea team would like to provide an update regarding the recent exploit. Since identifying the situation approximately 10 hours ago, we have been focused on safeguarding users and coordinating recovery efforts across all fronts.
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OpenZeppelin Move Contracts are now live on @SuiNetwork 💧 The same library securing over $35 trillion in onchain value and trusted by the industry's most critical protocols is now purpose-built for Sui. Here's what's in the first release 👇
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Announcement: Scheduled Website Maintenance Our website may be temporarily unavailable. or encountered an error while accessing the website. We apologize for the inconvenience.🙇‍♂️ You can still contact us at [email protected] TG: t.me/scrl_io
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Update: Website maintenance has been completed. You can now access our website as normal. We apologize for any inconvenience. The reason for the extended maintenance period was that we upgraded our server to expand our service capacity.
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Update: the balancer hacker has added console logs onchain. there is also a good probability that the hackers vibe coded the attack or used LLMs. Here's why I think that: >hackers usually never leave console.log in production code. >when console.log does appear on-chain, it’s almost always a mistake. >a mistake like that only happens if the coder forgot to delete debug lines. >forgetting to delete debug lines = copy-pasted straight from an LLM. >LLMs love to add console.log("Step 1") to “help you follow”. >So when the log says garbage like Done with amts1, it’s mostly AI slop.
Here's everything you need to know about the Balancer Hack: 1. The attack targeted Balancer's V2 vaults and liquidity pools, exploiting a vulnerability in smart contract interactions. Preliminary analysis from on-chain investigators points to a maliciously deployed contract that manipulated Vault calls during pool initialization. 2. Improper authorization and callback handling allowed the attacker to bypass safeguards. This enabled unauthorized swaps or balance manipulations across interconnected pools, draining assets in rapid succession (within minutes). 3. The exploiter initiated a series of transactions starting with a key Ethereum mainnet tx (0xd155207261712c35fa3d472ed1e51bfcd816e616dd4f517fa5959836f5b48569), which funneled assets to a new wallet under their control. Funds were then consolidated, likely for laundering via mixers or bridges. 4. Balancer's composable design where pools interact heavily amplified the flaw. Similar issues have plagued AMMs before, often tied to how they handle deflationary tokens or pool rebalancing. Full forensic details are still emerging, with auditors like PeckShield and Nansen involved. No evidence of a private key compromise; this was a pure smart contract exploit. Here's roughly the stolen assets: >Ethereum: ~$70M+ drained (main hit) >Base & Sonic: ~$7M combined >Other chains: ~$2M+ >Main stolen assets: WETH, wstETH, osETH, frxETH, rsETH, rETH — roughly $110–116M total. Here's what you should do If you're exposed: 1/ Withdraw Immediately: Pull funds from Balancer V2 pools if possibleavoid affected ones. 2/ Revoke Approvals: Use Revoke, DeBank, or Etherscan to cancel smart contract permissions for Balancer addresses. 3/ Monitor Wallets: Track via Etherscan or Dune Analytics for suspicious activity. 4/Stay Informed: Follow lookonchain, PeckShieldAlert, and Balancer for updates.
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We’re aware of a potential exploit impacting Balancer v2 pools. Our engineering and security teams are investigating with high priority. We’ll share verified updates and next steps as soon as we have more information.
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What’s most interesting is wallet addresses listed in the US government $14B (127K BTC) seizure previously were named in a Milky Sad report ~2 years ago for having vulnerable private keys and now the USG says they have custody of them.
[ ZOOMER ] U.S. SEEKS FORFEITURE OF 127,271 BTC ($12B) TIED TO TRANSNATIONAL PIG BUTCHERING SCAM RUN BY CHINESE NATIONAL CHEN ZHI
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